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ABSTRACT 
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Dynamic Response Recovery Tool for Emergency Response in State 
Highway Organisations in New Zealand 
by Frederico Ferreira 
This thesis reports the research efforts conducted in order to develop the Dynamic Response 
Recovery Tool. The DRRT was developed as a decision support tool under a holistic approach 
considering both emergency management research and transportation studies. The proposed system 
was assessed by a series of case studies in order to identify its efficiency and suitability for roading 
organisations.  
Knowledge developed from two novel research approaches are comprehensively described 
throughout the thesis. Initially, we report on the observation of three emergency exercises and two 
real events in New Zealand. This set of activities indicated the complex and dynamic environment 
in which emergency management takes place as well as organisational settings and management 
structures implemented to better respond and recover from disasters events. Additionally, a 
secondary approach was designed to overcome limitations identified in the observation method. In 
this context, a game-based scenario simulation was developed and conducted with twelve 
participants. With a focus in resource deployment decisions during emergencies, the game 
simulated an earthquake scenario in which participants had to allocate physical resources to fix 
damage created in a road network. Simulations indicated that Naturalistic Decision-making 
processes were used to respond to the scenario. Thus, resource allocation followed planning 
priorities defined previously the simulation, which further considered individual experiences and 
knowledge. 
Taking advantage from the findings achieved and knowledge developed by the observations and 
game simulations, the DRRT was designed using the conceptual background identified in the 
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literature review. The DRRT was conceptualised as a logistics sub-system as part of the broad field 
of Disaster Management. In particular, the DRRT was geared towards supporting decision-making 
by providing procedural recommendations and identifying optimum physical deployment 
strategies. In order to assess the proposed system, an Information Technology application was built 
according to the DRRT’s specifications.  
A series of eleven individual and three group simulations was performed in order to assess the 
DRRT. Data collected through the application indicated that the DRRT enhanced decision-making 
during extreme events. In specific, case study participants using the system at greater levels 
achieved better decision-making accuracy than those disregarding completely or partially the 
system. Case studies also indicated that emergency management knowledge was represented by the 
application and its logistics model provided participants with vital information to optimise resource 
allocation.  
Keywords: Disaster Management, Emergency Response, Transportation, Roading Organisations, 
Information Technology, Decision Support System and Expert System. 
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RESUMO 
Resumo de tese submetida como requerimento 
parcial para a obtenção do título de Doutor 
 
Sistema Dinâmico para Resposta a Situações de Emergência em 
Organizações Rodoviárias na Nova Zelândia 
por Frederico Ferreira 
Essa tese apresenta as atividades de pesquisa conduzidas para a proposta e desenvolvimento de um 
sistema dinâmico para resposta em situações de emergências. Nomeado DRRT (Dynamic Response 
Recovery Tool), o sistema foi desenvolvido segundo premissas básicas de ferramentas de apoio à 
decisão e uma análise holística das teorias de gerênciamento de emergências e estudos em 
transportes. Uma série de estudos de caso foi finalmente conduzida de forma a se identificar 
efficiência e limitações do sistema proposto.   
Uma vasta gama de experiências e conhecimento gerado através de dois metódos de pesquisa 
inovativos são descritos no decorrer da tese. Inicialmente, a observação de três simulações de 
emergências e dois eventos ocorridos na Nova Zelândia são apresentados. Tais atividades 
subsidiaram análises do complexo e dinâmico ambiente no qual o gerênciamento de emergências 
ocorre bem como sistemas organizacionais implementados para subsidiar a tomada de decisão. 
Complementarmente, a simulação de emergências usando-se de conceitos de jogos foi proposta de 
forma a superar limitações de pesquisa e coleta de dados identificadas no decorrer das atividades de 
observação. Focando-se em atividades de alocação de recursos durante a resposta em emergências, 
o método foi conduzido com 12 participantes. Tais experiências subsidiaram a coleta de dados e a 
identificação de processos naturalísticos de tomada de decisão. Nesse sentido, concluiu-se que a 
alocação de recursos segue prioridades previamente definidas pelo decisor, as quais são 
influenciadas por conhecimento e experiências pessoais.     
Utilizando-se do conhecimento gerado através dos métods de pesquisa descritos no parágrafo 
anterior, o DRRT foi conceptualizado como um sub-sistema logístico contido no amplo campo de 
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conhecimento da gerência de desastres. Em específico, o DRRT objetiva o apoio à decisão através 
do fomento de recomendações no âmbito de processos e identificação de estratégias ótimas de 
alocação de recursos físicos na rede de transportes. 
Uma série de onze estudo de casos e três simulações em grupo foi conduzida para a avaliação da 
eficácia do sistema proposto. Conclui-se então que o DRRT contribui para o aumento da 
performance de processos de decisão em situações de emergências. Em específico, participantes 
que utilizaram o sistema de forma mais consistente obtiveram melhores performances quando 
comparados com participantes que não utilizaram o sistema em sua total capacidade. Dados 
coletados também indicaram que o modelo de alocação de recursos proposto no sistema fomentou 
identificação de estratégias ótimas para o reparo da rede de transportes em função dos danos 
sofridos e disponibilidade de recursos.   
Palavras-chave: Gerênciamento de Desastres, Resposta à Emergências, Transportes, Organizações 
Rodoviárias, Tecnologia da Informação, Sistemas de Apoio à Decisão. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
This research investigated the decision-making process during emergency events at New Zealand 
State Highway Organisations (SHO1). These organisations face conflicting priorities and resource 
limitations during emergency response and recovery activities. Throughout this research, these 
issues were examined, in order to develop an understanding of their genesis. This understanding 
then enabled us to propose a new conceptual tool that may help SHO in responding to and 
recovering from emergency events.  
Recent disasters around the world and in New Zealand (NZ) have highlighted the limitations of the 
concepts and tools currently available to facilitate emergency management. On one hand, products 
that are developed based purely on the information gained from practical experiences (e.g. response 
manuals) sometimes do not allow the understanding of the complex nature of emergencies so it can 
jeopardise quick and effective decision-making. On the other hand, academic/technical endeavours 
and information technology systems and tools usually require too much data and too many 
resources to be effectively and consistently applied during real events. 
These issues have helped to identify a gap between science and practice. In order to shrink this gap, 
decision support concepts from Decision Support Systems (DSS) and Expert Systems (ES) were 
employed (along with the expertise gained from practical experiences in simulated emergency 
exercises and games) to design and implement a conceptual system known as the Dynamic 
Response Recovery Tool (DRRT). Finally, a series of case studies with New Zealand’s 
organisations were conducted in order to assess the DRRT’s efficiency and suitability for SHO.  
The first section of this chapter contains a brief overview of Emergency Management Research. 
The subsequent sections are dedicated to the research motivation, the scientific problem/thesis 
objectives definition and the research method explanation. The last two sections discuss the 
                                                     
1 SHO comprise New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) and its regional contractors and consultants. 
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challenges and areas of contribution that could be made based on this research, as well as a 
description of the thesis structure.   
1.1 The History of Disasters and Emergency Management Research 
Some affirm that disasters occurred in human history since its origin. For instance, the floodings 
events associated with the biblical story of Noah’s Ark is claimed by many as been accurately 
and reliably described in the Bible. Despite arguments and myths, disasters were first recorded 
in human history according to currently scientific standards in 430 B.C., when Athens (Greece) 
experienced the catastrophic effects of a typhus epidemic. While the information available is at 
times both controversial and imprecise, disasters (either natural or man-made) have been cyclically 
harming societies throughout recorded history. Scaruffi (2008) reports a very extensive list of the 
worst disasters experienced by humanity. This list comprises more than 200 events, extending from 
430 B.C. to 2008, and includes disasters such as famines (Japan, 1181), volcanic eruptions (Italy, 
1631), yellow fever (Cuba, 1648), plagues (Russia, 1654), cholera (Russia, 1830), cyclones (India, 
1864), smallpox (France and Germany, 1870), typhoons (China, 1881), influenza pandemics 
(worldwide, 1957), river floods (Vietnam, 1971), sea floods (Bangladesh, 1970), heat waves (USA, 
1995), earthquakes (Japan, 1995), meningitis (West Africa, 1996), tsunamis (Asia, 2004) and 
hurricanes (USA, 2005). 
Modern society acknowledges that many disasters are both hard to manage and very difficult to 
predict (e.g. earthquakes and tsunamis). Nevertheless, when they can be and are better managed, 
the associated consequences are reduced. Earthquakes and floods cannot be stopped, but people 
employed across many fields (e.g. engineering, management, policy making and community 
support) can act in decisive ways that ultimately reduce a disaster’s potential social and economic 
impact. 
According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCRCS) 
(2002), disasters accounted for 535,000 deaths and US$684 billion in losses from direct damage to 
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infrastructures and crops in the decade preceding 2001 alone. Jain and McLean (2003) conclude 
that disaster responses are characterised by a series of interdependent events that struggle to coexist 
amidst conflicting priorities, random resource needs (human and physical) and uncertain 
information. These findings have prompted both public and private organisations to seek a better 
understanding of the issues involved. Public organisations tend to focus their efforts at the 
community level, in developing awareness, preparedness, risk reduction programmes, response 
planning and trying to guarantee peoples’ well-being during disasters. Private organisations, 
however, aim at providing services according to community expectations – they ensure their 
respective businesses’ continuity and make the protection of property and staff a priority during 
emergency events.  
Recently, emergency management practices and the related research have together played a 
significant role in reducing the social and economic impacts associated with disasters. Applications 
range from operational responses to strategic recovery planning, and involve a variety of 
organisations. For instance, a well structured emergency management plan includes logistics 
operations (to effectively deploy resources), public information (to keep the affected public 
updated), information sharing procedures (to avoid data loss), and strategic reconstruction planning 
(to ensure long-term recovery). Emergency management is a well structured field that includes 
worldwide and locally-based organisations, as well as professionals with recognised credentials 
that can act effectively in a wide variety of situations.  
Nevertheless, recent emergency events still show that current emergency management techniques 
need to evolve further in order to be able to consistently deal with the complex problems that are 
created by the interface between disasters and the copious amounts of interdependent physical 
infrastructures that exist. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2004 Sumatran earthquake and tsunami 
both offer many insights into limited response and recovery. They ultimately highlight the need to 
develop and improve the currently accepted emergency management principles and techniques. 
Cooperation between academia and industry has been fundamental in developing a creative 
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environment that can act as fertile soil for new concepts and the design of up-to-date and user 
friendly tools for emergency management. In this environment, policies can be created to set up 
arrangements for pre/post disaster situations; decision-making models are used to understand how 
response actions are planned and implemented; information technologies can be tested during 
emergency simulations, and so on. We have identified a research opportunity within this context, 
and this is detailed in the next section.   
1.2 Research Motivation 
Natural and man-made disasters are always associated with a series of negative consequences. As 
presented by IFRCRCS (2002), they primarily cause deaths, chaos and political/economic 
disruptions. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 accounted for economic losses of approximately US$96 
billion (The White House, 2006), while the 2004 Sumatran earthquake and tsunami caused nearly 
250,000 deaths (Earth and Space Sciences, 2008) and the September 11 attacks in the United States 
of America considerably changed international policies on immigration, diplomacy and terrorism 
threat management. 
The backdrop of these recent historical events highlights the need to consistently address a subject 
that has been progressively labelled by academia, industry and public organisations as “Emergency 
Management”. Emergency Management (EM) is structured in such a way that the risks involved 
are understood and responses are planned and implemented so that the ultimate impact associated 
with a disaster is reduced. However, recent events have revealed the limitations of many of the 
Emergency Management models currently used. One of these limitations is in the area of decision-
making (DM). Many studies and products specifically designed for emergency management lack a 
thorough understanding of DM. Systems that incorporate evacuation models and shortest path 
algorithms (see examples from Cherrie and Dickson, 2006; Fu et al., 2006; Liu, 1997; Liu et al., 
2006a; Liu et al., 2006b; Takeuchi and Kondo, 2003) are all limited in their own individual ways in 
real situations. Additionally, McManus (2008) highlights that time shortages and the immediate 
consequences of a vast range of decisions make it imperative to quickly and effectively respond to 
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events in order to reduce disruptions. Data unavailability, inconsistent information, pressure/stress, 
inoperative systems, and power shortages all end up limiting many of these studies, as they do not 
offer alternative approaches.  
A scientifically structured approach that focuses on end users and decision-making concepts is one 
way to develop novel concepts, knowledge and tools for emergency management. Engaging with 
end-users during the development stages is considered vital so as to understand the practical needs 
and reasoning applied during an emergency response. The scientific method should provide an 
additional way to meet specific needs according to the existing models, techniques and 
technologies. Therefore, a combined academic/practical approach can help foment knowledge 
development and tool designs that will fulfil the specific needs of the end-users, making sure to 
take into consideration the complex and dynamic nature of emergency events. 
Additionally, the literature indicates that roading networks are extremely important during 
emergencies, but also that there is a lack of studies based around this particular cluster of 
organisations (which is pertinent to this research). The Auckland Engineering Lifelines (AELG, 
2005) states that many organisations depend on road transport to conduct their aid activities during 
response and recovery. However, few authors have studied decision-making specifically according 
to end-users’ needs and the complex issues the roading sector faces during emergencies. Therefore, 
the techniques, models and tools used to understand the roading sector have had limited 
performance levels.  
Finally, New Zealand’s SHO were chosen as the specific case study for this research, because 
several disasters (e.g. Canterbury Snowstorm – 2006, Matata/Tauranga flooding – 2005, Manawatu 
Floods – 2004, Bay of Plenty Earthquake – 1987) have impacted the country in recent years and 
have badly affected the roading system. These events have ultimately generated large economic 
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losses due to the limited road accessibility and lack of alternative transportation choices2. Finally, 
roading organisations as a group have also been a subject under investigation by the Resilient 
Organisations Research Programme (ResOrgs, 2008) since 2004.  
1.3 Scientific Problem and Thesis Objectives 
Some emergency events allow for a warning system, while others do not. Earthquakes can happen 
at any time for instance, while hurricanes and volcanic eruptions can be predicted in advance. 
Either way, responding organisations start to collect information as soon as the event happens or is 
forecasted. Organisations also begin to assess how reliable and complete their collected 
information is, in order to strategise their response. Specific circumstances and internal information 
(e.g. resources available, formal obligations, previous arrangements) are used to plan the response 
actions. This is a typical decision-making process, which involves a complex combination of 
knowledge, priorities, previous experiences, and resource availability. Following this cognitive and 
practical exercise, actions are taken and the outcomes of these are further observed/assessed so that 
response strategies can be changed accordingly. 
This dynamic is the one experienced by SHO in New Zealand. The New Zealand Transport Agency 
(NZTA), together with its consultants and contractors, have to respond to a number of emergencies 
every year in order to provide an integrated, safe, responsive, and sustainable land transport system 
(Transit NZ, 2007a). In this context, we address the following scientific problem in this thesis: 
How to study New Zealand’s State Highway Organisations’ decision-making during 
emergency events subject to changing conditions, multiple actors and various levels of 
information reliability and availability? 
From the scientific problem stated above, we defined the main objective for this research as the 
conceptualisation of the DRRT for New Zealand SHO. The DRRT aims supporting decision-
                                                     
2 For specific details on recent New Zealand’s disasters please refer to GNS Science & NIWA (2006), 
Newlands (2006), Dantas et al. (2005) and Flood Recovery (2007) 
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making, which can potentially mitigate the impacts of disasters by minimising response times and 
facilitating the planning and deployment of physical and human resources to conduct repairs. It is 
argued that well informed, integrated and timely decisions “can save lives, reduce damage and 
disruption, and enable faster recovery” (GNS Science and NIWA, 2006). Finally, an application of 
the DRRT’s concepts was implemented and assessed in a case study conducted with NZTA and its 
associates.  
In order to tackle the scientific problem stated above and achieve the main objective stipulated, we 
divided the focus of this research into six specific objectives: 
1. To identify the theories, techniques and knowledge needed to conceptualise the DRRT; 
2. To create a data collection framework to be applied within SHO’s decision-making 
process during emergency events, exercises and simulations; 
3. To analyse collected data in order to identify the key factors affecting SHO’s decision-
making processes; 
4. To develop a decision-making model for SHO; 
5. To develop a DRRT application to run case studies; and 
6. To assess the efficiency and suitability of the DRRT through a series of case studies. 
1.4 Research Method 
The research method was designed focusing at a comprehensive study of decision-making during 
extreme events, so that the DRRT highly regarded proposed, designed and assessed. The 
conceptualisation of the DRRT focused on the specific end users’ needs and the decision-making 
concepts identified according to an extensive set of experiences acquired during the research. A 
final set of case studies was used to assess DRRT’s efficiency and suitability in the context of 
SHO’s emergency management systems. Figure 1-1 illustrates the proposed research method, 
which is described as follows. 
 8 
 
Figure 1-1: Research Method. 
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The initial literature review for this research comprehensively covered three major topics: 
Emergency Management, Decision-making Theories, and Decision Support Tools. These 
supporting theories, along with a number of practical experiences, were originally thought to be 
sufficient for the development of the DRRT conceptual package.  
A series of emergency exercises and real events observations were conducted since 2007. They 
allowed us to collect and analyse data towards the understanding of organisational emergency 
management. Thus, a complete analysis process was proposed and it supported the identification of 
general knowledge regarding organisational decision-making during disasters. Nonetheless, it was 
found that data gleaned through the observation of emergency exercises and real events and 
findings from the analysis method had limited applicability to the DRRT development. In this 
context, the synergy between the supporting theories (i.e. Emergency Management, Decision-
making Theory and Decision Support Tools) and the data collected was not possible when only 
using traditional observational techniques (e.g. naturalistic observation) of real and simulated 
emergency events.  
Therefore, a complementary research approach was planned in order to cope with the possible 
limitations created by solely observing exercises and real events. A secondary literature review in 
gaming techniques was conducted, and this indicated that it was possible to collect additional data 
within controlled environments and experiments. A game-based scenario simulation was then 
developed in order to support specific data collection in regards to decision-making about physical 
resource deployment. An earthquake scenario simulation was designed in a hypothetical city, 
aimed at emulating an emergency environment – complete with the common dilemmas faced in 
real events such as resource limitations, time pressures and conflicting priorities. 
In this backdrop, a comprehensive set of data was collected through the observation of real 
events/emergency exercises and game simulations. The analysis of this data set, along with the 
findings from the scientific literature, contributed to our understanding of roading organisations’ 
decision-making in the context of extreme events. Hence, data and knowledge from the activities 
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described previously were used to conceptually design and implement a DRRT application (i.e. 
partially operational system). The conceptual package included a specification of the knowledge 
base, an inference engine, a graphical user interface and the semi-operational system to run case 
studies. The application presented an emergency scenario environment that allowed the user to 
operate various system’s functions in order to experience how the DRRT could be operated during 
real events.   
Case studies were conducted using the DRRT application to support the assessment of its 
efficiency and suitability. The case studies were analysed by measuring the effort (time) involved 
in and accuracy (quality) of decision-making. It helped us to understand how the system facilitated 
decision-making for different individuals, as well as to draw general conclusions and discuss the 
limitations and opportunities for decision support during emergency events. A specific analysis of 
the DRRT in the context of resource deployment was also conducted in order to identify its 
contributions and limitations for transport organisations such as New Zealand SHO.   
1.5 Challenges and Original Contributions 
Researching a complex topic like extreme events decision-making poses a series of challenges. 
Initially, scientific gaps were identified in order to clearly define research objectives and methods. 
For this research, in addition to the definition of research objectives and methods, we needed to 
specify data collection and analyses procedures as well as scenario implementation routines and 
case study set-up, which contributed to increase the challenges to be dealt with.  
In this particular study we aimed at understanding the existing opportunities for decision support 
systems and expert systems in the context of emergency management. Practical needs observed 
during emergency situations (e.g. simulated exercises or real events) were considered when 
designing and developing the DRRT. Thus, we considered possible shortcomings of the conceptual 
interface between emergency management and decision-making support in our adoption of an 
appropriate research method. The DRRT development included defining data collection procedures 
and data analysis methods (to understand decision-making) in order to consistently support 
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decision-making during emergency events. Scientific concepts from the literature as well as 
practical needs from the industry were essential in conducting the research and developing the 
DRRT.   
The original contributions of this research relate to new methods and practices that can be applied 
in order to develop decision support tools for emergency management through a comprehensive 
understanding of extreme events decision-making. Observational methods, gaming simulations, 
decision-making theories, emergency management processes and information technologies all help 
to lay a robust research framework. Nonetheless, the design of the research framework and its 
application were still challenging due to the need to consider conceptual interfaces between 
emergency management and transportation, which have never been explored before. 
Finally, this original method explores emergency decision-making using a combined engineering 
and cognitive framework, which ultimately attempted to fill the gaps in current practices. A deep 
cognitive decision-making understanding was achieved by observing organisations and staff during 
real and simulated emergencies. A complimentary game simulation supported better 
comprehension of physical deployment activities performed to respond to emergencies. Ultimately, 
information technologies, engineering optimisation models and experiences acquired over the 
observations and game simulation, were holistically combined in order to propose the DRRT. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This PhD thesis is divided into seven chapters in order to clearly describe all the activities 
undertaken during the research. After this introductory chapter, we present the complete literature 
review. The second chapter is dedicated to discussing concepts such as Emergency Management, 
the Decision-making Theory and Decision Support Systems/Expert Systems. Along with a 
technically-oriented review, we also discuss the opportunities to apply current techniques and 
Information Technologies in real emergency management situations. 
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The third chapter describes the research method applied to observe emergency exercises and real 
events in New Zealand. A deep understanding on organisational emergency management is 
achieved after taking part on the observation of four exercises and three real events since 2005.  
Building upon findings from chapter 3, a game-based scenario simulation is proposed in the fourth 
chapter. This novel approach complement the data acquired in the third chapter as well as broadens 
knowledge on specific physical resource deployment activities. Both observations and game 
simulations target the identification of decision-making patterns and processes during extreme 
events. The comprehensive knowledge developed throughout chapters 3 and 4 is finally used to 
propose and describe the DRRT system. 
The fifth chapter presents the development of the DRRT System. It initially describes the 
conceptual system along with information technology requirements and operational procedures. 
Both DRRT processes and logistics conceptualisation are discussed, using concepts identified in 
the literature review and decision-making knowledge gathered in the third chapter.  
A series of case studies are introduced and analysed in the sixth chapter. It aimed at assessing the 
proposed DRRT system in order to identify its strengths and weaknesses in the context of New 
Zealand SHO. Hence, participants are presented with an emergency scenario and then their 
decision making accuracy (quality) and effort (time) are assessed. Complementarily, an analysis of 
logistics modelling routines proposed is performed in order to identify opportunities to support 
decision-making for resource allocation in transport networks. Findings from these experiences are 
considered, so that limitations in the current proposed system can be addressed in future research. 
Finally, the last chapter summarizes the research and all the steps taken to reach its final outcomes: 
i) Comprehensive extreme events decision-making knowledge and ii) DRRT System proposal and 
assessment. A critical research analysis is conducted and both successes and limitations are 
reported so that future research recommendations can help to propose better system configurations 
and further evolve the collective understanding of decision-making during extreme events.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The intrinsic complexity of emergency events (e.g. conflicting priorities, resources limitations, 
community expectations, interdependent physical systems) requires the consideration of both 
practical and theoretical elements influencing decision-making during response and recovery 
activities. Thus, various disciplines and practical instances need to be considered in order to 
comprehensively understand decision-making under stress. In this context, this chapter presents the 
reader with a complete literature review on Emergency Management, Decision-making Theory and 
Decision Support Systems/Expert Systems. The review focuses on the identification and discussion 
of practical needs from the emergency management field and technical opportunities from the 
scientific literature in the context of decision-making and decision-making support. The chapter 
ultimately builds the basic knowledge necessary to achieve the main objective of this thesis, which 
is the development of the Dynamic Response Recovery Tool for roading organisations.  
2.1 Emergency Management 
Emergency Management (EM) has become a broad discipline dealing with risk management (i.e. 
mitigation and preparedness), response and recovery. Emergency Management Australia (EMA, 
2009a) defines EM as “a range of measures to manage risks to communities and the environment”. 
In spite to different approaches, EM usually aims at either avoiding a disaster (when it is possible) 
or reducing its impacts on communities and economies. Some EM frameworks have been identified 
as follows:  
 Canada: effective since January 2005, the framework comprises Prevention and Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery (PSC, 2009); 
 Australia: the national government refers to Emergency Risk Management, Disaster 
Mitigation and Consequence Management (EMA, 2009b); 
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 United States of America: the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has a 
very comprehensive set of documentation for both public and businesses. Overall, it ranges 
from previous planning (Plan Ahead) to response and recovery (Recover and Rebuild); and 
 New Zealand: the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Planning adopted the 4 
Rs approach comprising Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery (MCDEM, 2009). 
Emergency Management aims at disaster management and loss reduction by holistically 
considering relations between organisations and communities. The complexity of such emergency 
management activity has been illustrated in recent disasters such as the 1994 Northridge 
Earthquake, the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami, 2005’s 
Hurricane Katrina and the 2010 Haitian Earthquake. These events highlight the vast range of 
situations to be considered when managing disasters as well as limitations on current practices and 
processes.  
Practical experiences have led researchers and practitioners into broad theoretical/practical scopes 
of emergency management. Several studies have been undertaken in the context of engineering, 
geology, psychology, policy making, resilience and many other disciplines. Outcomes from 
different fields have helped to frame EM under specific management structures aiming at co-
ordinated response. Figure 2-1 illustrates a common management structure involving many 
organisations as well as basic activities to be performed while responding an emergency (e.g. 
logistics, operation, planning intelligence).  
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Figure 2-1: Multi-incident and Co-ordination Structure. 
Source: Adapted from MCDEM (2009) 
In spite to specific approaches, a co-ordinated management of an emergency can be achieved 
through clear information sharing procedures and response prioritisation. Although additional 
activities also need to be properly performed, information sharing among involved organisations 
along with specific event’s needs and priorities play a key role for consistent emergency 
management.  
Unfailing information flows and proper prioritisation take place when organisations and 
communities are well aware of the procedural platform to be implemented to respond an event as 
well as have available vital information to make decisions. As shown in Figure 2-1, links from the 
Central Government (National Controller) to Local Communities are established through Planning 
and Intelligence, Logistics and Operations commands. Hence, operational issues and national 
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strategies can be holistically considered along with resources availability, international aid and 
local contingencies achieving great integration. 
2.1.1 Emergency Management Concepts 
A series of concepts is presented in this sub-section in order to explore different facets from 
Emergency Management. We start by defining emergency events and the four emergency 
management components, i.e. mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery/reconstruction. In 
closing, a discussion on integrated information sharing and logistics is presented.  
2.1.1.1 Emergency Events 
In order to define emergency events, we have to initially comprehend the meaning of hazard. 
Hazards are potential physical instances, phenomenon or human activity that can harm a 
community and create damage to its infrastructure (PSC, 2009). The Cambridge Dictionary also 
associates hazards with danger (an instance likely to cause damage) and risks (probabilities of 
events to produce harm or create damage) (Cambridge, 2008). 
Disasters or extreme events are the result of the combination of hazards and vulnerabilities, which 
overwhelm community’s ability to cope with the situation; therefore, incurs in loss of life and/or 
damage to infrastructures. The situation can be motivated by the geophysical or biological 
environment (natural disaster) or by human action or error (man-made disaster) (PSC, 2009). 
Stewart and Bomstrom (2002) summarize this conceptual topic by referring to extreme events as 
uncertain outcomes from either natural or man-made hazards, which creates potential damage and 
broad consequences to communities. 
Finally, an emergency event represents a present or imminent disaster or extreme event, which 
prompts co-ordinated actions among people and organisations in order to protect life and/or 
property or reduce death and/or damage. Emergency events necessarily involve response and co-
ordination towards risk reduction (for imminent disasters) or impact reduction (for present 
disasters). 
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In New Zealand, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (New Zealand, 2002) 
classifies emergencies as any happening that causes or may cause loss of life, injury, illness, 
distress or endangers life or property that require significant co-ordination response under the Act.  
2.1.1.2 Mitigation 
Mitigation involves pre-event actions taken in order to comprehend and reduce risks associated 
with hazards. The understanding of potential hazards reduces community’s vulnerabilities and 
increases its ability to cope with disasters situations. PSC (2009) formally defines mitigation as 
“sustained actions taken to eliminate or reduce risks and impacts well before an emergency or 
disaster occurs”. 
Numerous frameworks and projects propose different paradigms for mitigation as it is 
acknowledged that future disasters cannot be exactly predicted. For instance, FEMA (2009) made 
available to the general public a standardised methodology and software (HAZUS-MH) containing 
models to estimate loses due to a number of events (e.g. earthquakes, flooding, hurricane). 
Additionally, the New Zealand approach presented in the National CDEM Planning (MCDEM, 
2009) accounts for multi-agency mitigation supported by policies (CDEM Act 2002, National 
CDEM Strategy, National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group Plans) and the AS/NZS 4360 Risk 
Management Standard (2004) 
In summary, mitigation can be defined as a group of actions taken before an extreme event in order 
to comprehend the relationships between communities (people and systems) and the surrounding 
physical environment. Such an approach has been already proven successful for disaster’s 
prevention and reduction.  
2.1.1.3 Preparedness 
The second EM component focuses on readiness or planning. The Cambridge Dictionary 
(Cambridge, 2008) defines the adjective ready as being prepared and suitable for immediate 
activity. According to basic premises from emergency preparedness, organisations and people 
should exercise and plan in advance so they can be ready for immediate response. 
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A common framework used for preparedness refers to previous planning, mutual assistance 
agreements (aka memorandum of understanding), resource inventories, equipment and formal 
training (PSC, 2009). It ultimately consists of developing operational systems and capabilities 
before a disaster strikes (MCDEM, 2009) so effective response can take place. A practical three 
objective programme is proposed by the IFRCRCS (2002) comprising the following:  
 To increase efficiency, effectiveness and impact of emergency response by developing 
regular training, system’s testing and establishing clear policies;  
 To strength community preparedness by supporting local population through National 
Programmes; and 
 To develop activities addressing everyday risks faced by communities. 
2.1.1.4 Response 
The comprehension of risks (mitigation) along with response planning (preparedness) supports 
people and organisations to quickly and effectively respond to extreme events. Knowledge from the 
two previous emergency management components facilitates in defining the most appropriate 
response actions. It usually aims at reducing potential impacts associated with the occurrence of an 
extreme event according to specific situations, conflicting priorities and resources limitations.  
Response is defined as co-ordinated actions taken immediately before, during or shortly after a 
disaster occurs. They refer to short term activities aiming at managing the situation through public 
communication, search and rescue activities, medical assistance, evacuation, well being/hosting 
and etc (PSC, 2009). Response activities are usually supported by systems (e.g. Co-ordinated 
Incident Management System – CIMS; Incident Control System – ICS), policies or response 
manuals, which ultimately targets reducing people’s suffering and economic impacts.  
Tools such as the ones cited above aim at operational co-ordination among public organisations 
(e.g. Fire, Ambulance, Councils) and private services (e.g. Power, Water, Telecommunications). 
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Thus, response and restoration times can be reduced as well as resources used at optimum levels. A 
good example of such an approach is the New Zealand’s Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management CIMS (Devereux-Blum, 2010). It is a variation from NIMS – National Incident 
Management Systems (FEMA, 2010) and it is based on four core elements (known as control, 
planning and intelligence, operations and logistics). Been a multi-agency approach it aims at co-
ordinated and effective response and recovery among involved organisations and general public. 
The previous understanding of risks and impacts (planning) helps in projecting future situations on 
real-time basis (intelligence) to effectively deploy/manage resources (operations and logistics). 
Finally, these activities are performed under strict levels of co-ordination (or control) involving a 
number of information sharing procedures among response organisations so conflicting priorities 
and resources limitations can be properly taken into consideration before resources can be 
deployed. 
2.1.1.5 Recovery and Reconstruction 
Also known as post-disaster response, recovery targets the reparation and restoration of 
communities and systems up to acceptable levels of operationability after a disaster occurrence. 
The MCDEM (2005) formally defines recovery as the “immediate, medium and long term holistic 
regeneration of a community following a disaster”. Sullivan (2003) explores more this concept by 
describing recovery as activities undertaken immediately after the initial response, which bring 
self-sustainability to affected communities so external support frameworks and resources are no 
longer needed.  
Moreover, reconstruction is classified as the recovery process at medium and long terms with focus 
on specific analysis of impacts and full restoration of a community and its environment (Brunsdon 
and Smith, 2004). Specific studies (Bhesram, 2007; Rotimi et al., 2006) frame reconstruction into a 
five stage process: i) Impact Assessment; ii) Restoration Proposal; iii) Funding Arrangement; iv) 
Regulatory Process and v) Physical construction/reconstruction. 
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From the conceptual definitions of Response and Recovery, it is clear that there is an overlap 
between these two concepts. This is due to emergency management’s components being fully 
integrated as a consequence of their dynamic nature. Been dynamic implies the need to consider 
EM as a cyclical interconnected process in which processes are shifted according to specific 
circumstances faced and needs (see Figure 2-2).  
 
Figure 2-2: EM Components according to New Zealand’s CDEM Planning. 
Source: MCDEM (2009) 
The interdependency of EM components creates the need for integrated Emergency Management 
platforms. This goal can be achieved by applying frameworks as the one illustrated in Figure 2-1, 
in which numerous organisations and communities are involved at different EM levels. In this 
backdrop, Emergency Management shall be holistically considered due to a vast range of activities 
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to be performed such as preparation, training, response and recovery. Integration is finally 
accomplished using prominent information sharing procedures either at planning stages for 
developing accountability amongst involved parties or at response to improve decision-making and 
improvisation. This whole platform is geared towards proper resource deployment and 
management of conflicting priorities. 
2.1.2 Emergency Management in the Context of Transportation 
Emergency events present organisations with complex situations with risk to life, health, property 
and environment that require immediate response (Vedder, 1990; Fink, 1986; Berroggi and 
Wallace, 1995). Fredholm (1999) adds that quick response under changing conditions and unstable 
environments impose great challenges due to non-business as usual circumstances.  
Particularly for transport networks, emergency management is of great interest. Recent worldwide 
events have demonstrated that the functionality of road transport networks to respond to disasters is 
vital in saving lives, reducing costs and enhancing the resilience of communities to recover from 
crises events. The New Zealand’s Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM, 2002) 
emphasises that transport networks, among other key lifeline utilities (e.g. telecommunications, 
sewage, water, gas, power, fuel), need to be able to function to the fullest possible extent during 
and after an emergency event. 
Transportation researchers have tackled different topics such as shortest path selection (Cherrie and 
Dickson, 2006; Fu et al., 2006; Liu, 1997; Liu et al., 2006a; Liu et al., 2006b; Takeuchi and 
Kondo, 2003), network reliability (Nicholson, 2007), risk assessment (Asakura, 2004; Dalziell and 
McManus, 2004), evacuation modelling (Fu et al., 2007; Moriarty et al., 2007) and Geographic 
Information Systems (ESRI, 1999). 
This range of studies has developed very consistent knowledge on how emergencies can be better 
managed throughout mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. For instance, information 
need is defined in lifeline studies (Dantas et al., 2007), data analysis methodologies scrutinized by 
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logical and mathematical models and data gathering and representation performed by spatial 
information systems such as GIS.   
These advances have ultimately paved the way towards integrated applications. Kepaptsoglou et al. 
(2007) report a very interesting application including web communication and decision support to 
manage bridged networks. Mendonça and Wallace (2007), Mendonça et al. (2001) and Mendonça 
et al. (2006) have used Decision-making Theory to study emergency management decision support 
and improvisation. However, these numerous findings are yet to be considered by the transport 
community. 
The inclusion of decision-making paradigms along with identified opportunities from modelling 
(e.g. evacuation, short paths, network reliability, risk assessment) and information technologies 
(e.g. GIS, Decision Support Systems/Expert Systems, Web communication) have drawn a new 
research prospect, which is under investigation in this thesis. This trend is further explored in the 
next section by presenting and discussing Decision-making theory concepts in the context of 
emergency events.  
2.2 Decision-making Theory 
The American Heritage Dictionary (2000) defines “decision” as the act of passing judgment on an 
issue under consideration, reaching a conclusion and pronouncing a verdict. The Cambridge 
Dictionary (2008) refers to the verb “decide” as the act of “choosing something after thinking 
carefully about several options” and the noun “decision” as the “ability to decide quickly and 
without pausing because of uncertainty” (Cambridge, 2008). Chiang-Hanisko (2002) finally defines 
“decision-making as a method of choosing among potential possibilities, including possible 
actions, beliefs and personal goals”. 
Numerous studies can be found in the context of decision-making in different fields (e.g. 
Operational Research – Charnes et al., 1978; Business/Operations Research – Bell, 1982; Political 
Sciences – Tsebelis, 1995; Psychology/Cognitive Sciences – Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993). 
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The common factors considered are human components (e.g. knowledge, memory, cognitiveness, 
experience, expertise etc) used during the identification and assessment of decision-making 
choices. 
This section reviews decision-making concepts and models with special focus on emergency 
management. It is initially presented a quick overview on decision-making theories in order to 
discuss suitable models in the light of the emergency management. The section is closed with a 
discussion about expertise in the decision-making processes.   
2.2.1 Overview 
Research conducted indicated that decision-making does not have a single definition. Its definitions 
range from cyclical process in which assets (physical resources plus abilities and skills), utilities 
(estimated satisfaction value associated to each possible decision) and outcomes (possible 
consequences) are interactively considered (Levin and Brazil, 2008). The process aims at selecting 
actions to advance people’s welfare according to everything known and felt (Brown, 2005). 
For the specific aim of this research, we define decision-making as processes in which agents (e.g. 
individuals, organisations, governments) identify options and project outcomes according to their 
best knowledge and information as well as available time and resource limitations. It is reinforced 
that this definition cannot be taken as absolute as extreme events are characterised as having many 
involved agents. Some authors state that decision-making during extreme events is a complex and 
ill-structured problem (XE, 2002). 
Numerous studies have already been devoted in understanding extreme events decision-making 
(XE, 2002). Findings regard to the identification of linear and non-linear models, social and 
organisational factors, human behaviour (e.g. stress, emotion) etc. In this light, a range of decision-
making models are presented and specified in the literature (Stacey, 1996 apud Firestone, 2008a; 
Brown, 2005; Hastie and Dawes, 2001 apud Levin and Brazil, 2008; Levin and Brazil, 2008; 
Zsambok and Klein, 1997; Saaty, 1996; Sinha, 2005). They are products of different research 
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endeavours aiming at clarifying principles and procedures “between the agent’s goal state and the 
actual state of the world the agent is trying to manage” (Firestone, 2008a). The next sub-section 
narrows down decision-making studies into the emergency management discipline in order to 
specify the conceptual range to be dealt with. 
2.2.2 Decision Making Models in the Emergency Management Context 
Emergency management activities involve cognitiveness due to extreme events being 
fundamentally complex ill-structured phenomena (XE, 2002). Decision-making approaches in this 
context commonly tackle cognitiveness by considering knowledge, experience, logical reasoning, 
mathematical analyses etc. Additionally, urgency in decision-making during disasters emerges 
from so-called Golden Hour, Golden Ten Minutes (McDonald et al., 2006) and 72 Hours rules. 
These paradigms claim that lives can be likely saved if hospital care and first aid are provided to 
victims within a short time spans defined by event’s type and consequences.  
In the specific emergency management context, among a number of decision-making models found 
in the literature, we have identified two suitable techniques for the case of emergency management: 
i) Normative Decision Model and ii) Naturalistic Decision Model. These models come from 
general frameworks such as Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Cycle (Boyd, 1987) and 
Decision and Learning Cycles (DLC). Conceptual representations of cognitiveness associated with 
both frameworks provide the necessary flexibility to understand emergency management. 
On one side of the spectrum, the Normative decision model (or prescriptive model) aligns with the 
classical decision-making theory. In this model the decision maker presume a “rational” agent, 
fully informed, who examines a set of alternatives and weight attributes in order to make the “best 
choice”. On the other side of the spectrum, the Naturalistic Decision Model has recently emerged 
as a complementary model to the Normative Decision Model. It incorporates complex cognitive 
functions performed in demanding situations, e.g. time restriction, uncertainty, vague goals, high 
stakes, team and organisational constraints, changing conditions. 
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Recent research has shown that emergency events are characterized by dynamic conditions, in 
which conflicting priorities, multiple actors and different levels of information reliability and 
availability play major roles. Therefore, people do not conform to a normative decision model, 
being more likely to use simple heuristics and to display systematic biases in their decision process 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). For instance, research conducted in the military environment 
(Klein, 1989) found that the very language of decision models is difficult to translate into 
operational settings. Numerous decision makers interviewed rejected the notions that they were 
“making choices”, “considering alternatives” or “assessing probabilities”. Instead, they saw 
themselves as acting and reacting on the basis of prior experience, generating, monitoring, and 
modifying plans (i.e. improvising) to meet specific needs arising from different situations. In other 
words, experts use their experience to make rapid and effective decisions under time pressure and 
uncertainty. 
Complimentarily, the conventional methods prescribed by the normative decision-making (e.g. 
deductive logical thinking, analysis of probabilities, and statistical methods) were not perceived 
useful during emergencies due to limited power of intuition and mental stimulation (Kaemps et al., 
1993; Klein, 1998). Normative decision models are more likely to be applicable for well defined 
problems, in which there is plenty of time for options evaluation and limited pressure (Endsley and 
Jones, 1997). 
In this context, the following sub-section summarizes key fundamentals for the Naturalistic 
Decision Model due to its suitability for emergency management.  
2.2.2.1 Naturalistic Decision Model  
Dreyfus (1981) and Sweller (1988) cite that under pressure and uncertainty, decisions are made 
using a process of situation recognition and pattern matching to memory structures and prototypical 
situations. Human behaviour research conducted by the New Zealand Fire Department (NZFD, 
2009) highlights that under time pressure humans employ “situation satisfying processes”, which 
are more efficient than optimization procedures. This process conforms to the Naturalistic Decision 
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Model, in which pattern matching draw upon long term memory (Endsley, 1995b) and prototypical 
situations supports instantaneous situation classification under specific schemes (Endsley and 
Garland, 2000). 
In this light, three cognitive functions were defined in the context of Naturalistic decision-making 
models:  
 Situation awareness: the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space. The comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in 
the near future considering possible actions to be taken (Endsley 1988);  
 Sense-making: the interpretation of equivocal cues into meaningful narratives (Weick 
1995; Lamertz 2002). It is a social activity whereby, through multi-contextual 
conversations, sense is constructed, destructed and reconstructed in an on-going attempt to 
craft, understand and accept new conceptualizations prior to consistently act according to 
new interpretations (Kezar and Eckel, 2002); and 
 Planning: an integral part of the sense-making process dealing with the visualisation of 
alternative futures.  
Situation awareness shows to be of great interest in the context of emergency management. It 
represents ways that “people interpret sensory stimuli received by their environment” (NZFD, 
2009). This is the process in which decision-making agents use knowledge and information to 
comprehend current instances and project future intended states of the world. As Figure 2-3 
illustrates it is a cyclical process where sense making and planning are also performed before 
decisions are chosen and implemented. New instances unfold due to previous actions so the 
situation awareness shall be updated in order to support upcoming decision-making activities.  
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Figure 2-3: Situation Awareness in the Decision-making Loop. 
(Endsley, 1995b). 
2.2.3 Expertise in the Context of Emergency Management Decision-making 
The Naturalistic Decision Model and situation awareness process indicate links between 
emergency management decision-making and knowledge. The Oxford English Dictionary (1999) 
defines knowledge as expertise and skills acquired by experience or education and awareness as 
familiarity gained by experience or collection of facts and information.  
According to the Naturalistic model, decisions are made under a situation recognition process. It is 
reliant on the decision maker’s memory (or accumulated knowledge), which comprises a series of 
situation prototypes and their respective scripted actions (Figure 2-4). The memory component 
starts operating after initial information about the situation is given to the decision maker. Actual 
situations and experienced instances are compared and intended to be matched. After 
commonalities between previous and current realities are identified, decisions are made 
accordingly to scripted actions, i.e. successful actions performed in the past. Note that decisions 
can also be made if similarities are not found in the memory component. In such cases, they are 
motivated by a human capacity of improvisation. 
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Figure 2-4: Role of Situation Recognition and Scripted Actions in the Decision-making Processes.  
(Cheah et al., 2000) 
For instance, in a particular scenario of an earthquake consider the destruction of an isolated and 
sparsely populated area and the collapse of several main road infrastructures. Initial reports from 
the affected area indicate that people suffered minor injuries, but there were significant damage to 
major infrastructures. Given this initial level of situation awareness, the decision makers draw back 
on their memories for similar events in order to identify a case or circumstance (situation 
prototype) that mostly resembles the current event. Once matches are found, the decision makers 
associate the case or circumstance to what were the most efficient or useful actions previously 
taken or recommended (scripted actions). This could be the immediate deployment of resources for 
main road infrastructures repairs, open access for external resources deployment, invest on 
allowing air transportation into the affected area, ensuring business support and property protection 
etc. Ultimately, the decision makers reach a decision point in which field actions are decided and 
further implemented.  
Clearly, situation recognition places considerable value on how decision makers use their 
memories (or knowledge base) when dealing with extreme events. The decision maker’s capacity 
to perform “situation recognition” is heavily influenced by experience and expertise. On one hand, 
the decision maker is only capable on drawing on his/her knowledge base if he/she has had proper 
training or instruction on the relevant matter. On the other hand, experienced decision makers, 
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more then novices, are able to carry out their tasks even when faced with uncertainty, e.g. missing, 
ambiguous or unreliable information.  
Within the common uncertain environment in which emergency managers operate, we have 
decided to investigate possible opportunities from Information Technology (IT). It has been found 
that recent advances in IT have targeted decision support by comprehending situation recognition 
processes. Cannon-Bowers and Bell (1997) highlight that experts are able to quickly recognise an 
entire pattern during a decision-making processes by using their expertise. Hence, applications such 
as Decision Support Systems (DSS) and Expert Systems (ES) can be employed under the 
knowledge-base paradigm in order to facilitate decision-making for inexperienced decision makers, 
during inexperienced situations and highly demanding emergencies. Such IT tools are further 
presented and discussed in the next section to build the necessary knowledge to develop the 
proposed Dynamic Response Recovery Tool.  
2.3 Decision Support Tools for Emergency Management 
The review of Emergency Management concepts and Decision-making Theory has indicated the 
need to identify suitable techniques to support decision-making during emergency events. Two 
techniques (namely Decision Support Systems and Expert Systems) have initially shown potential 
to incorporate emergency management needs and decision-making theories within a theoretical 
framework, which could be further used to propose and develop the Dynamic Response Recovery 
Tool (the main objective of this thesis). 
2.3.1 Decision Support Systems 
A growing number of organisations have been developing, implementing and improving Decision 
Support Systems (DSS) in recent decades. However, objectives, structure and decision-making 
support may vary considerably among applications (Sprague and Watson, 1986). Some authors 
claim that DSS has no formal theory and it is just another “buzz word” to replace Management 
Information Systems (Sprague, 1980 apud Sprague and Watson, 1986). Sol (1987) states that DSS 
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is a label to the philosophy on how to integrate tools and human judgement. Another insight is 
given by Power (2007) who highlights that DSS have focus on semi or unstructured problems 
while Management Information Systems (MIS) have an information focus on structured problems. 
In this extensive and complex background, the following review discusses DSS concepts, history 
and frameworks. This section is limited in presenting technical components needed to develop the 
DRRT. 
2.3.1.1 Definition 
Power (2005a) defines DSS as any specialized system that support decision-making. DSS are 
systems aiming at facilitating decision processes and supporting (but not automating) decision-
making to quickly respond to changing needs that decision makers commonly experience in 
practice (Power, 2002) . Alternative concepts found in the literature define DSS as computerized 
information systems that supports business and organisational decision-making by helping to 
process/compile information from raw data, documents, personal knowledge, and/or business 
models (Information Builders, 2008). Decision Support Systems are also generally described as 
systems that gather and present data from various sources and properly combine multiple 
Information Technologies (IT). 
In this vast conceptual environment, different applications are labelled as DSS (Power, 2005a and 
BTM and KM Research Network Web Site, 2007). Few examples of DSS are OLAP (On line 
analytical processing), data warehouses, optimisation models, visual simulations, GIS (Geographic 
Information Systems), desktop data bases with query tools, PSS (Planning Support Systems), PDSS 
(Planning and Decision Support Systems), BI (Business Intelligence). 
From the above it is clear that a single DSS definition would not extensively exhaust the paradigms 
associate with DSS. Therefore, numerous researchers simply consider DSS as computerized 
information systems that support businesses and organisations to make decisions (Power, 2005a). 
This general definition gives the necessary flexibility to consider communication technologies, 
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data/document/knowledge processing tools, problem solving models and decision processes 
(DSSR, 2007) in order to achieve the ultimate goal of efficient decision-making support. 
2.3.1.2 History 
The history of DSS formally starts at the mid sixties. Concepts and paradigms have considerably 
evolved due to technology and human resources advances over the past five decades. Table 2-1 
summarizes what have been experienced in terms of DSS development since its first developments 
up to present days. 
Table 2-1: Decision Support Systems History. 
Modified from Sol (1987) and Power (2002). 
Period Characteristics 
Prior to 1965. 
It was very expensive to build large scale information systems. At this 
stage Management Information Systems (MIS) were only observed in 
large companies. 
Late 60’s. 
Concepts of DSS evolved from studies conducted at the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT). Model Oriented DSS or Management Decision Systems were the 
main achievements in this period.  
Early 70’s. A great number of computerized based systems were developed aiming decision-making aid. 
Mid to late 70’s. 
DSS research focused on developing interactive computerized based 
systems. Data base management and decision models were used to aid 
solving ill-structured problems. 
Late 70’s. Practitioners, vendors and academics promoted a consistent development of DSS. 
Late 70’s to early 
80’s. 
Strong efforts in developing user friendly software to improve the 
effectiveness of managerial and professional activities. 
Early 80’s. Created the theoretical framework for developing knowledge-oriented DSS. 
Late 80’s. Convergence to use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) paradigms to emulate human reasoning. Initial developments of Expert Systems (ES). 
Mid 90’s. The introduction of Data Warehousing and the World Wide Web impacted the course of DSS development. 
Late 90’s. 
“The data warehouse became the cornerstone of an integrated knowledge 
environment that provided a higher level of information sharing across 
an organisation, enabling faster and better decision making” (Professor 
Philip Powell apud Power, 2002). 
Present 
A number of academic disciplines such as database research, 
management science, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, software 
engineering etc stimulated the DSS development. 
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Table 2-1 shows that DSS have experienced progressive developments throughout time. Simple 
concepts have developed into complex and well fundamented techniques (e.g. Artificial 
Intelligence) through academic research and industry development. Easier and cheaper access to 
computers and efficient data processing tools were also facts that motivated the popularization of 
DSS.  
In this backdrop, DSS projects can be successfully developed nowadays. The actual flexibility 
associated with DSS development has defined three methods, namely DSS Generator, DSS Shells 
and Customer Made Software (Singh, 2007). These methods allow the development of DSS from a 
simple external data base connection into a pre-programmed framework application (commonly 
referenced as DSS Shells) to complete customizable applications. This range of possibilities has 
empowered both small and big organisations to develop DSS applications according to specific 
needs. A few frameworks are presented and discussed as follows as a practical illustration on how 
the DSS technique can be applied in the development and deployment of decision support 
applications.   
2.3.1.3 Decision Support System Frameworks 
The American Heritage Dictionary (2008a) defines “framework” as a fundamental structure that 
contains a set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a way of viewing 
reality. A Decision Support System Framework represents a structure, in which interfaces among 
four components (namely data base, model, communication and user interface) are linked in order 
to produce and present outcomes designed to facilitate decision-making.  
Figure 2-5 illustrates a basic DSS Structure along with the existing relations among the four 
components abovementioned. External and internal data sources feed the Data Base Component 
with information needed by the system. The data base component ultimately represents knowledge, 
current situations, rules/procedures, regulations, etc. External/internal data is processed by the 
Model Component, which contains models and a computational application, namely Inference 
Engine. This processing stage aims at replicating human reasoning and emulating knowledge so 
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burden on decision makers can be reduced. Outcomes from data processing are transferred to a 
Communication Component, which prompts the information in different interface units. Finally, 
the Interface Component transforms the information received into ease representation formats such 
as charts, graphs, maps, reports, etc. The end-user receives the information in its final 
representation format and uses it according to his/her best convenience. We reinforce that DSS do 
facilitate, not automate, decision-making and do not replace the human decision maker as 
highlighted by Power (2005a).     
 
Figure 2-5: DSS Basic Structure. 
Source: Power (2005a). 
Different frameworks are cited in the scientific literature in order to facilitate the process described 
in the last paragraph. Power’s Expanded Decision Support System Framework (Power, 2002) 
presents a very comprehensive set of five frameworks as follows: 
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o Data-driven DSS: Used for the analysis of large amounts of structured data. It 
provides tools to access and manipulate different data types (e.g. time series, 
spatial). It commonly has functionabilities such as query and retrieval, which 
provide simple data aggregation, management and calculations; 
o Model-driven DSS: Systems embedded with numerous models like 
accounting, financial, representational and optimisation. Complimentarily, 
statistical and analytical tools provide an elementary level of data analysis. 
Model-driven DSS mainly aid decision makers in the analyses of situations, 
which data is already available so they are non data intensive systems (i.e. do 
not consider data collection methods) as data must be available either from the 
end user or from a given database; 
o Knowledge-driven DSS: The terminology for these systems is still evolving. 
Knowledge-driven DSS, Suggestion DSS or Management Expert Systems 
(MES) are different acronyms used to refer to those systems. They mainly 
generate suggestions and/or recommendations of actions to end users. To do 
so, a set of rules and a knowledge base are combined in order to represent a 
specific expertise capable to infer problems; therefore, facilitate decision-
making. The concept of expertise refers to particular knowledge and skills 
used to solve problem on specified domains; 
o Document-driven DSS: Recently, this particular framework has experienced a 
great development. It aims at helping managers to gather, retrieve, classify and 
manage unstructured documents. Document-driven DSS involves a variety of 
technologies that allow document retrieval and analysis. Possible applications 
refer to both governmental and private sectors in accessing policies, 
procedures, products specifications, catalogues, etc; and 
o Communication-driven DSS: It is a hybrid DSS that uses both communications 
technologies and decision-making models. They are computerized based 
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systems intended to support group decision-making by facilitating problem 
inference and decision/information sharing. It is developed by taking 
advantage of opportunities from communication and computer science 
technologies. Common applications regards to electronic communication, 
scheduling, document sharing among others. 
From the frameworks previously described, it is clear that decision-making can be aided using a 
different set of resources depending on problems faced and available information. In this context, 
DSS does not automate decision-making as it deals with ill-structured problems as optimum 
courses of actions are seldom identifiable.   
2.3.2  Expert Systems 
The Expert System (ES) paradigm has been identified as a significant topic while conducting the 
Literature Review on DSS. Similarly to DSS, Expert Systems are used to design decision support 
tools; however, they are more oriented towards knowledge representation and management. It can 
be ultimately classified as a Knowledge-driven DSS due to its knowledge representation and 
management approach. We further present a brief history, background, fundamentals and basic 
structures of Expert Systems in order to clarify the differences and commonalities with DSS as well 
as potential opportunities for ES to be used in the DRRT development. 
2.3.2.1 History 
Some authors recognise that the first developments in Expert Systems theory were made in the 
seventies, while others point Artificial Intelligence studies as the formal ES origin. This debate 
comes from the fact that ES and AI have similar foundations so splitting their development into 
two different streams would be unrealistic.  
Despite this debate, ES progress experienced a great development in the seventies due to the 
conception of the knowledge base paradigm. Expert Systems have proven to be able to represent 
reality through knowledge management theories by using “a set of assumptions, concepts, values, 
and practices” (The American Heritage Dictionary, 2008b).  
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The development of standard knowledge representation methods, have motivated academia and 
industry to deploy ES in many fields. For instance, the PROSPECTOR was used to find a mineral 
deposit worthing at its time about US$ 100 million. The XCON/R1 helped Digital Equipment 
Corporation to save millions of dollars a year by optimising the time to configure and improving 
accuracy in purchase orders so shipment delays and reconfiguration needs were considerably 
reduced. 
However, the big “boom” experienced during the seventies was interrupted in the early eighties due 
to high costs associated with AI Laboratories. At this time, setting up and running a laboratory with 
six programmers was estimated in half million American dollars (Power, 2007). Considerable 
efforts to develop simple and efficient programming languages were put in place by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The goal was to reduce human resource needs and 
improve system’s development and performance. NASA developed the CLIPS Language, which is 
written in C Language and has advantages such as high programming speed, portability and 
compatibility with the Rete Algorithm for pattern matching.  
Actions towards reducing human efforts were also observed with other software products such as 
ES shells. An ES Shell allows users to focus on the development of the Knowledge Base rather 
than on technical computational details like programming, debugging and graphical interfaces. The 
EMYCIN (Empty or Essential MYCIN) is one of many examples of ES shells that are 
commercially available. Expert System’s shells are formally defined as a special propose tool 
designed for specific applications in which the user must only develop the knowledge base 
(Giarratano and Riley, 1998).  
In the recent decade, the Expert System Theory has been paving its way on the basis of the 
symbolic reasoning. However, non-numerical programming basis associated with the recent 
computational developments (both software and hardware) have brought new challenges for 
researchers and professionals. Similarly to past decades, human resources constraint project 
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budgets and development regardless physical resources been considerable accessible due to 
popularization of computer hardware and software.  
Ultimately, trade-offs between outcomes (both social and economic benefits in using ES) and 
investment needed to develop ES are key assessment measures in deciding to develop an Expert 
System. It is also needed to consider that symbolic programming cannot always achieve an 
efficient generalization of ill-structured problems due to domains been hard to be properly defined 
and unexpected inputs usually common (Giarratano and Riley, 1998). 
2.3.2.2 Background 
Expert Systems and Decision Support Systems originated from the Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
studies during the sixties and seventies. Mostly, AI focuses on emulating human behaviour by 
modelling reasoning capabilities. AI can also be used to represent and to manage knowledge. 
The development of Expert Systems began with Feigenbaum and others at Stanford with the 
Heuristic Programming Project (HPP) (Pomykalski et al., 1999). A good example is the MYCIN 
System, which performs about 450 rules to diagnose blood infections. During its time, the MYCIN 
performed similarly to experts and considerably better than some junior doctors (Pomykalski et al., 
1999). However, it has never been used in practice due to legal and ethical issues concerning 
medical practices. 
Similarly to Decision Support Systems, Expert Systems can be broadly defined. The following list 
presents the most popular definitions found in the international literature:     
o Computer programs designed to make available to non-experts some skills of 
an expert (Siler and Buckley, 2004); 
o Software designed to mimic the decision-making ability of an expert decision 
maker in a particular narrow domain of expertise (Pomykalski et al., 1999); 
o Reasoning systems designed to replicate problem-solving techniques of an 
expert in a narrow area of specialism (Beerel, 1987); 
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o Intelligent computer programs that use knowledge and inference to solve 
problems (Feigenbaum, 1892 apud Giarratano and Riley, 1998); 
o Systems that emulates the decision-making ability of a human expert 
(Giarratano and Riley, 1998); and 
o Systems that address problems normally thought to require human specialist to 
be solved (AIM Expert Systems, 2008). 
Generally, Expert Systems aim the representation of knowledge in order to achieve the goal of 
decision support. They are systems that represent in structured ways (i.e. pre-defined schemes) the 
top level of the pyramid illustrated in Figure 2-6. Knowledge is developed through a process of 
refining expertise. According to Jackson (1999), expertise is a set of skills that have been honed in 
a particular situation for a specific purpose or domain. Finally, expertise originates from 
information, which is obtained via data processing under specific paradigms of syntax and 
semantic, analysis methods and/or models. Note that this process is dependent on time as 
transforming data into knowledge demands well structured methods, numerous experts as well as 
physical resources and appropriate funding accordingly to particular projects and objectives. 
 
Figure 2-6: Knowledge Development. 
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Figure 2-6 shows that knowledge representation can be applied in many fields due to conceptual 
depth. Thus, the use of Expert Systems can support numerous problem-solving tasks as their 
knowledge base structure allows the integration of human expertise and computing facilities 
(Badiru and Cheung, 2002). Pomykalski et al. (1999) state that ES can contribute to decision-
making activities through knowledge representation as: i) it preserves human expertise by 
recording it in long-lasting ways; ii) it allows humans to be freed from performing routine/time 
consuming activities and iii) it provides support in performing complex activities. 
However, Siler and Buckley (2004) state that representing knowledge is a complex and critical 
stage in developing any ES application. For instance, the definition of criteria and actions to be 
triggered in IF/THEN rules (a common structure in many Expert System’s Inference Engine) can 
consume lots of human effort and time depending on the field and on the expertise level. Thus, a 
successful development of an ES must consider factors such as the nature of the application (e.g. 
engineering, management, medical), availability and need to develop knowledge, analyses skills, 
development/deployment time-frame, accuracy of results and available budget.     
Hence, achieving a good level of knowledge representation is undoubtedly a fundamental step in 
developing Expert Systems. Once it is accomplished, an alternative supporting source for decision-
making is available. Jackson (1999) cites that well developed ES have great chances to suggest 
recommendations in a reasonable time and be regularly or at least as often correct as human 
experts. Moreover, an ES application must be seen as an alternative source of information, which 
does not intend to replace the human decision maker as intelligent systems are still limited when 
compared to human beings. Inaccuracies (fluctuation in performance) are expected and efficient 
systems can originate from designs using both facts and heuristics under hierarchical analysis 
processes (Badiru and Cheung, 2002). 
2.3.2.3 Fundamentals 
Four basic concepts comprise what specialists refer as fundamentals of Expert Systems. The 
concepts vary from the way that knowledge is acquired from experts and represented within 
 40 
computerized systems to how the system can explain the reasoning used to achieve solutions. 
Figure 2-7 shows the four fundamentals concepts and the relationships among them. The process of 
developing an Expert System starts with the knowledge acquisition and finishes with the 
development of the solution explanation component. Intermediate phases are known as Knowledge 
Representation and Reasoning Controlling.  
 
Figure 2-7: Fundamentals of Expert Systems. 
Knowledge acquisition or machine learning is defined as the transformation of potential problem-
solving expertise from a knowledge source to a computer program (Buchanan et al., 1983 apud 
Jackson, 1999). The knowledge source is ideally a human expert; however, alternative sources (e.g. 
books, manuals, raw data) are also used as human experts can imply high costs or being 
unavailable.  
As highlighted by Siler and Buckley (2004), this activity is recognised as the bottleneck of Expert 
Systems as it can demand too much time and/or resources due to poor productivity. This is a direct 
consequence from facts and principles being many time ill-structured; therefore, hard to be 
modelled and represented by mathematical or cognitive theories. Feigenbaum (1977) apud Jackson 
(1999) states that both mathematical and cognitive theories cannot many times consider at full 
extend human’s expertise and associated problem solving capabilities. This is ultimately a 
consequence of decision-making being very complex and abstract subject. 
After knowledge is acquired, it must be structured in standard ways. Knowledge representation 
comes from the formal philosophy and cognitive psychology (Jackson, 1999). Computationally, the 
effort focuses on representing knowledge using symbolic or non numeric computation. This is done 
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by making use of programming languages, which contains syntax (forms) and semantic 
(meanings). A well known language to build ES is the C Language Integrated Production System 
(CLIPS) developed in the eighties by NASA (GHG Corporation, 2008). Nowadays, alternative 
programming languages can also be used to build ES (e.g. FORTRAN, C++, C Sharp, Ruby etc), 
which reflects the great computational development experienced in the last two decades.  
“Controlling Reasoning” refers to determine how knowledge should be accessed and used during 
the search for solutions or data processing. It is formally set up in the inference engine, which 
contains the implementation algorithm responsible for operationalising the system. The final 
fundament (solution explanation) specifies how conclusions were achieved and what pieces of 
knowledge were used. This final process is important in order to give transparency to the system 
(meaning, ES are not meant to be black box tools) and to allow the user to evaluate proposed 
solutions or recommendations according to his/her needs. 
Finally, Table 2-2 summarizes the key characteristics of an Expert System according to Beerel 
(1987). It reinforces that Expert Systems are computer tools, which intend to replicate human 
decision-making skills through representing knowledge within rule base components. Furthermore, 
it is explicit that errors and inaccuracies are expected as human knowledge is too vast and hard to 
be entirely modelled by currently available frameworks and computer paradigms. 
Table 2-2: Expert System’s Key Characteristics. 
Source: Adapted from Beerel (1987). 
ES system manipulates symbols rather than numbers. 
ES system makes inferences and deductions from the information provided. 
Knowledge is applied to solve problems. 
Problem’s domain is narrow and specifically defined. 
Knowledge-Base is used to guide and constrain search for solutions. 
Optimum solutions are seldom identified due to the complex nature of problems 
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2.3.2.4 Structure 
An Expert System application contains two basic components: a Knowledge Base and an Inference 
Engine. Operationally wise, a dynamic relationship between user and system occurs as illustrated 
in Figure 2-8. The system uses data and facts provided by the user and return expertise. Outcomes 
(e.g. recommendations, solutions) are generated after inputs are processed by engaging the existing 
set of rules within the knowledge base. The inference engine contains the operational algorithm, 
which selects the most applicable rule(s) accordingly to particular situations represented by 
data/facts. Giarratano and Riley (1998) formally describe the inference engine as the component 
responsible to execute and prioritize rules accordingly to inputs received from the user. 
 
Figure 2-8: Expert System Structure and User Relationship. 
Source: Giarratano and Riley (1998). 
Although the simple and straight forward description provided in the last paragraph, additional ES 
structures need to be properly defined. Berkes et al. (2001), Giarratano and Riley (1998), AIM 
Expert Systems (2008), Biondo (1990) and Arockiasamy (1993) are well known authors, which 
propose slightly different ES structures. Among these structures, we have identified Berkes’ et al. 
(2001) proposal as the one most suitable for the specific development of the DRRT (Figure 2-9) 
Data 
Facts 
Expertise 
Expert System 
 
Knowledge Base 
Inference Engine 
User 
 43 
 
Figure 2-9: Berkes’ Expert System Structure. 
(Berkes et al., 2001) 
Berkes’ (2001) structure illustrates how an Expert System should operate as well as key relations 
among knowledge base, external data modules, inference engine and user interface. In addition, 
roles of knowledge engineers and users are highlighted in the development process and system 
operation, respectively. In this respect, Berkes (2001) proposes the development of the Knowledge 
Base by using both practical and hard data. These data come from a number of sources, such as 
experts (managers and scientists), published material, field studies and etc. Data is used to create 
information which is ultimately represented in forms of rules within the Knowledge Base. The 
interface between user and Knowledge Base operates through the Inference Engine (IE). IE is the 
operational module, which process data/facts provided by the user using the rules contained in the 
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Knowledge Base. Outcomes from this process are named solutions or recommendations and aim at 
supporting decision-making. 
The review of ES and their structures highlighted a number of additional concepts. Giarratano and 
Riley (1998) describe eight general concepts commonly used to develop ES applications: 
o Languages: commands written in a specific syntax. Must be associated with 
the inference engine to execute the statements; 
o Tool: a language and an utility program to facilitate development, debugging 
and delivery; 
o Shell: a special propose tool designed for certain types of applications in which 
the user must supply only the knowledge base; 
o User Interface: mechanism in which user and the ES tool can communicate; 
o Explanation Facility: component that explain the reasoning used to achieve 
solutions; 
o Working Memory: global data base of facts; 
o Agenda: prioritized list of rules from the working memory; and 
o Knowledge Acquisition Facility (or rule induction): automatic way to acquire 
knowledge by creating new rules from examples.  
2.3.2.5 Expert Systems Applications 
Expert Systems have been under development and use since the seventies. Although technologies 
and requirements have considerably changed over the period of forty years, an ES application still 
aims at providing expert knowledge to decision-makers in order to facilitate and improve decision 
processes.  
In the seventies, the systems DENTRAL, MYCIN, DIPMETER, PROSPECTOR and XCON/R1 
become very popular due to potential impacts in savings and decision-making agility. For instance, 
PROSPECTOR was used to find a mineral deposit that worth at the time about U$ 100 million and 
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the XCON/R1 helped Digital Equipment Corporation to save millions of dollars a year, reducing 
the time to configure the orders and improving its accuracy.  
Currently, agriculture research has invested in developing ES (e.g. AGREX) to help farmers to 
make better decision in the areas of fertilizer application, crop protection, irrigation scheduling, and 
diagnosis of diseases in paddy and post harvest technology of fruits and vegetables. Applications in 
medicine continue to be developed as a pioneer field. A specific example would be the PXDES 
systems, which detects pneumoconiosis, a lung disease through X-rays. This particular system 
incorporates an inference engine to examine the shadows on the X-ray. The shadows are used to 
determine the type and the degree of pneumoconiosis so medical decision can be facilitated. 
Finally, Steadman and Pell (1995) proposed an ES for helping manufacturing processes. Steadman 
and Pell’s system provide tools to support complex engineering designs such as the injection 
molding of plastic parts.  
2.4 Conclusive Topics 
This comprehensive literature review has found Emergency Management to be a complex topic, in 
which a number of concepts are interrelated. We initially defined the EM field by presenting basic 
management structures used during disaster situations as well as related concepts. Systems such as 
CIMS or ICS support organisational arrangements, co-ordinate response and recovery, distribute 
resources, enforce information sharing process and etc in order to ultimately facilitate the 
management of emergencies in spite to specific circumstances faced.  
Nevertheless, decision-making processes at individual, departmental, corporative and inter-
organisational levels are still unclear. A review of Decision-making theory has led us to a better 
understanding of models, paradigms, reasoning structures etc used by human beings when making 
decisions in numerous fields. A specific focus was given to decision-making models during 
emergency events. Some authors (Dreyfus, 1981; Sweller, 1988) indicate that under pressure and 
uncertainty typically faced during disasters, decision makers tend to use the Naturalistic Decision 
Model. This model regards to a three stage process (known as Situation Awareness, Sense Making 
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and Planning), in which decision makers compare present situations with previous experiences 
under rational paradigms. Improvisation is used when patterns are not found in existing memory 
structures. 
The process described above involves a great deal of knowledge, memory and expertise. Pattern 
matching requires well structured memory for identification of prototypical situations and 
improvisation is performed using comprehensive knowledge/expertise. In this respect, information 
systems such as Decision Support Systems and Expert Systems help to represent and manage 
knowledge; therefore, facilitate decision-making. Nevertheless, knowledge generation and 
representation is considered to be a complex task due to high levels of cognitiveness involved in 
decision-making. Successful applications have already been reported in the literature by Mendonça 
and Mendonça et al. (2001), Mendonça (2005), Mendonça et al. (2006) and Wallace (2007). 
Finally, it is believed that this comprehensive background can support the proposal and design of 
the DRRT. The case of roading organisations is considered according to the objectives defined for 
this thesis. Thus, we initially envisaged the need to specifically study decision-making processes 
applied by roading personnel during emergencies. So emergency exercises were observed as this 
particular approach can objectively simulates real instances and common decision-making 
processes faced by emergency managers. A specific observation technique and a series of case 
studies will be used to collect and process data about decision-making processes. The next chapter 
reports on these developments and experiences using New Zealand Roading Organisations as case 
studies. 
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3 UNDERSTANDING THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Extreme events present responding organisations with complex and unprecedented situations, 
which may generate catastrophic losses and disruptions for communities. In a crises or emergency 
there is an immediate risk to life, health, property and environment (Vedder, 1990; Fink, 1986; 
Berroggi and Wallace, 1995). Thus, organisations have to quickly respond to observed and 
changing conditions. These events are usually different of what personnel are used in dealing with 
on a daily basis, under business-as-usual circumstances (Fredholm, 1999).  
However, there is limited understanding of how organisations make decisions during extreme 
events. Some recent studies provide empirical evidence that decision makers are impaired by 
existing complexities in real situations (Zografos et al., 2000; Mendonça et al., 2001; Mendonça, 
2005; Sinha, 2005; Mendonça et al., 2006; Mendonça and Wallace, 2007). Such studies also 
indicate through anecdotal evidence that decision makers use their own experience and common 
sense in order to respond to events. 
This chapter presents a method used to observe and collect data during emergency exercises and 
real events. The method aims at studying organisational emergency management at deeper levels 
by incorporating a balanced representation of emergency realities. Such approach targeted to 
acquire useful information about organisations’ decision-making processes, which was further used 
to analyse the organisational context where extreme events decision-making occurs. Furthermore, 
experiences can be achieved through gradually becoming involved and immersed in the 
organisation’s context.  
The first section presents the observation and analysis methods. Building upon this proposed 
framework a series of three emergency exercises and two real events were observed and are 
reported in the second section. The final section is dedicated in presenting the findings from the 
case study experiences in a broad context. 
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3.1 Observation Framework 
This section describes the observation framework and the analysis method proposed to collect and 
process data from real and simulated emergency events, respectively. The framework is focused on 
four extreme events decision-making domains: physical, information, cognitive and social. 
3.1.1 Observation Method   
A five-step observation method was developed, taking advantage of the fact that emergency 
exercises are routinely practised in New Zealand. This method aimed at identifying and observing 
emergency training endeavours accordingly to the following process: 
 Step 1: Search for appropriate upcoming emergency exercises; 
 Step 2: Once an exercise is identified, contact the organisations responsible for organising 
the exercise in order to check if it is possible to take part as observers; 
 Step 3: If participation is authorised, get familiar with the dynamics, participating 
organisations, objectives, major players, scenario and injects3;  
 Step 4: Arrange consumables/processes needed to conduct the exercise observation, 
focusing on the three steps described in Table 3-1; and 
 Step 5: Report the experience to fellow researchers in order to exchange alternative points 
of view 
Although the process seems fairly simple, it incorporates two complex realities. The first of these is 
the issue of commercial sensitivity and getting organisational consent for the intended observation 
and analysis. The researcher always guaranteed anonymity and name suppression in order to 
facilitate the authorisation (refer to Appendix A for ethics committee approval). The second 
complication involved the technical challenges of properly observing and capturing 
data/information for further analyses. An adaptation of the Defence Command and Control 
Research Program (CCRP) model (Cheah et al., 2000) was used to conduct the observation and 
                                                     
3 Refer to injections of specific information about the emergency scenario under simulation. 
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collect data as required in Step 4. The CCRP method is further explored in the next sub-section 
along with the analysis process.  
Finally, the observation of real events occurred in a flexible manner as they cannot be obviously 
predicted. In this context, the research team was required to maintain up to date key contacts with 
NZTA, consultant and contractor in order to quickly obtain permission to go to the field. For safety 
reasons, researchers were only authorised to observe real events either at office headquarters or 
properly accompanied by experienced field professionals.   
3.1.2 Analysis Method 
The general analysis method is described in this sub-section. It aims at the understanding of the 
four decision-making domains. The method focuses on assessing collected data under three key 
elements of decision-making (known as situation awareness, information sharing, and 
expertise/experience). Each of these elements are scrutinised according to the research steps, 
observation activities and expected outcomes illustrated in Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1: Observation Activities and Expected Analyses of Emergency Exercises. 
Step Observation Activities Expected Outcomes 
1 
Observation of the decision-
making process during real and 
simulated extreme events; tracing 
of decision-making stories. 
- Comprehensive understanding of 
the real or simulated event scenario; 
and  
- Qualitative assessment of the 
tangible/intangible vulnerabilities 
affecting decision-making.  
2 
Knowledge 
Elicitation 
Debriefs and in-depth interviews 
with experts in the subject matter 
following real and simulated 
events. 
Identification of the cognitive 
elements that underlie decision-
making. 
3 
Analysis and 
Knowledge 
Representation
Extracting meaning from the 
acquired data and information and 
displaying the results. 
Assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses within the decision-
making processes. 
 
Each of the previously mentioned decision-making domains is described as follows in order to 
support data analyses. They have been adapted from traditional definitions to specifically suit the 
case of roading organisations. 
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 Physical domain: this is the tangible real world where physical and human resources are 
moved through time and space to perform the range of operations required to respond an 
evolving extreme event; 
 Information domain: the abstract space, in which data exists and is collected, created, 
processed, manipulated, and shared in the form of information. This ultimately represents 
the flow of information content, i.e. the link between reality of the physical domain and 
human perceptions;  
 Cognitive domain: the mind of the decision-makers, where the individual and 
organisational collective consciousnesses exist. The decision makers’ knowledge, 
capabilities, techniques, and procedures are stored here; and 
 Social domain: where humans interact, exchange information and form a shared awareness 
and understanding, as well as make collaborative decisions. This domain encompasses the 
intangibles of culture, values, attitudes, beliefs and leadership. 
3.2 Case Studies 
This section summarises three simulation exercises (Table 3-2) and two real events (Table 3-3) 
involving SHO. All cases were observed in New Zealand since 2007. 
The exercise observations comprise a major earthquake (Icarus exercise), a tropical cyclone 
(Marconi exercise) and a major volcano eruption in the Auckland area (Ruamouko exercise). The 
observed sample has included two types of exercise (tabletop and functional) and a significant 
variety of levels of organisational involvement (national, regional and single organisation). Only 
one observed exercise was classified as a table-top exercise (Marconi exercise) while all the others 
have been identified as functional exercises.  
Due to resource limitations (mainly human resources), it was only possible to directly observe the 
consultants and contractors actions and decision-making procedures in the Icarus exercise. For all 
other exercises, only the activities at the New Zealand Transport Agency (formerly known as 
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Transit New Zealand) were observed. From all cases, consistent decision-making data was 
collected.  
Table 3-2: Observed Emergency Exercises. 
Name Date 
Location 
Simulated 
Event Exercise Typology Aim 
Observed 
Organisations
Marconi 
Exercise 
8th June 2007 
Auckland 
Tropical 
cyclone 
causing 
significant 
damage and 
flooding in 
the 
Auckland 
Region 
Distributed tabletop 
exercise organised 
by the Auckland 
Engineering 
Lifelines Group 
Lifeline utility co-
ordination processes 
in the Group EOC 
with focus to 
information transfer 
NZTA 
Northcote 
Traffic 
Management 
Centre 
(ATTOMS 
Centre) 
Auckland 
Icarus 
Exercise 
22nd November 
2007 
Wellington 
Major 
earthquake 
in 
Wellington 
Functional exercise 
as part of the NZTA 
scheduled annual 
training 
Train staff in their 
roles within EOC 
(Emergency 
Operations Centre); 
practice allocation and 
communication 
between 
organisations; test 
aerial reconnaissance 
arrangements between 
NZTA and Greater 
Wellington Regional 
Council  (GWRC) 
NZTA 
Wellington 
Regional 
Office, 
Consultants 
one contractor 
and the 
GWRC 
Ruamouko 
Exercise 
13th March 
2008 
Auckland 
Volcanic 
eruption in  
Auckland 
Tier 4 national-level 
functional exercise 
in accordance with 
the MCDEM 
National Exercise 
Programme (joint 
local government 
and central 
government 
exercise, Auckland 
CDEM Group, 
MCDEM, DPMC) 
Test New Zealand's 
all-of-nation 
arrangements for 
responding to a major 
disaster with 
particular focus on 
roles and 
responsibilities, 
arrangements and 
connections between, 
local, regional, 
national and 
international agencies 
NZTA 
National 
Office in 
Wellington, 
GEOC 
Auckland, 
GEOC 
Wellington,  
ATTOMS 
Centre, 
Waitakere 
EOC 
 
Complimentarily, two real events were observed. The Mount Ruapehu (Tongariro National Park) 
eruption was observed on site by a single researcher as well as monitored by two others from their 
respective offices at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch. The field observation was 
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conducted solo as no major hazards were associated with the events due to its small scale. 
Furthermore, the management activities conducted by a national consultant were observed over a 
day during the 2008 Storm events, which affected the south island of New Zealand. 
Table 3-3: Observed Real Emergency Events. 
Name Date 
Location Summary Event Description 
Organisations 
Observed 
Mount Ruapehu 
Volcanic 
Eruption 
25th of September 
2007 
A 2.9 Earthquake occurred on the night of the 25th 
September that triggered a number of response actions 
from NZ Police and a local contractor. The response 
included the evacuation of sixty people from Aorangi 
and Ruapehu huts, closing ski fields on the 26th 
September and assessing damage at State Highways 
surrounding the Tongariro National Park on the night 
of the event. Road damage was not reported and an 
injured climber was the only direct victim of the event. 
National 
contractor (on 
site observation) 
 
The 2008 Storm 
Events  
31st of July 2008 
During late July 2008, a severe weather front arrived in 
New Zealand. Both north and south islands were 
affected by heavy rain, which created flooding and 
landslides. From the 28-30th July, four researchers 
monitored the event’s development. On site 
observation at the consultant’s office took place on the 
31st July when the storms badly affected the South 
Island’s state highway network. Major damage 
observed included flooding in both north and south of 
Christchurch and a major landslide south of the 
Kaikoura Peninsula on SH1. 
National 
consultant 
(office 
observation) 
 
The following sub-sections describe in detail all observations conducted as well as the initial 
findings achieved from it. They include all research activities undertaken before the observation 
(e.g. contacting organisations, engaging with staff, organising research material, arranging data 
collection tools) as well as specific details about the scenario or event. Finally, general findings 
about responses performed, such as common management processes applied, impact assessment, 
pending issues on response and so on are individually discussed for observations.  
Overall, all observations contributed towards the understanding of organisational emergency 
management in New Zealand and data collected were suitable for analyses. Thus, the observations 
consistently supported in-depth analyses of structured roading organisations emergency 
management operations.   
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3.2.1 Marconi Exercise 
On the morning of Friday 8th June 2007, the Auckland Region exercised coordination and 
communication between lifeline utilities and Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) 
centres. The exercise focused on the response phase of a major emergency, simulated via a 
distributed tabletop exercise. The exercise was led by the Auckland Engineering Lifelines Group 
(AELG) representing Auckland transport, water, energy and telecommunication utilities in 
conjunction with the Auckland CDEM Group. 
The Emergency Operation Centres (EOC) at Auckland, North Shore, Waitakere and Manukau 
cities, the CDEM group EOC team and the lifeline utility coordinators took part in the exercise 
together with 24 lifeline utility organisations across many sectors. The transportation sector was 
represented by NZTA, On Track (the regional railways corporation), Air New Zealand and 
Auckland International Airport. 
The aim of the exercise was to review and improve the lifeline utility coordination response 
processes. In this context, specific objectives were defined as follows: 
 To review lifeline utility co-ordination processes in the group EOC through escalating 
levels of emergency (culminating in a group declaration of civil defence emergency); 
 To assess the lifeline utility interface with the group EOC with a focus on communication; 
and 
 To perform information transfer.  
Beyond the abovementioned objectives, lifelines utilities were free to test their own plans, 
processes and procedures during the exercise. 
Scenario 
The scenario was an extreme weather event (tropical cyclone) causing significant damage and 
flooding in the Auckland Region. For the transport sector the damage scenario involved: a) high 
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wind gusts (up to 170km/h) wit potential hazards for vehicles crossing Auckland Harbour Bridge; 
b) heavy rainfall; c) heavy sea swells and inundation; and d) major flooding on the State Highways 
and on the main arterial routes. The scenario complimentarily included a widespread and prolonged 
power outage with uncertain times for service restoration, possible fuel shortage and 
telecommunication disruptions.  
The seriousness of the scenario induced other effects such as main road closures, including the 
Auckland harbour bridge, traffic signal failures and subsequent gridlock and traffic accidents. It 
was also simulated the inability of emergency services to reach affected sites or hospitals, 
evacuation needs, and the dependency on the telecommunications and electricity sectors.  
Roading utilities were assessed within their responsibilities such as liaison with the Police to 
control the roads, use of contractors to assist in traffic control and restoration of priority routes. At 
minor importance, they were required to assist councils to manage evacuation, to support 
emergency services and to arrange for aerial reconnaissance if needed.  
Relevant Emergency Management Procedures Observed during Marconi Exercise 
Lifeline Utility Response and Recovery Protocols (AELG, 2006) outlines recommendations for 
communication and information transfer between the lifeline utilities and the Emergency 
Operations Centre Group (thereafter referred as Group EOC). Utilities are expected to 
communicate directly with each local Emergency Operations Centre (also known as local EOC) to 
manage specific localised emergencies. 
In an event of regional scale, the coordination of the lifeline utilities will occur at a regional level 
via a Lifeline Utility Coordinator, who belongs to the group EOC. Such coordination was exercised 
during the Marconi exercise when local authorities continued to report locally with relevant local 
EOCs. In this backdrop, the CDEM group public information management shall control media and 
public communication. Moreover, the NZTA makes use of its emergency procedures manual for 
region 2 (TNZ, 2000) and the guidelines from the Auckland Engineering Lifeline Group Project 5 
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(AELG 2004, AELG 2005), which identifies priority routes for response and recovery activities in 
the Auckland region. 
Activities Observed at New Zealand Transport Agency 
The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) used the emergency management room in the 
Northcote Traffic Management Centre (ATTOMS Centre). The Centre is also used to monitor 
traffic 24 hours/7 days a week in the Auckland Metropolitan area. Three participants from NZTA 
took part in the exercise plus the ATTOMS centre manager.  
The exercise had a “warm start” in which it was assumed that the initial notifications and activation 
of EOCs had already been carried out after a MetService weather warning was issued in the day 
before. This meant that staff were on standby and the EOC group was already activated. Exercise 
injects were sent via e-mail as attached files in “word document” format. Such injects were 
originated from the Lifelines Utility Coordinator to all the lifelines utilities participating in the 
exercise. The injects comprised weather warnings and updates on the development or progress of 
the scenario. Three types of injects were received before the formal start of the exercise: 1) weather 
warnings; 2) radio station news; and 3) Auckland group EOC initial general situation report.  
After the “warm start”, NZTA staff mostly focused on impact assessment/communication and 
identification of pending issues and reporting back needs/implications. The following describe the 
outcomes of these activities. 
NZTA Impact assessment and communication 
The impact assessment was made exclusively on the basis of injects that were received from the 
lifelines utility coordinator as NZTA road maintenance contractors did not participate in the 
exercise. In order to facilitate discussions about possible consequences to network operations and 
possible actions to be undertaken, key information was summarised on a white board. The damage 
 56 
and disruption highlighted in the first three injects received as well as possible response actions to 
be taken were colour coded by NZTA staff on a laminated map.  
Subsequently NZTA, together with other lifelines utilities, were requested to state their current 
situation and report to the lifeline utility coordinator. Thus, the NZTA personnel produced a report 
comprising:  
 The overview of the scale and extent of event and the identified and likely future impact on 
the road network;  
 Major disruptions experienced including location and number of customers affected in 
each location and estimated restoration times;  
 Priority areas for response actions;  
 Public information and precautions to be promulgated;  
 Specific requests for support and information enquires;  
 Additional critical pending issues; and  
 Action required by Group EOC. 
Identification of Pending Issues Arising from the Scenario and Needs Report and 
Implications 
Following an external request from the lifeline utility coordinator, NZTA had to analyse the 
interdependencies among lifelines utilities. It has been done by considering a detailed report 
provided by the electricity sector. This intended to encourage organisations to analyse pending 
issues arising from a possible electricity shortage. Furthermore, each lifeline utility sent a report to 
all other participants to share information. Nonetheless, NZTA did not take any formal action to 
summarise the information received from the other lifelines utilities.  
In specific for the electricity sector report, lifelines utilities were required to deal with three main 
issues: i) to test of alternative communications; ii) to identify the services dependent on fuel and 
fuel stocks assured for the next 3-5 days (contacting the fuel supplier directly to ascertain this, if 
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necessary); and iii) to use the priority sites lists and maps provided in AELG (2005) as priorities for 
restoration.  
Regarding the test of alternative communication, contacts via radio were attempted with the NZTA 
regional office in Auckland and with one contractor. The initial attempt was unsuccessful. 
Communications via fax were also tested. The main road closures resulting after the damage 
scenario were sketched on a map showing that the highway network in the Auckland region. 
Fuel issues were discussed and NZTA stated that “contractors will need diesel by the 10th June”. 
The fuel stocks assured for the next 3-5 days were identified on a map, but fuel suppliers were not 
contacted in order to confirm the accuracy of the information.  
Finally, priority sites lists and maps were assumed to be the same previously identified by 
Auckland Lifeline Organisations Group (AELG 2004, AELG 2005). Priority routes for Auckland 
City as well as a different set of geographic supporting information were available at the EOC, but 
seldom consulted by NZTA staff. 
3.2.2 Icarus Exercise 
On the morning of the 22nd November 2007, the NZTA Wellington Regional Office, in conjunction 
with its consultants and contractors, exercised its emergency response arrangements. The exercise 
was part of the scheduled annual training organised by the NZTA Wellington Regional Office and 
involved two consultancy companies (MWH and OPUS), one contractor (Fulton Hogan) and the 
Greater Wellington Regional Council (GWRC). 
One of the aims of the exercise was to train staff in their respective roles. The exercise was also 
used to test the practicality of the aerial reconnaissance arrangements that have been developed 
through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the NZTA and the GWRC. 
The following presents in detail, the observation conducted at the Fulton Hogan Emergency 
Operations Centre (EOC). Furthermore, the observation at both NZTA and lifeline coordinator sites 
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are discussed. Findings about decision-making activities were presented and communication issues 
identified after observing the exercise Icarus.  
Scenario 
The exercise was based on the 2006 Capital Quake scenario. It comprised a major rupture in 
Wellington’s fault creating major damage at Wellington city and region. The NZTA modified the 
scenario in order to meet the specific objectives set up for the exercise. These modifications 
focused on preparedness and decision-making to reopen State Highway 1 (SH 1) north of 
Wellington. Specific exercise objectives were: 
 To practice EOC operations and role delegation; 
 To interpret reconnaissance information acquired by Fulton Hogan field staff and aerial 
photographs; and 
 To train and practice interactions between organisations and the Lifeline Utility 
Coordinator. 
A research team member observed Fulton Hogan’s EOC on the day of the exercise. The aim was to 
obtain data about decision-making and communication performed during the exercise. The 
simulation ran from 9.00am to 12.30pm and included the various small events as listed by the 
exercise planning document made available to organising members previously the simulation: 
 Bridge over motorway at Johnsonville – holes in the road on both sides of the bridge – soil 
collapsing; 
 Rail bridge over motorway at bottom of Ngauranga Gorge – smoke coming out of tunnels, 
East (South) bound lanes blocked; 
 Aotea Quay bridge onto Hutt Road – span fallen down with obvious displacement of 
bridge both ways; 
 Motorway over rail yards – one span on catchers and displacement to both north and south 
bound lanes; 
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 Motorway off-ramp by James Cook hotel blocked with debris by a fallen building; 
 North end of Terrace Tunnel – slips cover north bound lane; 
 Portal at eastern end of Mount Vic Tunnel – blocked by a landslide; 
 Southbound section of road between Pukerua Bay and Plimmerton – slips; and 
 Between Pukerua Bay and Fisherman's Table – massive slips/blockages (and a passenger 
train half visible within one of the slips). 
Although the exercise’s primary goal was to reopen SH 1, conflicting information about SH 58 was 
also given in order to create more challenging decision-making problems. Furthermore, it was 
expected that organisations would improvise and create injects in order to test their own procedures 
and to train their respective emergency response teams. Damage and information about the road 
network was provided to participants through a series of standard injects. 
Activities at the Fulton Hogan Emergency Operations Centre 
The Fulton Hogan Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) was set up at the Wellington area office 
(Marine Parade, Petone). The observation process can be divided into three different phases: 1) 
Pre-exercise, 2) Exercise observation and 3) Post-exercise. The description of each phase is 
presented as follows: 
1) Pre-exercise: The room was initially arranged to reflect possible effects from an 
earthquake. This was followed by a quick introduction presenting the scenario, exercise 
rules, objectives and etc. The Fulton Hogan’s manager clarified his role during the exercise 
and the expectations of FH’s team in terms of response and emergency management.  
Available resources were discussed at this stage (e.g. building facilities, communication 
infrastructure) in order to plan response strategies. The following consumables were made 
available for FH personnel during the exercise:  
 A single room commonly used for meetings in the company; 
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 A Radio Transmitter (RT) to communicate with other organisations; 
 A single landline phone; 
 2 white boards fixed onto the walls; 
 A desktop computer; 
 A box containing an emergency kit including safe vests, gloves, buckets, non perishable 
food, torches, gas torches, blankets, respirators and etc; 
 5 tables and a carrel; 
 A flip chart; 
 A portable white board; 
 Maps for the Wellington Area including a map with state highways, urban areas etc. and a 
map from Civil Defence (CD) showing priority routes and CD Centres; 
 Emergency response forms;  
 A box containing a great range of office consumables; 
2) Exercise observation: The participants had to arrange the EOC room after the formal 
start of the exercise at 9.00am. In addition to taking notes about actions and discussions, 
pictures were taken, discussions recorded and a survey form completed as part of the 
observation of the exercise. The data collected comprises 45 pictures, a three page long 
survey and approximately 36 minutes of audio recordings. A detailed timeline presenting 
injects, decision-making, communication and discussions on the morning of the exercise 
was produced. Refer to Dantas et al. (2010b) for full details.   
While every effort was made to collect all available data during the exercises, it is 
inevitable to miss response actions, decisions or discussions due to the complex and 
extremely dynamic nature of emergency exercises. Overall, the observation focused on 
general aspects of decision-making and communication performed during emergency 
events and how they could be improved. 
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3) Post-exercise:  A hot debrief was conducted immediately after the exercise was 
officially finished. Participants were asked to complete a survey. The team then discussed 
response strengths and weaknesses identified during the exercise. The following presents a 
non exhaustive list of issues raised during the hot debrief: 
 Stress management (especially when injured staff are involved);  
 Emergency Depot Roles clarification (EOC Manager, Information and Communication 
Manager, Road Clearing Operations Manager and Logistics and Staff Requirements 
Manager); 
 Information sharing and support from other organisations; 
 The use of NZTA Emergency Response Plan, Fulton Hogan’s procedures and Role 
Description laminated sheets; 
 EOC Room layout; 
 EOC equipment (e.g. desks, desktop computer, printer, RT); 
 EOC location at Fulton Hogan area office at Marine Parade, Petone, Wellington; 
 Power availability during real events and generators; and 
 Emergency box items.   
3.2.3 Ruamouko Exercise 
On the morning of the 13th March 2008, various lifelines organisations, and Civil Defence groups 
simulated a major volcanic eruption in the Auckland region. The exercise was organised as a Tier 4 
national-level exercise (a joint local government and central government exercise) in accordance 
with the CDEM National Exercise Programme. It aimed to test New Zealand's all-of-nation 
arrangements for responding to a major disaster. A particular focus was given on roles and 
responsibilities between local, regional, a national and international agencies.  
The exercise included features typical of a full scale exercise (e.g. simulation, resource assessment 
and deployment and damage assessment operations). For the NZTA National office, the challenge 
was how to cope with the massive evacuation planned for residents within the 5 Km radius 
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blast zone. It was expected that the evacuation would cause significant congestion on motorways 
and SH 1 to Hamilton as well as SH 2 to the east coast. Another important issue raised by the 
exercise was staff safety for both NZTA and its suppliers, given the potential severity of the event.  
Scenario 
The scenario comprised a volcanic eruption located at the inner Manukau harbour. It was expected 
to severely damage land transport and to severely affect the north island.  
The exercise commenced with the identification of precursor activity in the form of seismicity in 
the Auckland region during November 2007.  In early 2008, unusual and sustained seismicity in the 
Auckland region prompted further attention until it was clear that a volcanic eruption was 
becoming imminent due to increasing seismic activity. The scenario also simulated earthquakes 
with intensity equal to Mercalli Intensity 6-7 in last 24-48 hours before the actual eruption, which 
included:  
 Violent explosions caused by magma coming into contact with water; sound/pressure 
shock waves and complete devastation 1-3 km from vent;  
 Extremely violent base surge phenomenon with turbulent ground-hugging flows of ash/gas 
with a speed of 50-300 km/h;  
 Ash fall; 
 Fountains in the vent area only lasting from 1 week to several months;  
 Lava flows crushing and burning everything within 1-10 km from vent and lasting from 
several weeks to months;  
 Risk of widespread fire from hot ash, lava, or disrupted gas supply lines within 1-10 km 
from vent; and 
 Asphyxiating gases (CO, CO2, HF, SO2) accompanying lava flows within 1-5km from 
vent.  
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Physical impacts included damage to infrastructure and transportation utilities (including roads, 
ports, and airports) and disruption to critical services, such as electricity, gas, fuel, 
telecommunications and water. The damage from the eruption severely affected the ability of the 
remainder of the North Island to function and provide support to refugees.  
Road controlling authorities were asked to understand and simulate the reaction for the city 
population during the volcanic eruption. It aims at predicting the level of panic, trips direction and 
the main purposes of trips. Self evacuation was considered the primary means, including 60% of 
residents within the 5 Km radius blast zone. As a result Civil Defence was responsible to moved 
40% of affected people and encourage 60% to self evacuate. This created great pressure on the 
NZTA to manage the motorway and SH 1 to Hamilton as well as SH 2 to the east. The event 
escalated considerably as it coincided with the normal evening rush hour peak flow. 
Observed activities  
Researchers were distributed throughout five different locations (NZTA national office in 
Wellington, group emergency operations centre, GEOC Auckland, NZTA Northcote traffic 
management, national GEOC Wellington and evacuation coordinator support at Waitakere EOC). 
Such great number of researchers allowed vast data collection and a very comprehensive 
observation process.  
It was observed that participating organisations had substantially different levels of awareness on 
initial situations (e.g. impact assessment, damage identification and vulnerabilities). Upon the 
introduction of initial injects, organisations faced a common issue, which was to predict how the 
volcanic eruption could affect the immediate and extended surrounding areas. It was also 
questioned whether these impacts aligned with assumptions made during previous planning. For 
instance, the NZTA National office showed very limited knowledge about affected area/assets, 
personnel, volcanic explosion consequences, and how traffic would behaviour and traffic 
management should change in the face of the chaos. At the regional level, the NZTA relied on 
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previous knowledge about the network, but ignored the fact that evacuation patterns could be 
significantly different to those observed during other types of events. The Group Emergency 
Operations Centre (GEOC) in Auckland had access to a considerable amount of scientific 
information about the implications of the eruption. However, had a limited understanding to where 
to evacuate people and had different views on how traffic would be affected.  
Situation awareness had considerable influence on how participants understood and proactively 
managed vulnerabilities. For instance, the NZTA National Office did not take an active role during 
the exercise. The participating personnel were reluctant to get involved and decided to wait for 
requests from the NZTA Regional Office. Overall, it was observed that participating organisations 
were waiting for information rather than proactively seeking it. One exception was the Bay of 
Plenty (BOP) regional council that proactively engaged in seeking information on estimated arrival 
numbers and responding by directing the appropriate amount of evacuees to their respective 
welfare centres. The BOP was also accountable in back feeding this information into other 
organisation in order to facilitate their decision-making process.  
The different perceptions of the initial situation were mostly due to difficulties in assimilating 
incoming information. Most participating organisations relied heavily on email communication, 
which would, in principle allow them to share text documents, maps and other various data about 
the event. Due to the magnitude of the event, participating organisations were swamped with very 
large and varied communication attempts. These eventually did not materialise into useful and 
reliable information that could support decision-making. On the contrary, it was often observed that 
staff would spend significant time dealing with communication problems (e.g. email sizes, spam 
filters and delays).  
Such difficulties were clearly shown by the way the NZTA processed information. At the national 
level, staff decided to use as little information technology as they could, with the exception of 
email messages. At the regional level spreadsheets for logging phone calls and other acquired 
information were produced during the exercise. Finally, regional staff recognised that they should 
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not rely only on emails and phones as those could be unavailable in a real event. Nevertheless, no 
ideas on how to overcome these issues were considered.  
Good adaptation was shown as many participating organisations managed to adjust as the exercise 
progressed. On one side of the spectrum, the expansion of the eruption affected area prompted the 
NZTA regional office to quickly reorganise the traffic management arrangements. On the other 
side of the spectrum, the NZTA national office showed poor adaptive capability to deal with new 
situations. The national office staff also showed limited communication actions as updated 
information about the event was seldom transferred to regional and local NZTA offices. 
3.2.4 Mount Ruapehu Volcanic Eruption 
On the 25th September 2007, the Mount Ruapehu volcano erupted in the New Zealand’s north 
island. According to the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, the eruption 
occurred at 8:20pm without any warning and lasted for about ten minutes. As a precaution, the ski 
fields were closed the following day and sixty people from Aorangi and Ruapehu huts were 
evacuated. The adjacent state highway was also closed until possible damage was assessed. The 
eruption was accompanied by magnitude 2.9 ground shaking on the Richter Scale that lasted seven 
minutes. An injured climber was the only direct victim from the event.  
The eruption prompted regional Police, Civil Defence and NZTA’s regional contractors to activate 
emergency response procedures. The event received attention from international, national, regional 
and local media as well from government agencies.  
The eruption caused concern for the local population, who criticised authorities for a lack of 
communication as rumours about a failure in the warning system were circulated. However, the 
Conservation Department Tongariro acting manager said that the alarm system had worked and the 
police area commander advised that appropriate response steps were taken to communicate those in 
the region in accordance with the emergency response plan. Nonetheless, the confirmed failure of 
the cell-phone text message alert occurred because the event created a magnitude 2.9 earthquake, 
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while the alert threshold is a magnitude 3.4. Ruapehu’s ski fields were expected to reopen on the 
day after the event, but they were only re-opened three days after the eruption. Many tourists 
complained about the ski field closures as it happened in the middle of the busy school holiday 
period. No property damage was reported and roads were closed for damage assessment until 11 
pm on the night of the event. The mountain’s extreme unpredictability and potential for further 
eruptions highlighted the importance of having a good warning system in the region and well 
defined response procedures and plans.  
Contractor’s Experience  
An interview was conducted at the Work Infrastructure’s office at Taumarunui on the 26th 
September 2007. Information collected during the interview confirmed that after the Mount 
Ruapehu eruption, the contractor was alerted via the after-hours emergency system (around 9:40 
pm). The decision to close the state highway was made at that time and road blocks and temporary 
signage were set up while assessing the road conditions. Road blocks were located at Ohakune, 
Manunui, Waiouru and Rangipo. Also, a small section of the SH was closed, but drivers were 
allowed to pass with caution.  
Eight light trucks with road management gear (signs, barriers, flashing lights) and 14 people were 
used to set up the road blocks. Gears were located at local depots located at Taumarunui, Raetihi 
and Turangi. Roads were re-opened at approximately 11:30pm on the same night of the event as no 
damage was found. Two staff were left at Turangi to monitor the situation over night. 
Road assessment was conducted by driving in the network and visually assessing the condition of 
pavements, culverts, signage and etc. Occasional assessments were performed by stopping for a 
visual analysis at critical points (mainly bridges) to check for possible damage. Costs involved in 
the response for Ruapehu’s Eruption (mainly petrol and wages) were claimed from the NZTA.  
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New Zealand Police’s Experience  
An interview with the local police inspector was conducted at Taumarunui on the 29th September 
2007. According to the police inspector, after the volcanic eruption the New Zealand Police 
received a 111 phone call from a ski operator. It was noticed that the Eruption Detection System 
(EDS) did not work as the earthquake event accompanying the volcanic eruption was of the 
magnitude 2.9. The EDS system is set up to be triggered by a magnitude 3.4 event. 
Recommendations were made in order to lower the alarm trigging threshold.   
The policeman decided to close roads in the region of Mount Ruapehu in face of his 17 years of 
experience in the area and on lessons identified after the 1995 Mount Ruapehu volcanic eruption. 
This indicates the use of experience and previous knowledge like in a naturalistic decision-making 
process. Although appropriated for such cases, this process has to be carefully considered as 
emergency events are unique. Hence, 1995’s experiences can be definitely applicable, but it needs 
to be re-assessed in face of new infrastructures, communication technologies, public expectations 
and etc. 
The situation was managed using the principles from the Coordinated Incident Management 
System (CIMS). According to the standard procedures of CIMS, the Communication Centre of 
Taumarunui Police contacted the local contractor. The police inspector expressed concern about the 
decision process and effectiveness applied by the contractor. It was argued that road blockages 
could be quickly pt in place as the contractor has resources scattered in the affected area. While 
waiting for the contractors, the police staff drove along the closed roads to check its condition. The 
NZTA and the consultant were not contacted by the Police, which fully coordinated the response 
with the contractor.   
After the roads were closed and the contractor arrived in the area, the police inspector travelled to 
the Emergency Operation Centre established at Whakakapa, in the Department of Conservation’s 
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(DoC) Office. A DoC staff member was assigned to the role of incident controller and Local 
volunteers were appointed to different roles required by the CIMS structure. 
The decisions taken on the night of the event comprised the evacuation of 60 people from Iwikau 
Village to Hotel Chateaux. As the situation became clearer, an alternative option to return to their 
accommodations was immediately granted. Roads were closed for assessment until the contractor 
had confirmed their safety condition. The final decision concerning the event was to close the ski 
fields until the situation was under control. 
GNS Science monitored and evaluated the volcano activity regularly until a final decision could be 
made about re-opening the ski fields. On the day after the event, two meetings a day (scheduled for 
4.30pm and 6.00pm) were hosted by GNS until the situation could be considered as completely 
safe. 
3.2.5 The 2008 Storm Events  
During late July 2008, a series of storm events affected New Zealand. The South Island was badly 
affected and in particular a Civil Defence Emergency was declared in the Marlborough District 
Council region.  
Dozens of people were evacuated from their homes and a camping ground was set up in Picton due 
to the flooding. Swollen streams were made worse by a high tide and sandbags were used to try and 
kept rising water from houses. In Nelson, a major water pipeline was damaged by falling trees and 
authorities asked residents to minimise water consumption. About a dozen residents from Sefton, 
north of Christchurch, were also evacuated because of the events and were moved to a local school 
hall.  
Flooding forced the closure of State Highway 1 between Blenheim and Kaikoura. Emergency 
services warned about flooding dangers in many parts of Canterbury and Marlborough, including 
Christchurch city. However, few roads in Christchurch and the Waimakariri area experienced 
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surface flooding. The situation was worsened by extreme winds which were lifting roof tiles and 
scattering branches and other debris throughout neighbourhoods. 
The decision process relevant to the management of the State Highway network in the South Island 
was observed at Opus International Consultants’ office in Christchurch. The observation lasted for 
approximately seven hours on the 31st of July 2008. 
Consultants mostly liaised with contractors and the NZTA. A very comprehensive information 
sharing process was observed between consultants and contractors while NZTA oversaw the 
situation. The consultant's staff have shown deep understanding of how to conduct the response. It 
was seldom observed hesitation on decision-making regardless the extent of the situation and 
external pressure.  
The only limitation identified refers to the lack of a secondary response team. For instance, the 
main manager was in charge since early in the morning (4.00am) and had no one to replace him 
until the research left the organisation (5.00pm). Although its criticality, the same manager did 
mention in a latter instance that the organisation did have spare staff to take over the situation if 
needed. It was also mentioned that contingency plans such as a secondary office location exists in 
case of the major building cannot be accessed due to limited transportation or collapse. 
3.3 Conclusive Remarks 
The intrinsic complex nature of exercises and real events along with data collected from the 
observations supported the identification of emergency management procedures at the Emergency 
Operations Centre level. Such experiences were vital in collecting data and developing knowledge 
on organisational decision-making.  
Although, the complex nature of emergency events was simulated by exercises, real events 
observations have indicated limitations in simulations. Hence, both approaches were synergic in 
helping to understand the environment and processes in which decisions take place.  
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Specific findings for each event/exercise were previously reported in the Case Study section. Those 
were achieved after compiling and analysing data under the flexible method proposed in sub-
section 3.1.2. General findings are now reported according to considerations on the four decision-
making domains (i.e. physical, information, cognitive and social). 
 Response operations: interactions among individuals within an organisation occur under 
well defined structures such as the CIMS. However, inter-organisational activities seem to 
be performed without much standardisation;  
 Information loss: the common process of logging received information on white boards 
has shown poor performances as reporting styles vary among people and events are highly 
dynamic. Additionally, the process cannot comprehensively take into account the 
numerous communication channels operating during an emergency (e.g. phone, fax, radio, 
cell phone, e-mail) therefore it is not able to accurately represent the event’s unfold; 
 Lack of communication redundancy: some observed organisations either did not have 
alternative communication channels in place or did not have staff capable to operate 
alternative technologies (e.g. satellite phones). Lack of communication redundancy often 
implied in information loss such as an observed organisation, which only became aware of 
a Civil Emergency situation after two hours it has been formally declared by the exercise 
controller. Many times such instances occurred as most of the communication and 
information sharing were performed using exclusively e-mails or phones; 
 Limited leadership: although every team had a staff member assigned as a “leader”, 
his/her influence was restricted to a team and it never crossed the “organisation’s 
boundaries”. Also at many observed exercises, the leadership role was limited and often 
underestimated; 
 Conflicting priorities and response goals: limited communication implied in defining 
conflicting priorities as organisations defined individual objectives without considering the 
emergency situation in a holistic context (i.e. shared priorities, limited resource 
availability). It was also observed passive response behaviour at some organisations, which 
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can be possibly associated with poor communication as staff waited for priorities to be 
defined by external organisations;     
 Team work: it is predominant in comparison to individual decision-making and 
management. All staff contributed by using the best of their knowledge and expertise in 
order to achieve efficient response. However, individual knowledge and expertise can still 
be better used when managing emergencies. For instance, it was observed wrong allocation 
of staff to particular roles, which consequently incurred in limited individual performances. 
In this sense, clear communication protocols, information systems, 
accountability/leadership skills, etc need to be developed, trained and implemented 
Although observations added a considerable body of knowledge on extreme events decision-
making at organisational contexts, they could not suffice all data and experiences needed to 
proposed the Dynamic Response Recovery Tool. In this respect, a complimentary research 
approach was developed. It is fully described in the next chapter along with its case studies, which 
finally supported the proposal of the DRRT.   
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4 UNDERSTANDING EXTREME EVENTS RESOURCE 
DEPLOYMENT 
This chapter presents the development and application of a game based scenario simulation. This 
approach was envisaged as a way to overcome the limitations from the observation of emergency 
exercises in the context of physical resource deployment. The chapter begins with a brief review of 
the gaming techniques used for surveying purposes. The second section presents the development 
and design activities undertaken to create the game-based emergency scenario simulation. The third 
section describes the field tests and the final game package deployed for case studies. The reaming 
two sections are dedicated in explaining the proposed analysis method and reporting the series of 
case studies conducted in New Zealand. 
4.1 Gaming for Surveying 
The history of gaming can be tracked back to 1962, when a PDP-1 (Programmed Data Processor-1) 
was used to develop simulations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (McCarthy et al., 
2005). Despite its initial success, gaming simulations have not had a place within a formal branch 
in science until the eighties when Ellington et al. (1981) published a book entitled “Games and 
Simulations in Science Education”. The authors identified the lack of basic formal texts and source 
books on science-based gaming as a gap. This gap was seen to have impaired the technique’s 
development. This fact motivated Ellington and other authors to review early developments and to 
investigate a series of concepts and applications for gaming within research.  
Against this backdrop, Ellington et al. (1981) reported the use of numerous simulations in the 
forms of cards and board games between 1970 and 1975. This was also when computer-based 
simulations became accessible to many universities and large organisations (e.g. IBM Research 
Centre – Peterson and Wahi, 1972). Over the next two decades (1980s and 1990s), gaming 
concepts were consistently developed and evolved for the purposes of both entertainment and 
surveying. For instance, the well known game SimCity 2000 (first released in 1993) originated 
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from formal studies about urban dynamics (Peschon et al., 1996) and resulted in a very popular 
entertainment and teaching tool (Adams, 1998).  
Additional successful teaching and learning experiences (like those gained from SimCity) have 
encouraged researchers and practitioners to invest effort and resources into game simulation 
research and development. For instance, Fong (2006) reports numerous commercial games that 
have been adapted for military training. In such context, game simulations can focus on exercising 
the “use of information to alleviate the challenges in an urban warfare scenario” as well as 
understanding “issues surrounding information requirement and usage, sense making, and 
command and control” (Fong, 2006). Additionally, Belardo and Wallace (1989) report the 
evaluation of decision support tools through game simulation and Prohaska and Frank (1990) 
purely used simulations to investigate decision-making activities.  
From the nineties to date, computer developments have created more sophisticated opportunities 
thanks to the greater flexibility and data handling capacity offered by the combination of hardware 
and software. Cognitive skills such as problem-solving and decision-making have been consistently 
practiced in game simulations. In recent years, Power (2003, 2005b) and Mendonça et al. (2006) 
have developed concepts and reported experiences using complex simulations that are used for the 
study of decision-making and decision-making support during stress laden situations.    
No matter what field of expertise, game simulations have, over time, shown their fascinating 
capacity to emulate scenarios and practice real-life situations. Ellington et al. (1981) conclude that 
game simulations are useful for research as they can be highly versatile and flexible, unlike real 
situations observation. They can also achieve a positive transfer of learning (i.e. development of 
abilities and skills to be applied in real situations – Gagné, 1970). 
Three formal concepts lay the foundations for game simulations: i) Game, ii) Simulation and iii) 
Case Study. In general terms, games are defined as contests between adversaries operating under 
constraints (rules) for an objective, while simulations are “operating representations of contextual 
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features of realities” (Bloomer, 1973 apud Ellington et al. 1981). Finally, case studies are in-depth 
studies of a particular event, problem or situation (Walker, 1974). It ultimately targets knowledge 
development regardless specific circumstances defined by the case study (Van Wagner, 2009).  
Although the abovementioned concepts are individually limited, a number of possibilities are 
created when they are combined. For instance, Bloomer (1973) describes the overlap between 
simulation and game as hybrid exercises or simulation games. Ellington et al. (1981) define the 
seven types of exercises as illustrated in Figure 4-1. We further explore “Simulation Games Used 
as Case Studies” because of its potential for this research.  
 
Figure 4-1: Relationships between Games, Simulations and Case Studies. 
Source: Ellington et al. (1981). 
The overlap of these three basic concepts (i.e. Simulation Games Used as Case Studies) is the most 
promising one for this particular research. This type of exercise can replicate a real ongoing 
situation (Simulation) under specific pre-defined rules (Game). Thus, particular events, problems or 
situations can be studied in-depth (Case Study) in order to answer research questions (which is 
meant to be the game’s objective). Ellington et al. (1981) formally define Simulation Games Used 
as Case Studies as a class of exercises that has all the components from Games, Simulations and 
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Case Studies. This includes both small and large-scale simulations for teaching and interactive 
teaching, respectively. Some examples refer to “real” war games used for military training and 
computerised business management games.     
In order to fully explore the approach described above, four development items should be properly 
considered (Peterson and Wahi, 1972). Initially, a scenario has to be created. This scenario defines 
the boundaries and set up limitations so that a controlled environment can be simulated. A scenario 
(also referred as an approximation model) emulates the reality surrounding the particular event, 
problem or situation under study. Scenario characteristics lead to two development needs, also 
regarded as game facets. One facet refers to the game’s interactiveness and the other to its 
instructions. The first one defines the dialog interface between player and game through the 
provision of multiple accesses and courses of events. The player only sees inputs and outputs in the 
forms of natural language (i.e. statements, pictures and etc), while the game platform runs the 
approximation model in a “black box” environment to ultimately perform all possible variations. 
The another facet provides teaching capabilities, as it helps the player to make inferences about the 
hidden model ruling the game simulation or the approximation model. Finally, game 
inconsistencies should be always expected no matter how well conceived and tested the game was. 
Thus, a game authoring tool should allow modifications to be quickly performed. 
Along with having a straightforward development procedure, gaming techniques have shown 
potential for studying a number of subjects for almost five decades. Applications vary in 
complexity (e.g. board or computer based games) depending on the specific approaches, objectives 
and resources. Results reported by numerous authors have proven the applicability and success of 
gaming techniques, as well as suggesting promising opportunities for the future.  
In this context, we aimed at developing a game simulation for the specific context of roading 
organisations. The main idea was to focus on a singular research subject (or individual) so that 
specific decision-making activities could be observed and recorded. By collecting specific data sets 
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(further described in this chapter), we aimed at the identification of patterns of resource 
deployment, which can ultimately represent decision-making behaviour. 
4.2 Game Based Scenario Design Protocols 
The design task was initially tackled using a three step process comprised of Conceptualisation, 
Creation of a Prototype, and Testing (as illustrated in Figure 4-2). 
 
Figure 4-2: Converting a Basic Idea into a Viable Package. 
Source: Ellington et al. (1981). 
Aimed at designing a viable game package for the case of State Highway Organisations, the 
conceptualisation step defined the format, structure and content. A board game format was chosen 
based on simple graphical development needs in the context of the available information 
technologies. The structure accounted for the information dispersal during an emergency 
simulation, so that the scenario becomes clear to the player through a series of reports. This 
structure is very similar to the one used to run the exercises observed in chapter 3. A 7.2 earthquake 
on the Richter Scale, affecting a hypothetical city of 150,000 inhabitants featuring common urban 
systems (e.g. central business district, residential suburbia, commercial areas, industrial area, road 
network system, railway line), defined the game’s content. 
 77 
With the basic concept of the exercise set up, we drew up the initial prototype package 
descriptions. The general requirements to fulfil structure needs and content representation in 
accordance with the desired format were considered. The Prototype Package was created according 
to the following necessary components:  
 Representation of transport networks such as roading and rail due to our intended focus on 
the transportation issues that arise during emergency events; 
 Presentation of a common urban region, including a hospital, parks, an airport, commercial 
and administrational centres, a central business district, residential areas etc; 
 Non-cluttered graphical board game; 
 Injections of information in hardcopy formats; 
 Physical resources numerically represented, i.e. number of available units of resources 
without distinction of type (e.g. diggers, trucks, temporary traffic management signage); 
 Time limitations created for response in order to simulate the stress and pressures common 
to emergencies; 
 Game to be played either by individuals or groups. Hence, no conflicts between parties are 
to be simulated; 
 Exercise length limited to a range of 25 to 35 minutes to encourage participation.  
At practical levels, the abovementioned design requirements have helped to shape final procedural 
ideas for the game simulation as well as to refine the content and define the list of materials needed 
(Stage 2). In general terms, the game intends to present the user with a board representation of an 
urban area, a specific number of physical resources to be managed and a time limitation device 
such as chronometer or the exercise controller himself/herself. The simulation shall be operational 
through a series of injects in hard copy formats given to the participant at the beginning of each 
response day. Finally, the simulation’s rules allow the participant to ask the exercise controller 
about possible additional information not presented in the injects. However, additional information 
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will only be provided on the basis of the scenario development and the specific query of the 
participant. 
Finally, the prototype package (Stages 1 and 2) can be summarily described as been an emergency 
scenario simulation containing a board game, resource limitation techniques and injects. The board 
game, resources and hardcopy injects include within them the materials needed to run the 
simulation. The following section describes how the field test package was developed during pilot 
testing, and finally the Game-Based Scenario Simulation.    
4.3 Pilot Test and Game Based Scenario Simulation Package 
The first version of the game (i.e. board, scenario’s injects, simulation procedures) was 
implemented and tested in order to finalise the process described in Figure 4-2. Alongside 
developing the game we have set up testing routines based on simple procedures and volunteer 
participation (e.g. fellow research colleagues). A number of participants (initially unaware of the 
research objectives) were asked to “play” the game and report their impressions, feelings and 
suggestions for improvement. The testing was performed in two rounds with five different people. 
Thanks to this process, great improvements were made to both the graphical design and the 
scenario specification. For the sake of simplicity, we present here only the final version of the game 
simulation.  
The simulation was graphically designed using simple tools to create the board game (Figure 4-3) 
and the emergency scenario. The board game is associated with a set of events referred to as 
injects, which ultimately define the emergency scenario. Injects are designed to dynamically 
present data and information about the extreme event under simulation. Both the board and the 
injects were developed simultaneously and checked against each other in order to avoid 
inconsistencies. 
Operationally, a few rules were created to keep the experiment uncomplicated and interesting for 
the participant. Thus, the participant could not make use of any external resources (e.g. computer, 
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response manual, maps) or ask for support from work colleagues during the simulation due to the 
individual style of the game. Information is only given in the form of hardcopy injects presented to 
the participant at the beginning of each simulated response day or sometimes as the result of further 
enquiries made of the exercise controller. In this case, a proper query should be directed to the 
person in charge with a clear message about the information desired, e.g. “What is the level of 
damage at the bridge over the river (link 14)?” Additional information could then be provided to 
the participant according to the exercise flow, i.e. none, incomplete or complete additional 
information. 
Following the design descriptions defined at Stage 1, the experiment was to be limited to a 25 – 35 
minute period accordingly to the participant’s ability to make the decisions. This was assumed to 
be a good length of time in terms of encouraging participation, based on impressions gained during 
the pilot simulations and suggestions made by the volunteers involved in the trials. Within this time 
frame and the specifics of the scenario, we limited the number of resource deployments to five. 
Each deployment represents a response day and should take approximately six to seven minutes. If 
resources were not deployed after this deadline time, this would be considered a status quo 
resource deployment decision and the simulation would continue the following response day.  
Experiences acquired during the observation and analyses of simulated exercises and real events 
were used to develop a data collection method to capture response planning. The Analytical 
Hierarchy Process – AHP (Saaty, 1996) was chosen as it is a structured and extensively applied 
technique in the engineering decision-making science, which helps to deal with complex decisions 
and judgments (Saaty, 2008; Zahedi, 1986).  
The AHP is a pragmatic process in which various elements from a basic structure are pairwise 
compared until all combinations are exhausted (Virginia Tech, 2010). Comparisons can be 
performed either by using concrete data about the elements or personal judgments on elements’ 
meaning and importance. The process ultimately allows the conversion of cognitive judgment into 
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numerical values. The final outcome of the AHP methodology is the estimation of weights or 
priorities for each element under consideration in a rational and consistent manner.  
The AHP method was vital in this research stage as the literature review (chapter 2) indicated that 
extreme events decision-making is a complex and interdependent process. The observation of 
emergency exercises and real events (chapter 3) confirmed that previous knowledge, personal 
experiences, organisation procedures, response plans, resource availability and so on need to be 
considered when managing extreme events.  
Hence, a powerful approach such as AHP could capture the existing complexity in prioritising 
objectives during an emergency as well as ensure that data collected (i.e. weights assigned by 
participants) is consistent. In this context, the AHP method was used to certify that the game based 
scenario simulation and collected data would indeed represent common challenges and decision-
making actions performed during emergency situations.   
The AHP was applied in this research by requiring game participants to fill a so called Importance 
Matrix ( 
Table 4-1). This matrix was designed to acquire data about how participants strategise their 
response (also referred in this study as priorities) and assess the consistency of the weights assigned 
to each pair of objectives (blank cells in  
Table 4-1). By using Saaty’s Consistency Ratio (CR) (Saaty, 1994) and estimating eigen values for 
all elements in the matrix according to the AHP method, we could ensure data consistency as well 
as a scientifically sound process to determine response priorities. In summary, the AHP method 
offered a complete suite of tools allowing the analysis of the complex prioritisation process 
performed by participants in the light of multi-criteria weight assignment.  
In the context of emergency management and game simulations, the Importance Matrix was vital in 
validating the research approach taken in this thesis. Initially, the game is considered to be an 
 81 
independent experiment aiming at understanding extreme events decision-making processes 
applied by distinct organisations and staff. Thus, the matrix should supports a data collection 
conferring the flexibly needed to analyse the simulations according to individual participants’ 
decision processes, prioritisation schemes, resource allocation routines and so on.  
The development of the Importance Matrix was necessary as case study participants were selected 
from a range of organisations involved with emergency management and not only roading 
organisations. Hence, decision processes and priorities were expected to considerably vary amongst 
groups under study. Finally, response plans and priorities are commonly qualitatively described in 
emergency manuals. Therefore, it was required to propose a method, which would convert a 
qualitative scheme in numerical values for further analyses.  
In essence, the Importance Matrix operates as a benchmarking tool. Its data collection procedure as 
well as weight assignment consistency check and priorities estimation allow us to study decision-
making processes applied by different case study participants in a common ground. It is therefore 
possible to compare performances without biasing results or compromising the realism of the 
analyses. An illustration for such a scenario would be the assessment of decisions made by two 
distinct groups of participants. Consider one group with strong priority towards road accessibility 
(i.e. accessibility between communities and external support) and another with focus on immediate 
rescue and lifeline support. The numerical estimation of priorities makes possible to correctly 
assess and understand the decision-making process adopted by each group in terms of resource 
allocation.  Thus, the analysis is substantiated by comprehensive data for both response planning 
and decision-making (resource deployment), which ultimately confers real value and accuracy to 
the process. 
The matrix is to be filled in before the formal beginning of the simulation so that the data collection 
is not biased with experiences gathered during the scenario simulation (e.g. lessons, criticisms, 
limitations). On a practical level, the participant had to fill in the blank cells in  
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Table 4-1 using the relative scale given; in this way their priorities for each objective could be 
estimated. Although assigning pairwise comparison weights for eight items is a complex and 
demanding process, it provides the researcher with comprehensive information regarding priority 
consistency ratios, conflicting priorities management routines, relative priorities etc. 
 
Table 4-1: Importance Matrix. 
 
During the simulation, data is collected by observing/recording the number of resources deployed 
to each road link and directly enquiring as to the motivation behind particular deployments. After 
the given time (of approximately six minutes), the number of resources deployed to each road asset 
and the participant’s statements regarding his/her decisions were recorded. Data was collected in 
such way so both quantitative and qualitative data were made available for subsequent analyses. 
Finally, upon the completion of the simulation, a semi-structured interview was conducted, aimed 
at gathering information on a participant’s general decision planning and decision-making (i.e. 
resources deployment). 
All data is to be analysed under the specifically designed method presented in the next sub-section. 
The remainder of this sub-section briefly describes the specific scenario that accompanies this 
board game (Figure 4-3). 
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Figure 4-3: Board Game. 
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The proposed earthquake scenario evolves similarly to a real event. Only general situations and 
superficial information are initially provided to participants on the first day, while specific data 
(e.g. damage, affected people, resource needs) are progressively made available on subsequent 
days. This simulates an evolving event, in which infrastructure assessments, lifeline situation 
reports, Civil Defence response operations, etc are provided as time elapses so response actions can 
be decided on. 
The scenario develops over a five-day period after a major shock in a hypothetical urban region. 
The event affects a city of around 150,000 people and damages roading systems, buildings/houses, 
businesses etc. As previously mentioned in the game rules, additional information can be acquired 
from the exercise controller, depending on the participant’s queries. That being said, all the 
information needed to proceed with a response is made available through injects given to 
participants during the simulation.   
Table 4-2 presents the detailed scenario injects (or game content) to be made available to 
participants on a “daily basis”. Observe that the emergency situation develops over time with a 
series of events as well as how the information accuracy increases over the response process. In 
this context, the five day event is described as follows: 
 Day One – superficial damage information about major transportation infrastructures is 
obtained from various sources. For instance, the road bridge over the river (road link 14) 
and the interchange (road link 4) are only reported as being damaged, without any 
additional information. Response priorities are also established and circulated among 
response organisations by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. The 
main challenges during the initial response day are balancing priorities in terms of the key 
road links (e.g. external access and main bridge over the river) and the central business 
district roads, and strategising a response plan without much information about damage in 
many affected areas; 
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 Day Two – building upon the events from the first day, information about previous damage 
is updated. The information provided is the result of formal assessments conducted during 
the first day, as well as public information collected and confirmed by the Civil Defence. 
At this stage, with an increased volume of damage information, the challenge lies in 
comprehending the most immediate needs according to the available resources, so that 
response plans can be quickly and effectively re-structured if needed. Finally, two injects 
(the immediate needs to have access to the power station and to increase traffic flow at the 
damaged bridge over the river) are provided in order to overwhelm the decision maker so 
the simulation can reach real life complexity levels; 
 Day Three – specific damage information is given regarding numerous components of 
transportation infrastructure. This ultimately creates a very complex decision environment 
with many conflicting priorities (the needs of the hospital, airport etc., issues such as river 
contamination) and limited resource availability. The imminent collapse of the main bridge 
(link 14) creates an urgent issue to be managed in order to keep the network connected. 
The main bridge allows for a more immediate response in the face of so much damage. 
Problems with water contamination and the need to arrange an alternative supply increases 
the complexity of the scenario in comparison with the previous day; 
 Day Four – the scenario situation does not change much during the fourth day and the only 
new piece of information comes via a phone call from field personnel reporting chaos and 
traffic problems in the Residential Area 1. A TV media update to report current response 
efforts and future plans needs to be given at the end of the day. Although little new 
information is given, the participant is still challenged to manage the very complex 
situation from day three as well as to keep the situation progressing. The participant needs 
to keep tracking the number of resources deployed and needed according to a number of 
different priorities – this can easily overwhelm the decision maker; and    
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 Day Five – similarly to day four, little information is added in terms of damage 
assessments and network operations. A series of faxes from numerous organisations (e.g. 
rail companies, contractors and consultancies) are given to the participant in order to 
represent the common process of information overload during emergency events. Thus, the 
intention is to simulate the latter stages of response when most information has already 
been collected and information overload is experienced due to lack of organisational 
information sharing. 
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Table 4-2: Game Scenario Development. 
Injects Location / 
Inject 1st Day 2nd Day 3rd Day 4th Day 5th Day 
Link 14: Road 
bridge 
- 1 lane operational 
- Resource need: 15 
units 
- Traffic overload 
- Assessment update 
due to next day 
- Assessment: 
imminent collapse if 
the immediate 
deployment of 7 units 
of resources is not 
done 
Nil Nil 
Link 1: Access 
to neighbour 
city 
- Additional resources 
from CD 
- Resource need: 10 
units 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Link 2: local 
suburbia roads 
- Housing debris 
- Unknown resource 
needs 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Fire at 
industrial area 
- Unknown details of 
cause if fires 
- Limited access to 
site by Link 5 
- Link 5 restricted to 
small vehicles 
- Unknown resource 
needs 
- Resource need: 6 
units Nil Nil 
Link 7: local 
CBD roads 
- Building debris 
- Petrol stations non 
accessible 
- Difficulties to 
commute 
- Resource need: 6 
units 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Link 4: road 
interchange - Unknown damage 
- North access to 
Residential Area 1 
blocked 
- Resource need: 15 
units 
Nil Nil Nil 
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Table 4-2: Game Scenario Development (cont.) 
Injects Location / 
Inject 1st Day 2nd Day 3rd Day 4th Day 5th Day 
Link 13: rail 
bridge 
- Collapsed 
- Resource need: 20 
units 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Link 3: access 
to power station Nil 
- Restricted to small 
machinery 
- Power station 
partially operational 
- Resource need: 7 
units 
Nil Nil Nil 
Link 12: link 
between 
commercial and 
educational 
centre 
Nil 
- Road closed due to 
fallen trees 
- Resource need: 6 
units 
Nil Nil Nil 
Link 8: access 
to hospital Nil Nil 
- Partially closed 
- Resource need: 4 
units 
Nil Nil 
Hospital needs Nil Nil 
Water 
Power 
Medial supplies 
Nil Nil 
River 
contamination Nil Nil 
Water contaminated 
due to chemical 
spilling from 
industrial area 
Nil Nil 
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Table 4-2: Game Scenario Development (cont.) 
Injects Location / 
Inject 1st Day 2nd Day 3rd Day 4th Day 5th Day 
Residential 
Area 1 Nil Nil 
- 1 building collapsed 
- 300 people missing, 
50 dead, 200 in need 
of hospital treatment 
- Local roads need 
cleaning to facilitate 
search and rescue 
- Resource need: 5 
units Nil 
Link 2: local 
roads at 
Suburbia 
Nil Nil 
- Housing debris 
- Resource need: 4 
units 
Nil Nil 
Link 11: Local 
road at 
Residential 
Area 2 
Nil Nil 
- Building debris 
- Resource need: 3 
units 
Nil Nil 
Link 10: access 
to Residential 
Area 2 (by 
Educational 
centre) 
Nil Nil 
- Closed 
- Resource need: 15 
units 
Nil Nil 
Link 9: access 
to Residential 
Area 2 (by 
hospital) 
Nil Nil 
- Partially closed 
- Resource need: 6 
units 
Nil Nil 
Report / 
Communication Nil Nil Nil Nil 
- Geological Services 
- Railway company 
- CR Engineering: 
development site 
availability 
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4.4 Analysis method 
The proposed Game-based Scenario Simulation Analysis Method aims at processing both the 
quantitative and qualitative data collected during game simulations in order to identify decision-
making processes and patterns. Information generated from these data helped us to understand 
influencing factors, key information, prioritisation schemes, and, ultimately, decision-making 
variables in the context of emergency management (within roading organisations). Although the 
game was carefully designed and a specific case study was defined (i.e. roading organisations), we 
could not pragmatically envisage a rigid analysis process due to the complex nature of emergency 
management and high cognitive levels of extreme events decision-making.  
The method has three phases, as illustrated in Figure 4-4. Each phase targets the accomplishment of 
a specific goal in order to progressively analyse decision-making during extreme events. As shown 
in Figure 4-4, data is initially filtered into two classes: qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative 
data is processed first, due to these data being more suited to numerical analyses and more widely 
represented in engineering contexts. Nonetheless, qualitative data is used to complement those 
analyses where quantitative sets did not sufficiently meet data needs. The analysis is concluded 
either by extracting general knowledge or specifying an extreme event decision-making model 
based upon results achieved for both response planning (Importance Matrices) and decision-
making response (resources deployment).  
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Figure 4-4: Proposed Game Analysis Method. 
The first phase involves collecting and organising data from different simulations into two data 
sets. These two sets will contain both qualitative data (audio records/transcripts of interviews and 
the reasoning stated for each decision made) and quantitative data (number of resources deployed 
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to each road link per day and Importance Matrix’s weights). The aim is to facilitate further analyses 
by using only two sets without compromising individual analyses. 
The second phase targets the identification of commonalities or patterns among participants. This is 
achieved by generating box-plot diagrams for the intended classes of data and identifying outliers 
and excluding them from the data set. Updated box-plot diagrams should be then generated in order 
to identify decision-making patterns. It is important to consider the number of outliers in terms of 
the total population, as large numbers do not indicate patterns by themselves. This proposed data 
analysis method is made extremely simple to facilitate the analyses of both response planning and 
decision-making responses, as described below.   
Data from the importance matrices ( 
Table 4-1) is used for the analysis of response planning. A Consistency Ratio (Equation 4-1) is 
proposed according to Saaty (1994) for a quick assessment of the weights assigned by the 
participant. Saaty’s original concept of CR aims at verifying if the decision maker is being random 
and/or illogical in the pairwise comparisons (Xu et al., 2008).  
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n
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CR                                                         (4-1) 
 
Where: n – number of items considered in the Importance Matrix;  
             RI – Random Index;  
             Lmax – Largest eigen value of the Importance Matrix; 
             CR ≤  0.10 for n greater than 4 (Saaty, 1994). 
 
At the end, we estimate priorities for each response objective using Equation 4-2 as follows.  
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Where: P(ROi) – ith Response Priorities; 
             i – row items; 
             j – column items; 
             n – number of row items or column items; 
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             wij – importance or weights assigned by participant; 
             1 ≤ i ≤ n;    
             1 ≤ j ≤ n.   
 The analysis of response planning is concluded by plotting box plot diagrams and identifying 
outliers in order to find commonalities and prioritisation patterns among participants.  
The Decision-making Response is similarly analysed (i.e. by plotting Box Plot Diagrams and 
identifying outliers). However, data from the resources deployed to each road link shall now be 
used. It is strongly recommended that data be used in a temporal fashion (i.e. resources deployed 
per response day) to assess how situation awareness develops and response processes change 
throughout the scenario. 
Finally, if the results obtained indicate patterns then a mathematical modelling development of 
extreme events decision-making shall take place in the third phase. This process will define 
variables, parameters, and ultimately equations, so as to describe the decision processes. Specific 
techniques for numerical modelling are not proposed yet as they may vary considerably (as a result 
of data availability, findings and local culture/environment). On the other hand, if patterns are not 
clearly identified then the analyst should extract general knowledge from the experiences acquired. 
Thus, further findings regarding the decision-making processes applied by participants can be 
drawn in future studies. In this particular case, it is envisaged that there are potential additional 
contributions from the qualitative data collected in the first phase.     
4.5 Game Simulation Case Studies 
Twelve case studies were conducted over a 3-month period. They included local and national 
roading authorities, consultants, and contractors with nation-wide operations. Organisations’ and 
participants’ names were suppressed due to privacy requirements and Human Ethics regulations 
(refer to Appendix A for University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee Approval). The 
results achieved are reported in terms of their phase below. 
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 1st Phase – Data Collection: 
The twelve case studies were initially considered suitable for analysis based on participants’ 
conduct and general decision-making and management performances during the simulations. All 
data collected were organised according to Phase 1 requirements and qualitative and quantitative 
data sets were organised. Appendix B presents the quantitative data collected from Importance 
Matrices and Resource Deployments. Qualitative data (e.g. interview records, comments, 
suggestions) remain in digital audio format, as it would demand too many human resources (and 
funding) to be transcribed.  
 2nd Phase – Data Analysis: 
Phase 2 incorporates the analysis of quantitative data for both the Response Planning and the 
Decision-making Response. Planning accounts for the structured response strategy defined by the 
participant previously the simulation. This data was recorded by asking the participants to fill in the 
given Importance Matrix. The Decision-making Response is the actual response process, limited in 
the proposed game-based simulation to the number of resources deployed to each link on the road 
network during the five simulated response days. Both planning and response stages are 
individually analysed as follows.  
 - Response Planning:  
Data from Importance Matrices were initially assessed in order to identify random or illogical 
pairwise comparisons (Saaty, 1994). Consistency Ratios (Equation 4-1) were estimated for each of 
the twelve participants. The results shown in Table 4-3 indicated the need to withdraw participants 
B, D, E, J, K and L from the study due to a lack of consistency (according to Saaty’s 
recommendation, i.e. CR equal or smaller to 0.10). However, a secondary analyses indicate that 
participants’ behaviours were appropriate during all simulations conducted so none participant was 
 95 
excluded from the data set. Inconsistent CRs presented in Table 4-3 can be associated with 
difficulties to fill the proposed Importance Matrices as assigning exact pairwise comparison 
weights to emergency response objectives can be a complex and demanding task. Some 
participants highlighted that prioritizing objectives using the proposed multicriteria approach was 
too difficult in face of many complexities to be considered when dealing with emergency events. 
This fact aligns with findings from the study conducted by Buckley and Uppuluri (1984), which 
discusses the advantages and disadvantages to use exact pairwise comparison ratios, flexible 
weighting criteria (such as fuzzy weights) and other alternative approaches to reduce bias and 
imprecision in multicriteria data collection. 
Table 4-3: Consistency Ratio. 
 Consistency Ratio 
Participant A 0.053 
Participant B 0.165 
Participant C -0.038 
Participant D 0.684 
Participant E 0.252 
Participant F 0.009 
Participant G 0.015 
Participant H 0.048 
Participant I 0.030 
Participant J 0.111 
Participant K 0.384 
Participant L 0.207 
Hence, exclusively using Saaty’s Consistency Ratio appears inappropriate when deciding who will 
be excluded. The exact pairwise weights could not incorporate all the complexities that exist in 
emergency management. Saaty’s Consistency Ratio was judged limited in the context of this 
research as it only considered data from the Importance Matrices and not from the remaining parts 
of the simulation (e.g. resources deployment, reasoning statements, participant’s behaviour, 
individual experiences and skills). Hence, Saaty’s CR was not used as the unique parameter to 
disqualify participants.  
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Data consistency analyses were performed along with pattern identification as the analysis 
framework (Figure 4-4) was designed to incorporate unforeseen data and/or processes limitations. 
Priorities were initially calculated for each response objective and associated participant using 
Equation 4-2. The results shown in Table 4-4, which represent the importance of each response 
priority in a percentage value, were used to plot a Box Plot Diagram and individual priorities for all 
twelve participants (Figure 4-5). Visual analysis of the Box Plot Diagram indicated a series of 
potential outliers (observations numerically distant from a pattern or cluster of data), which were 
highlighted in red in Table 4-4. Those values represent differences among individual prioritisation 
schemes applied by participants. Additionally, extreme values are possibly associated with 
misjudgements or misinterpretation of the multicriteria method required to fill the Importance 
Matrix. Ultimately, such results validate the intended research approach posed by Importance 
Matrix as it reflects the complex and overwhelming reality dealt when managing emergencies.  
Median priorities values for all participants are plotted in Figure 4-6. It indicates that decision 
makers have the tendency to prioritise “Support Immediate Rescue” during response activities (i.e. 
immediate aftermath of the event). Been the highest priority objective also incurs in randomness 
due to different possible approaches to be taken. Common values were set at the 0.30 mark 
although some participants have assigned very low or very high priorities for this specific 
objective. In the specific New Zealand context, it can be argued that underestimation rises from the 
assumption that Civil Defence’s recommendations (e.g. maintain provisional supplies for three 
days, community engagement) would be strictly obeyed by general public. On the other hand, 
overestimation can be associated with misconception of response planning by not taking into 
consideration conflicting priorities and the common multi-task nature of emergency management 
needed to be taken into consideration. 
Interestingly, the results have shown the commonalities tend to a particular study conducted by the 
Canterbury Engineering Lifelines Group (CELG, 2007). In the context of route prioritisation, 
community priorities were ranked as follows:  
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 Restoration of services providing an immediate threat to public health and safety (e.g. 
hospitals, ambulances, fire fighting services); 
 Restoration of supply to emergency services sites (police, fire service, Emergency 
Operations Centres); 
 Restoration of supply to key infrastructure sites requiring service for their own recovery 
such as Lifeline Utilities (including energy, telecommunications, water, wastewater, 
transport); 
 Restoration of services to key organisations that have been identified members of a 
welfare advisory group or similar; 
 Restoration of supply to major construction resources, to which access would be needed in 
the response and recovery phase (including contractors, materials, plants); and 
 Restoration of services to schools. 
An interesting phenomenon has been identified at medium priority levels (i.e. support lifelines, 
enabling support from other areas and repairing key infrastructure). The issue relates to the 
cognitive process used to balance conflicting and interdependent resource needs and availability. 
Medium priority objectives are flexibly incorporated into the emergency management and response 
planning. This happens due to the need to cope with the escalating nature of disasters, which can 
impose sudden challenges in response to unexpected events. Using this approach, medium priority 
objectives can be adapted according to real time needs; in this way the core response objectives can 
be maintained. 
In spite of the many differences between high, medium and low priority classifications, there is a 
general trend in the way that responses were planned by the participants before the simulations. 
Initially, their response is focused on attending affected people in order to save lives (usually the 
greatest priority during the immediate aftermath of disasters). Search and Rescue is a time 
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dependent objective, as affected people have a limited time span to receive support before they 
eventually perish (e.g. the 72 Hour Rule for earthquake events). Nevertheless, immediate rescue is 
not the only thing considered, as it only accounts for 33% of priorities. There is still a large margin 
for alternative objectives. In the specific simulations conducted in this research, 47% of priorities 
correspond to three objectives rated as medium priority (support lifelines, enable support from 
other areas and repair key infrastructure) and 20% for the remaining objectives or low priority 
responses. These facts show a response pattern among participants in which flexibility allows 
improvisation when unforeseen events occur. Response planning also considers a multi-objective 
approach as human life depends on resources (e.g. medical infrastructure, medicine, potable water, 
power) and critical systems are commonly interdependent. Ultimately, the response planning stage 
indicates decision processes aligned with the conceptual background of Naturalistic Decision 
Models (use of comparisons, reasoning, assumptions, facts/data, etc.) as incomplete, complex 
information needs to be considered and understood before strategies can be agreed upon. 
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Table 4-4: Response Priorities. 
 Support 
Immediate 
Rescue (%) 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
(%) 
Support 
Lifelines 
(%) 
Protect 
Economy 
(%) 
Protect 
Environment 
(%) 
Enable Support 
from other 
Areas (%) 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure 
(%) 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
(%) 
A 44.46 3.05 10.68 5.34 2.37 15.41 12.46 6.23 
B 33.86 11.59 15.35 5.11 5.53 8.96 11.74 7.86 
C 18.47 3.64 20.82 5.98 6.76 18.30 15.56 10.46 
D 11.65 10.80 18.14 3.08 3.45 20.23 9.68 22.98 
E 34.21 1.80 03.23 6.13 6.73 13.86 14.22 19.82 
F 31.82 21.10 12.21 4.56 4.50 8.11 11.60 6.11 
G 32.94 8.73 18.87 3.33 3.14 9.56 16.76 6.67 
H 21.24 8.13 14.56 4.41 5.73 26.56 9.66 9.70 
I 31.62 2.07 29.22 1.94 4.55 16.40 9.17 5.02 
J 16.02 2.50 11.89 8.97 8.12 17.96 17.27 17.27 
K 35.21 1.64 19.77 3.27 11.96 8.01 13.92 6.22 
P
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L 30.21 1.56 26.58 2.25 7.58 8.39 14.47 8.95 
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Figure 4-5: Box Plot Diagram and Outliers. 
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Figure 4-6: Final Median Values for Response Priorities. 
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 - Decision-making Response:  
Similarly to Decision Planning, we initially plotted a number of Box Plot Diagrams to support the 
identification of patterns. To do so we have used the data regarding the number of resources 
deployed daily to each road link. Figure 4-7 illustrates these data, which is presented in its raw 
format in Appendix B. 
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Figure 4-7: Daily Resource Deployment.  
Unlike the previous analysis conducted for response planning, Box Plot diagrams did not indicate 
any patterns. The variations were far too great to argue for the existence of commonalities in the 
way that physical resources were deployed to specific links of the network during the simulation. 
Against this backdrop, a complete review of both the scientific literature and practical experiences 
used to inform this research (i.e. observation of exercises and game simulations) was needed to 
support an alternative approach to decision-making response analysis. AELG (2005) reports that 
numerous organisations depend on road networks to conduct their own response. Observations of 
emergency exercises have demonstrated that roading authorities set priorities and make decisions 
according to external organisations’ needs as events unfold. Many of the participants interviewed at 
the end of each game simulation stated that resource deployment depends on the potential benefits 
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predicted according to existing needs. For instance, the deployment of resources to a specific link 
might be decided upon because it would potentially increase the road service access to a power 
plant while also supporting relief operations and evacuation.  
Deployment strategies were mostly focused on spreading resources throughout the affected region 
in order to attend multiple priorities simultaneously. Response from participants (who were 
required to play the role of transport managers) has shown to target external priorities and not 
internal ones. It means that response was conducted aiming at providing organisations involved 
with the emergency with the best possible road network. 
Following such principle, we estimated (according to the game’s design) how each road link could 
contribute to the eight response objectives presented in the Importance Matrix. Table 4-5 illustrates 
the weighting system used to estimate how response objectives were fulfilled by the deployment of 
resources to individual links.  
For instance, participant A adopted a strategic response during the simulation. His initial decisions 
were focused on re-establishing the link with the neighbour city to have an external link as well as 
to collect additional resources. Nonetheless, CBD local roads and the major bridge were also 
prioritised. Shortly after that, resources were relocated into the suburbia’s local roads and to the 
access to the industrial area due to potential hazards to the river. With the re-opening of the major 
external link and additional resources from the neighbour city, his priorities were once again re-
assessed and resources re-directed to support lifelines (e.g. hospital and power station) and to 
maintain the critical road bridge link operational. In the second half of the simulation, decisions 
continued to be strategically made, which finally culminated with ten out of fifteen damaged road 
links re-opened.  
Another interesting example of response was observed with participant E. This particular 
individual presented a long term strategic response. Resources were very much scattered 
throughout the affected area so a number of communities could be attended. In spite to the CBD, 
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all badly affected areas had at least one resource working on site. Priorities were also changed in 
face of potential catastrophic events and most of objectives were to be accomplished at similar 
times. As a consequence, not many road assets were operational (four out of fifteen) at the end of 
the simulation. Nevertheless, three assets (local roads at both the Residential Area 1 and CBD and 
access to the Hospital via the CBD) had very limited levels of damage at the end of the fifth day, 
meaning they could be shortly re-opened at full capacity. 
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Table 4-5: Response Objectives and Road Network Weighting System. 
 
 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property
Support 
Lifelines
Protect 
Economy
Protect 
Environment
Enable Support 
from other Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Link 1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 
Link 2 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Link 3 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Link 4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Link 5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Link 6 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Link 7 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Link 8 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Link 9 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Link 10 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Link 11 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Link 12 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Link 13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 
Link 14 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Airport 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 
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Using the total number of resources deployed to each road link during the simulation and the 
weighting system defined in Table 4-5, we calculated the proportion of resources contributing to all 
eight response objectives according to Equation 4-3.  

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ijji WRCR
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)(                                                             (4-3) 
 
Where: CRi – Contributing resources; 
 i – response objectives;  
             j – road links plus airport (Table 4-5); 
 Rj – Total number of resources deployed to each link; 
 Wij – Weight for each pair Link / Response Objective (Table 4-5); 
            1 ≤ i ≤ 8;   
            1 ≤ j ≤ 15.   
CRi results were plotted as shown in Figure 4-8. The graph points to the fact that Response 
Planning is indeed taken into consideration when making decisions (i.e. deploying resources in the 
specific case of the game simulation), as resource deployment is similarly proportional to the 
priorities extracted from Importance Matrices. It also confirms the naturalistic tendencies of 
emergency management decision-making. Thus, expertise and experience play fundamental roles 
in the decision-making processes, given that participants did not have access to the weighting 
system proposed in Table 4-5. In light of this, we conclude that decisions were based on personal 
estimations (experience and expertise) of the potential benefits. This way, the decision maker aims 
at achieving the priorities established in the beginning of the simulation through his/her resource 
deployment strategy. 
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Figure 4-8: Response Planning and Resource Deployment.
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Additional to the finding that response planning is considered carefully when making decisions, we 
also identified distinctions between short term and long term responses. Following on from the 
principles identified when analysing response planning (e.g. search and rescue activities have to be 
performed quickly and effectively due to human surviving time spans; critical systems can be re-
established after a few days due to provisional resources), we have combined certain response 
objectives in order to find time dependent response patterns.  
Figure 4-9 presents the patterns for both short and long term objectives. Short term responses 
accounted for “Immediate Rescue” and “External Support” and long term for the remaining six 
categories presented in the Importance Matrix. Moreover, short term responses have decreasing 
priorities, while long term ones present an increasing prioritisation. This fact was observed by 
noting the proportion of resources deployed to each class over time. Note two discontinuity points 
on the second and third response days, when lifeline support and the repair of key infrastructure are 
each considered to be immediate needs (or short term objectives) due to the specific game scenario. 
In these instances, the “flexibility component” that exists for medium priority response objectives 
plays a role and priorities are adjusted using the decision-maker’s improvisation skills. Ultimately, 
the main response core is maintained and priorities are re-balanced to normal planning levels as 
soon as the unforeseen situations are handled.     
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Figure 4-9: General Response Pattern. 
 3rd Phase –Results: 
The authors define decision-making as a series of actions that bring about changes to the 
environment or management processes. The analyses conducted indicated that extreme events 
decision-making is a function of response planning as events unfold. Although the data collected 
and the analysis method could not support the creation of a model for extreme events decision-
making, the general findings with regards to the decision-making process applied by game 
participants can be summarised as follows:  
1st Finding: Response planning and actual decision-making (i.e. resources deployment) match. 
Priorities extracted from the Importance Matrix are followed during the simulation, as 
decisions prioritised objectives according to their respective importance. This fact confirms 
the rational decision-making process presented in the scientific literature as the Naturalistic 
Decision Model, in which expertise/experience, knowledge/memory and improvisation all 
play vital roles; 
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2nd Finding: Short and long term response patterns are figurative references to emergency 
management response and recovery activities. Data collected have proven that response efforts 
focus on immediate needs such as “Immediate Rescue” and “External Support”. Recovery 
broadens emergency management into longer timeframes with ongoing and escalating efforts, 
e.g. a bridge repair requires consistent operations over a period of a few months at least; 
3rd Finding: Two response objectives are shown to be flexibly arranged in order to cope with 
unforeseen events. For instance, lifeline support and key infrastructures were highly prioritised 
at a specific response stage so the loss of power supply and the collapse of a key road bridge 
could be avoided. Such prioritisation effort was only possible due to resources been redirected 
from the major response objective defined by most participants (i.e. support immediate 
rescue); and 
4th Finding: Road networks are confirmed to be service providers to communities, critical 
systems, government and etc. Therefore, road network organisations shall ideally meet 
external needs according to the specific event’s circumstances. 
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5 DYNAMIC RESPONSE RECOVERY TOOL  
This chapter presents the conceptual development of the Dynamic Response Recovery Tool 
(DRRT). Following a specific development method, we define the DRRT’s framework and its 
logistics modelling routines. In the Emergency Management (EM) context, DRRT is considered to 
be a logistics sub-system. It is designed for roading organisations and made up of traditional 
logistics concepts (e.g. players, systems, distribution channels, cost functions) and lessons learned 
from the observation and simulation of emergencies.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. Initially, we explain the context in which the DRRT was 
designed. The second section describes the DRRT development method. The final section 
comprehensively describes the DRRT system, specifying its operational components (e.g. 
knowledge base, inference engine and graphical user interface) and its logistics tools (i.e. players’ 
identification, system conceptualisation, distribution channel configuration, total cost formulation 
and minimisation routines). 
5.1 DRRT Context 
The DRRT is conceptualised as a logistics sub-system as part of Disaster Management – a sub-
topic of EM itself. During a disaster, the DRRT facilitates decision-making by mobilising response 
organisations and deploying human and physical resources. These are considered to be typical 
logistics activities, which in the specific context of EM save lives, restore businesses and reduce 
the economic impact of disaster situations. Overall, they are part of the continuous efforts made to 
try to better achieve numerous organisations’ goals during disasters, according to the specific 
situations and resource availability/need. Decision support reaches its goals when efficient and 
accurate information is provided to end users so that decisions can be continuously made until a 
stable state of “normality” is reached. The DRRT is linked to the wider process of Reduction, 
Readiness, Response and Recovery defined by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management in New Zealand (MCDEM, 2009).  
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In particular, DRRT is geared towards supporting response and recovery activities by providing:  
 Procedural recommendations: a group of recommendations for effective and efficient 
organisational arrangement and response management. It comprises a series of guidelines 
that support the decision-making process with regards to communication set up, 
information sharing procedures, physical assessments of affected infrastructures, response 
prioritisation, etc; and 
 Physical resource deployment recommendations: these are intended to compliment the 
procedural recommendations. Optimisation routines were designed in order to facilitate 
resource allocation. Logistics concepts (e.g. total cost minimisation, distribution channels, 
players) and a GIS Platform were used to develop and deploy an optimisation routine that 
helps to minimise the total cost of response and to reduce the overall economic impact of 
disasters. 
In summary, the DRRT provides response recommendations regarding disaster management and 
suggests optimum strategies for deploying resources from their origins (availability) to the desired 
destinations (required locations). It is expected that the available resources will meet organisations’ 
needs if they adhere to the previously agreed upon optimum schedules and costs. The goal of this is 
for “normality” to be restored as soon as is practical. A schematic representation of the logistics 
environment in which the DRRT operates is illustrated in Figure 5-1. Three main components are 
considered in the quest to provide good levels of decision support during emergencies: i) 
participating parties; ii) data input and iii) support systems. These three components, if managed 
well, are expected to provide the information needed to the three existing logistics mechanisms 
within the DRRT system (described as follows): 
 Resource Needs: gear and materials needed to conduct repair and reconstruction efforts. 
Estimations of the resources needed (types and quantities) are based on previous studies or 
field assessments conducted immediately after the event; 
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 Resource Availability: available resources from both public and private organisations as 
well as international aid agencies (i.e. resources to be promptly deployed to disaster zones); 
and 
 Damage Location: specific geo-spatial information about physical damage to the 
numerous systems affected (e.g. road, sewage, power, telecommunications) within disaster 
zones.  
 
Figure 5-1: Conceptual DRRT Environment. 
Ultimately, physical deployment must take into account the complex set of information generated 
by the three abovementioned logistics mechanisms. These comprise the actual decision-making 
processes regarding the distribution of resources according to priorities, needs, availability and 
asset damage patterns in a holistic approach. 
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On practical grounds, the DRRT’s procedural level refers to management processes and protocols 
such as communication, information sharing and prioritisation. These are the outcomes of the 
complex and interrelated relationships among staff and organisations. Given that it is difficult to 
model these according to engineering paradigms, they were identified and recorded by observing 
organisations and communities during real or simulated emergencies as well as studying 
contingency, business continuity and response plans. Finally, optimisation routines aim to support 
the physical deployment of the resources and personnel needed to meet organisations’ needs 
(according to resource availability). Hence, data processed by logistics tools (e.g. shortest path, 
total cost minimisation) are expected to facilitate the decision-making processes by maximising 
response efforts. 
5.2 DRRT Development Method 
The DRRT system development method is made up of five phases: i) define requirements, ii) 
design, iii) implementation, iv) verification and v) maintenance. Initially, the DRRT system’s 
requirements, such as field of application, data input formats, information needs and logistics tools, 
were defined. Subsequently, the conceptual components of the DRRT as a decision support system 
were designed, e.g. Knowledge Base, Inference Engine, Modelling Routines and Graphical User 
Interface. The implementation phase involves envisaging, planning, developing and testing the 
Information Technology solution. After the IT Solution is implemented, it needs to be tested (i.e. 
verified) according to design parameters and its actual performance. Thus, real case studies need to 
be conducted in order to assess how end users are likely to perform while operating the system and 
how operational and technical shortcomings can be addressed. In this way, a final system version 
can be compiled and maintenance protocols can be defined. This process would aim to both 
maintain the system at acceptable operational levels and identify any shortcomings, so that updated 
versions can be more robust and can better attend users’ needs. 
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5.3 DRRT System 
This section reports the development activities performed for phases one and two from the DRRT 
Development Method. Initially, the DRRT system’s requirements were set up in line with the 
traditional concepts presented in section 5.1. Following that, the DRRT’s logistical components 
and its optimisation algorithm are described.   
5.3.1 Procedural DRRT: A Decision Support Tool for Emergency Response Operations within 
Roading Organisations 
The DRRT system was schematically designed (Figure 5-2) based on an adaptation of Berkes et al. 
(2001)’s Expert System model, lessons learned from exercise observations and game simulations, 
and logistics concepts. Note that the DRRT’s Knowledge Base receives data from the emergency 
environment and can also be adapted by Participating Parties if there are changes in priorities and 
response needs over time. Data is collected using Support Systems such as communication 
technologies, GIS and infrastructure assessment frameworks that ultimately represent emergency 
situations and resource needs/availability. These data are further filtered, accordingly to specific 
information needs, before being processed along with other inputs from communities and 
organisations. The process takes place at the Inference Engine, which also uses previous decisions 
made to recommend decision-making solutions (which are prompted in a user friendly interface). 
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Figure 5-2: DRRT System. 
Berkes et al. (2001)’s model configures the main core of the DRRT System, i.e. operational links 
between the Data Input, Knowledge Base, Inference Engine and User Interface. As described in the 
Literature Review, the Knowledge Base involves a set of rules used to process external inputs and 
generate information. Data processing takes place in the Inference Engine, which contains an 
operational algorithm that compares external inputs with the available knowledge (i.e. rules) in 
order to find appropriate solutions. Finally, a User Interface presents both external inputs and 
solutions (or outputs) in easy formats to facilitate decision-making. Note that the Knowledge Base 
(KB) is fed by general data and the Participating Parties, which represent the real time emergency 
environment and community/organisations’ needs, respectively.  
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In principle, the KB is static, meaning rules cannot be changed over the course of the event, but 
only have greater or smaller importance as the event unfolds. Nonetheless, findings from individual 
emergencies can be further incorporated into the KB by creating new rules. Hence, the system 
becomes more robust over time as new lessons are learned so that decision-making can be better 
supported. Finally, Support Systems (e.g. communication, Information Technology) capture data 
about Perceived and Observed Conditions as well as Resource Availability and Needs. These data 
are filtered by a human operator, according to individual organisations’ needs, and finally logged 
into the DRRT System. 
The vital DRRT System components are described as follows:  
 Data Log Module: this links the emergency environment and the Knowledge Base. Along 
with a human operator, it is responsible for filtering the incoming data according to 
individual organisations’ needs and system data formats;  
 Knowledge Base (KB): this is the component that contains the set of operational rules and 
optimisation routines used to process data into decision-making support information; 
 Inference Engine (IE): this is the computational component, which is responsible for 
running search and/or optimisation algorithms to process incoming data. For the first of 
these, the IE identifies rules (according to data fed into the system) that provide procedural 
response recommendations to the end-user. In the latter case, an algorithm is used to 
identify optimum resource deployment strategies according to resource availability and 
needs; and   
 User Interface: a graphical interface that presents incoming data and outcomes (e.g. 
recommendations, resource deployment strategy) to end-users in customised formats in 
order to support/facilitate decision-making. 
Operationally, the DRRT System processes external data according to two sub-sets of 
“knowledge”, i.e. Operations Decision-making and Resource Allocation Optimisation Tools. Both 
categories provide recommendations/information to end-users in the form of either decision-
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making processes or optimum logistics operations for resource allocation. Figure 5-3 illustrates this 
process, which is finalised by presenting information in an appropriate graphical interface to make 
it easy to visualise.  
 
Figure 5-3: Operational DRRT. 
In terms of supporting decision-making operations, the DRRT System is designed to operate 
according to binary codes. Thus, external data is coded and compared with knowledge (i.e. rules) 
recorded within the KB. When matching codes are found, recommended solutions are withdrawn 
from the KB and presented to the end-user. Figure 5-4 is an example of this process. For instance, 
consider that external data was coded as patterns 0001, 0101, 1010 and 1001. When searching the 
KB/Operations Decision-making sub set, the Inference Engine identifies two matching patterns: 
0001-x and 1010-x. These patterns are extracted from the KB, decoded and entered into the 
DRRT’s User Interface as recommendations (e.g. “Check landline, cell phone, Satellite phone, 
RTs, internet and e-mail services”, “Run test calls for confirmed operational technologies”, 
“Arrange EOC”, “Assign management positions”). Note that the code “x” in the Knowledge Base 
indicates a series of recommended action contained in a major category, e.g. communication. 
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Figure 5-4: Expected DRRT Inference Engine Process. 
The complimentary KB sub-set (i.e. Logistics Tools) is presented in the following sub-section. 
These logistics and resource allocation tools are proposed to facilitate decision-making. They do 
this by identifying the optimum deployment strategies according to the level of damage to the road 
network. 
5.3.2 DRRT Logistics Environment: Tools for Optimising Resource Allocation 
Logistics problems are usually solved using a three step process: i) gathering as much information 
as possible about the problem; ii) defining logistics systems and cost functions; and iii) developing 
mathematical optimisation routines (Daganzo, 2005).  
In accordance with this process, information was collected about how organisations and 
communities respond during emergency events (gleaned from exercises and real event 
observations). The information gathered was specifically related to how physical resources are 
deployed (according to availability, needs and priorities) during disasters – and game simulations. 
This process helped us to understand the complex management environment in which disaster 
response and recovery activities take place.  
Using this background knowledge in EM we identified the logistics problem faced when searching 
for optimum resource allocation strategies. Thus, a complete analysis the logistics problem faced 
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by roading organisations when deploying physical resources requires defining a logistics system as 
well as proposing an appropriate mathematical approach. These activities are described as follows.   
5.3.2.1 Logistics Systems 
Although human response can heavily impact the performance of logistics systems during 
emergency management, the model proposed in this thesis focuses in defining the physical 
environment in which resource prioritisation and deployment takes place. In this context, three 
distribution channels were defined: i) Resource Depot (RD), ii) Resource Availability Location (A) 
and iii) Resource Demand Location (R). Both “RD” and “A” represent locations where resources 
are available, either at depot(s) or on the field due to maintenance, repair or construction works. 
Additionally, the distribution channel “R” represents damaged asset locations that need to be 
repaired. In this context, two scenarios are likely to occur, namely i) Direct Resource Allocation or 
ii) Indirect Resource Allocation. In the first scenario, resources are deployed non-stop from 
depot(s) to points of need (required locations). Machinery is shifted directly from its origin to its 
destination; loading activities are not required given that all necessary physical and human 
resources (e.g. drivers, fuel, materials) are available at the depot(s). The second deployment 
scenario involves resources being available at numerous locations throughout a region, rather than 
just at depots. In this scenario machinery is used for construction or maintenance operations that 
can sometimes be scattered across a region. In this respect, resources can be deployed to required 
destinations as an emergency response either non-stop (considering that all material and labouring 
needs are already available) or with a stop at the depot(s) to load materials or collect additional 
personnel. Based on observations of real emergency events (e.g. the 1994 Northridge Earthquake - 
USA, the 1995 Kobe Earthquake - Japan, the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami - Asia, and 
the 2005 Hurricane Katrina - USA), the second scenario is the most likely one to occur during 
disasters. 
The logistics theory indicates four possible types of situations i) one origin and one destination; ii) 
one origin and many destinations; iii) many origins and one destination and iv) many origins and 
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many destinations. The study of (previously mentioned) recent disasters and the observation and 
simulation of emergency exercises as reported by Ferreira et al. (2010a, 2010b, 2010c) and 
Giovinazzi et al. (2008) strongly indicate that only the last two situations are likely to occur during 
an emergency. This is due to the probable fact that resources are available at multiple locations and 
might be required either at a single location (e.g. fire event, flash flood, traffic accident) or at 
multiple locations (e.g. earthquake, volcanic eruption, tsunami). Finally, the number of Resource 
Depot channels (RD) depends on specific environment configurations (e.g. number of contractors, 
existing management systems, affected area). Figure 5-5 illustrates these possible logistics system 
configurations.  
 
Figure 5-5: Logistics Systems and Problems in Disasters Situations. 
Finally, as previously described, resources can be deployed directly from available locations to 
final destinations (e.g. depot to required location: r’’’, or available location on field to required 
location: r’) or with a stop at a depot distribution channel – RD, i.e. from available location on field 
to required location with a stop at depot: r’’ + r’’’. Such deployment strategies are modelled in the 
next sub-section using a mathematical description of cost functions. An optimisation routine is 
proposed to identify the optimum resource deployment strategies in a complex disaster 
environment. 
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5.3.2.2 Logistics Problem Statement and Optimisation Model Design 
Consider an organisation performing response activities immediately after an extreme event that 
has affected an area of analysis and its road transport network. Roading organisations can deploy 
the total available resources at any given time t (R t) located at any location i such as R1 t, R2 t, R3 t, 
…Ri t… Rn t to support response efforts (asset damage repair, rescue operations, evacuation 
management, lifeline support, etc.) at any damaged location j such as D1 t, D2 t, D3 t, …Dj  t … Dm t. 
Resource deployment is further subject to a set of priorities Pt assigned to each response effort such 
as P1 t, P2 t, P3 t, … Pk t. Thus, set of resources with origin i and destination j (rij t) are allocated to 
damaged locations individually in order to support response efforts. 
A resource optimisation routine is defined around two cost components, namely Logistics 
Response Cost (LRC) and Delay Response Cost (DRC). The Total Response Cost (TRC) involves 
the LRC and the DRC, which is minimised subject to a set of conditions under the decision makers’ 
control. The remainder of this sub-section presents the LRC, the DRC and the TRC minimisation 
approach. 
Logistics Response Cost (LRC) 
LRC is the travel cost plus the loading and unloading costs. As defined in Equation 5.1, travel costs 
are directly proportional to allocated resources (rij t) and travel distance. Loading/unloading costs 
are only dependent on the volume of allocated resources.  
]*)()*[(*)(  UTLTtdrRLRC ijijt                                     (5-1) 
Where:  rij: allocated resources from origin i to destination j 
tdij: travel distance from i to j 
α: unitary travel cost (cost per distance) 
LT: Loading time (average time taken to load one resource unit with necessary materials 
and fuelling time) 
UT: Unloading time (average time taken to unload materials transported by one resource 
unit) 
β: unitary loading / unloading cost (cost per time) 
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Note that the travel distance (tdij) relates to the sum of the link lengths in the shortest path between 
an origin i and a destination j (Ptij). Furthermore, for a given time t (with Loading Time being equal 
to Unloading Time for the sake of simplification) we have: 
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Simplifying Equation 5.2 and Equation 5.3 which represents the Logistics Response Cost for any 
given time t. 
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Where:  rijt: allocated resources from origin i to destination j at time t 
tdij: travel distance from i to j 
α: unitary travel cost (cost per distance) 
LC: Logistics cost (total time for loading and unloading) 
β: unitary loading / unloading cost (cost per time) 
Ptij: Minimum path between an origin i to a destination j 
 Lla: Length value for a link belonging to the minimum path Ptij   
 
Delay Response Cost (DRC) 
The DRC represents the fixed asset repair cost plus the costs incurred when vehicles are unable to 
travel on a given link due to decreased road capacity. Equation 5.4 generalises the DRC at any 
given time t.   
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Where:  DRC: Delay Response Cost  
 Rt: Available Resources at time t 
 RCl: Link repair cost 
 CDl t: Cost of delay for link l at time t 
rijt: allocated resources from origin i to destination j at time t 
Dj t: Damage at destination j at time t (affected road asset) 
δjkt: Adjustment factor for Cost of Delay (CDl t)  
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Note that delay cost is a function of allocated resources (rij t) and experienced damage (Dj t), as 
repairs occur according to the number of resources available at extend of damage at each location. 
DRC is finally given by the Cost of Repair (RCl) plus the Cost of Delay (CDl t) for all damaged 
links at destinations j times the inverse factor δjkt. The factor δjkt considers the response priorities 
(Pkt), as extreme events decision-making has revealed itself to be a naturalistic decision process. As 
well, CDl t alone should not be considered the sole variable in extreme events decision-making 
(Ferreira et al., 2010a and Ferreira et al., 2010b and Ferreira et al., 2010c). Furthermore, δjkt 
expresses the directly proportional relationship between response objectives and the network. This 
is the reason why its inverse function needs to be considered, i.e. the greater the relationship 
response planning/road network links, the less it costs to deploy resources to damaged locations. In 
this light, DRC is specified using the following Equation 5.5. Observe that cost of delay will be null 
if the remaining link capacity ( )1(* tjl DC  ) is greater than the link flow. In such case, there is no 
congestion so road users are not delayed and costs are not incurred. On the contrary, there will be 
delay costs if link flow exceeds link capacity and therefore generate congestion.  
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Given: 0.10  tjD  
Where: CDl t: Cost of delay for link l at time t 
Fl: Link flow 
 Cl: Link capacity 
 Djt: Damage at destination j at time t (affected road asset) 
ө: unitary cost of delay per vehicle 
 
Finally, DRC is given by Equation 5.6. 
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Where:  CDl t: Cost of delay for link l at time t 
RCl: Link repair cost 
Fl: Link flow 
 Cl: Link capacity 
 Dj t: Damage at destination j at time t (affected road asset) 
ө: unitary cost of delay per vehicle 
 δjkt: Adjustment factor for Cost of delay (CDl t) 
 125 
Total Cost 
The TRC is the sum of LRC and the DRC. TRC is found by calculating the sum of LRC and DRC 
for all times t as presented in Equation 5.7. Thus, an organisation’s staff will attempt to allocate 
specific sets of resources rijt in order to minimise the TRC. This contributes to the overall response 
and recovery efforts to minimise loss of life and economic disruptions. The total response cost 
minimisation routine (or resource allocation optimisation routine) is specified below, along with its 
conditions.   
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5.3.2.3 Resource Allocation Optimisation Routine 
An organisation’s staff will attempt to allocate specific sets of resources rijt in order to minimise the 
TRC. To this end, they need to identify the best resource deployment strategy. This optimisation 
process is represented by the minimisation of TRC as shown in Equation 5.8, subject to the set of 
conditions proposed. It ultimately expresses the overall contribution of response and recovery 
efforts towards minimising loss of life and everyday disruptions. 
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Sum of resources deployed at tth time from origin i to destination j - rij - 
shall be equal the total available resources at tth time - Rt 
Travel distance from origin i to destination j is the sum of link lengths Ll 
for the minimum path Ptij 
Sum of priorities for k response objectives at a given time t shall be equal 
to 100 (i.e. 100%)  
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The process described by Equation 5-8 and its optimisation conditions is ultimately implemented 
by estimating LRC, DRC and TRC for all possible resource deployment strategies. This involves 
estimating all the different combinations of resource assignments to all the possible 
origin/destination sets.  
Results are to be presented in the user-friendly interface designed for the DRRT System. The next 
chapter presents the application of the DRRT concept to a series of case studies in order to assess 
the system’s efficiency, as well as how suitable it is to facilitate decision-making within roading 
organisations during emergency events. 
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6 DRRT CASE STUDY  
A set of case studies is presented in this chapter in order to assess the DRRT’s efficiency and 
suitability for SHO. By simulating an emergency scenario, DRRT was evaluated in its potentialities 
to facilitate decision-making during extreme events. We aimed at identifying whether participants 
using decision support information had better performance than those disregarding DRRT’s 
functions such as recommended actions, general maps, GIS maps and resource deployment 
recommendations. 
The case study application was developed taking into consideration the findings from exercise and 
real events observations (chapter 3), game based scenario simulations (chapter 4) and the DRRT 
system and resource allocation logistics model proposed in chapter 5. Participants were invited 
from both academia and industry in order to support an extensive data collection and analysis. The 
case study application was focused on the specific context of New Zealand SHO and emergency 
practices in currently use in the country. 
The chapter is divided into three major sections: DRRT Implementation, DRRT Case Studies and 
Results of the DRRT Experiment. The first section presents how an IT solution application was 
developed in order to run the case studies (i.e. emergency scenario, data collection routines, 
DRRT’s operations simulations). The case study set up, scenario specification, data collection 
procedure, data analysis method and simulation process are presented in the second section. The 
third and final section scrutinizes the information gathered during the case studies so major 
findings regarding DRRT’s decision support capability and applicability during real emergencies in 
the context of RCAs could be discussed. 
6.1 DRRT Implementation 
The DRRT application was developed accordingly to the Implementation Phase proposed in the 
section 5.2. Hence, three main activities were performed, namely IT Solution Framework design, 
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System Design Protocols specification and Case Study Application development. Each one of these 
activities is further described with sufficient details to clearly report the development and 
deployment of the case study application. 
6.1.1 IT Solution Framework 
Basic principles from the Microsoft Solution Framework® (MSF) were used to support the 
development and deployment of the DRRT Case Study Application. The MSF framework 
comprises five phases: i) Envisaging the Solution; ii) Planning the Solution; iii) Developing the 
Solution; iv) Testing the Solution and v) Deploying the Solution. All these phases are briefly 
discussed in this sub-section for the specific case of the DRRT. We only intend to lay down simple 
conceptual IT paradigms to support an easy comprehension of how the application was planned, 
developed and deployed.  
Following the initial phase proposed by the MSF, we envisaged the DRRT IT Solution as a 
prototype software. We aimed at a semi-operational application to demonstrate in a limited extent 
the DRRT’s functions. The application was designed to be operational at both Windows® and 
Linux® Operational Systems (OS) in order to avoid compatibility issues as well as be flexible 
enough to allow uploading different emergency scenarios.  
The planning stage accounted for defining the system’s information flow configuration, specifying 
data needs and running processes. Figure 6-1 schematically represents the basic DRRT 
demonstrator structure. Application data (or emergency scenario data) feeds a Graphical User 
Interface (GUI), which also serves for data log and collection. Application data are also presented 
by pop up windows (e.g. maps, situation reports) and dialog windows allow the end user to log 
specific information. The emergency scenario is simulated by a serial step process, in which 
decisions made and associated information are recorded, e.g. action taken, time elapsed, decision 
performance. The running process was designed so updated situations are presented to the end-user 
along with the scenario development.    
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Figure 6-1: DRRT Information Technology Solution Diagram. 
Following DRRT specifications defined in the initial two development phases, the DRRT was 
implemented using the Visual Basic (VB) Programming Language and the Microsoft Visual Studio 
.NET Framework® development environment. The first DRRT case study application version was 
deployed after 3 months from its initial planning. A number of pilot tests were performed over a six 
month period until the final version could be deployed to conduct the case studies. The next sub-
section briefly describes the final version as well as presents some snapshots from the proposed 
application. Very limited technical information is provided in the next sub-section due to the aim of 
this research and the intended objective of this chapter to assess the DRRT. 
6.1.2 DRRT Case Study Application 
Windows Forms applications were mostly used to develop a dynamic and comprehensive 
simulation for an evolving emergency scenario. .NET Framework® and Visual Basic® 
Programming Language were used to deploy the DRRT IT Solution and embed the intended 
emergency scenario. The application was flexibly designed so alternative emergency scenarios 
could be exercised (e.g. volcanic eruption, tsunami warning, flooding).    
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Figure 6-2 illustrates some of the windows forms designed for the DRRT application. They are 
snapshots from the welcome window, main decision-making form, resource deployment window 
and initial survey, respectively. Figure 6-2a presents the user with succinct information about the 
application as it is intended to use the DRRT Demonstrator in the future for emergency training 
without the presence of an exercise controller so costs can be reduced. The second window (top 
right corner) shows the main decision-making environment, in which a series of panels present the 
user with a complete set of information about the scenario and system’s functions. Each of these 
panels is further described in Figure 6-3. Figure 6-2c represents the resource deployment task 
required to be performed at a particular stage of the simulation. Note that the user has to fill in the 
number of resources to be deployed to each damaged link as well as their respective destinations. 
Decision support information is provided through available GIS Maps and results from a resource 
optimisation routine as illustrated in Figure 6-4. The last window illustrates a survey conducted to 
acquire specific information about the participant so data analyses can be performed taking into 
consideration personal experiences, organisational obligations and etc. Snapshots illustrated in 
Figure 6-2 superficially illustrate the DRRT Application as a number of additional windows are 
used to run the simulation (e.g. map views, GIS Data, Decision Summary), but are not shown here 
for the sake of space. 
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a) Welcome Window 
 
b) Decision-making Window 
 
c) Resources Deployment Window 
 
d) Survey Window 
Figure 6-2: Snapshots from the DRRT Application. 
To better present the DRRT Demonstrator, two of its main windows (decision-making and resource 
deployment) are specified as follows. Before describing these windows, it is important to 
remember that the DRRT was designed considering two approaches for decision support: i) to 
provide procedural decision-making recommendations and ii) to identify optimum resource 
deployment strategies. Both approaches were comprehensively based on the whole research 
conducted. Thus, findings from the literature review (chapter 2), exercise observations (chapter 3), 
game simulations (chapter 4) and DRRT conceptualisation/logistics model development (chapter 5) 
were fully utilised to deploy the DRRT case study application.  
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Firstly, procedural decision-making was designed to be facilitated by presenting the end-user with a 
series of recommendations and possible outcomes associated with each decision-making. Figure 
6-3 (the main decision-making window) contains a number of different panels, in which the 
decision support and the scenario information are presented. Each panel is described as follows:    
 Panel #1: Scenario information presented over time, also known as “scenario injects”; 
 Panel #2: Possible decision-making activities to be chosen; 
 Panel #3: Brief description of main decision-making activities; 
 Panel #4: Access to available maps for the affect area and road network. A full 
view is available by clicking the button “Full View”; 
 Panel #5: Presents the user with expected results from individual decision-making 
activities; 
 Panel #6: Tool that allows the end-user to log any additional information; 
 Panel #7: Recommended decision-making actions to support procedural decision-
making; and 
 Panel #8: Button “See Summary”: opens a summary window containing previous 
decisions taken and confirmed results; Button “Confirm Decision”: proceeds with 
the scenario simulation by confirming the decision selected on Panel #2.    
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Figure 6-3: DRRT Application Snapshot: Main Decision-making Window. 
Secondly, a resource deployment task was designed to collect resource allocation information. This 
task has been proposed in order to both check the realism of the proposed resource allocation 
optimisation routine proposed in chapter 5 and to identify ways to better present decision support 
information to the end-user In this context, a set different supporting information was added into 
deployment windows according to optimum resource allocation strategies identified using the 
proposed routine. Costs were estimated for more than 2,900 deployment strategies and the thirty 
optimum ones were chosen as shown in Appendix E. For the sake of a clear presentation, only the 
three best strategies and costs were presented to case study participants as illustrated in Figure 6-4. 
This figure shows both resource deployment window and decision support information as just 
described.  
1 
2
3
4 
5
6
7
8 
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Figure 6-4: DRRT Application Snapshot: Resource Deployment Window and Optimisation 
Results. 
The resource deployment window (top left corner) presents the participant with five panels. Each 
panel is further described and together they provide supporting information needed to define a 
resource allocation strategy in order to respond the event.  
 Panel #1: Presents general resource allocation recommendations. Also, button “Generate 
Resource Deployment Recommendation” opens the results from the optimisation routine 
window (bottom right corner), which contains results from the proposed logistics model 
identifying the three optimum deployment strategies; 
 Panel #2: Resource deployment strategy to be filled in by the case study participant; 
 Panel #3: Access to both available maps and GIS Data;   
 Panel #4: Available road network data previously the event (e.g. flows, capacity, repair 
cost, lengths, unitary logistics and transportation costs); and 
 Panel #5: Presents maps selected from the Panel #3.    
 
1 2
3 
4 
5
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6.2 DRRT Case Study 
This section presents the case study conducted to assess the DRRT System as proposed in the last 
chapter. We initially specify how the case studies were set up as well as the emergency scenario 
simulation and the data collection procedure. A Data Analysis Method is presented considering the 
data collected during the simulations so a final assessment about DRRT’s efficiency and 
applicability in real contexts could be drawn.  
6.2.1 Case Study Set Up and Scenario Specification 
An emergency scenario was developed using a number of previous experiences reported by Gohil 
(2005), Newlands (2006), Ferreira et al. (2010a, 2010b, 2010c) and the ResOrgs (2008). Thus, an 
earthquake occurring at 3.00am with the epicentre location within 10 km from the Central Business 
District (CBD) of a hypothetical region (Figure 6-5a) was specified. The event created a 75 
kilometre surface rupture along the fault and the ground was displaced horizontally by up to 5 
metres and vertically by up to 1 metre. It produced damage on links 6, 8, 9 and 14 (Figure 6-5b) as 
well as coordination among numerous responding organisations (e.g. Civil Defence, City Council, 
Contractors, Consultants, National Transportation Agency). The transport problem was further 
simulated by specifying damage information (lost capacity, resource need, delayed vehicles), traffic 
flows, road capacity, repair costs and available resources/locations.   
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a) Affected Region 
 
b) Affected Road Network 
Figure 6-5: Emergency Scenario Affected Region. 
In the specific context of the transport problem, case study participants were required to deploy 
available resources to damaged links in a given road network. To do so, they had to define the 
number of resources to be allocated to each link as well as their respective origins. Eight resource 
units are available at three locations (depots located at nodes 1, 9 and 10) and total damage demand 
40 resource units/day, i.e. at least 5 response days would be required to clear all damage 
The scenario was embedded in the DRRT case study application so it could be dynamically 
simulated. As previously highlighted, it links upcoming events with previous decisions made by the 
case study participant. The experiment was also set up to emulate DRRT’s functions (e.g. graphical 
interfaces, map presentations, data display, recommendation prompts) in order to provide the case 
study participant with a feeling on how the system would be when operational.  
Similarly to a real disaster, the case study application presents the end-user with emergency 
information and allows him/her to perform a vast number of decisions. Each one of the 25 
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decisions listed in Table 6-1 is associated with a number of marks for individual response phases 
(refer to Appendix C). It ultimately represents the quality or accuracy of the decision-making 
process adopted by the participant. The final performance was estimated according to the number 
of marks accumulated during the simulation and time taken to make decisions. Marks were 
assigned to each decision (outstanding: 100 marks, good: 75 marks, acceptable: 50 marks, poor: 25 
marks and wrong: 0 marks) according to an optimum course of actions defined for the proposed 
emergency scenario. Note that the optimum course of actions is qualitatively defined by the 
developer as the gaming technique allows the controller to do so accordingly to proposed rules for 
the given scenario under simulation.   
Table 6-1: Response Actions. 
ID Response Action 
1 Contact Civil Defence 
2 Contact contractors 
3 Contact consultants 
4 Contact City Councils 
5 Enquire Civil Defence 
6 Enquire contractors 
7 Enquire consultants 
8 Enquire City Councils 
9 Contact NZTA local office 
10 Contact NZTA regional office 
11 Contact NZTA national office 
12 Contact NZ Police 
13 Contact National Emergency Controller 
14 Mobilize physical resources 
15 Mobilize human resources 
16 Deploy human resources (management) 
17 Deploy physical resources (damage repair) 
18 Check available communication technologies 
19 Define information procedures 
20 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 
21 Define organisation's response objectives 
22 Define organisation's response priorities 
23 Define emergency needs 
24 Projection of future instances 
25 No action 
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Additionally, the emergency scenario simulates a physical resource allocation task. Thus, the case 
study participant was required to assign resources from given origins (depots) to damage locations 
in order to respond to the event by fixing a given road network. Performance was estimated 
comparing costs (logistics and response delay costs) associated with individual deployment 
strategies adopted by the participant and the optimum ones identified in Appendix E.   
Finally, the participant was required to play the role of the emergency manager coordinator. He/she 
was in charge of liaising with involved organisations as well as be responsible in deploying 
resources following the priorities defined by the National Emergency Controller.   
6.2.2 Data Collection Procedure 
A simple data collection procedure was implemented taking advantage of opportunities from 
information technologies and the case study application developed. Most of data to be collected is 
automatically performed by the DRRT case study application. In this context, decisions taken, time 
elapsed, number of resources deployed to individual road links and their origins, initial and final 
survey answers and any additional information logged by the participant are recorded in text 
formats for further analyses. The exercise controller is required to observe the simulation progress 
in order to capture general additional information to be used in the analysis process. 
6.2.3 Data Analysis Method 
A four stage Data Analysis Method (Figure 6-6) was designed making use of the DRRT case study 
application and its available tools. Eleven participants took part on the DRRT case study 
simulations. At the end of each simulation, data was recorded in text formats in order to allow 
compatibility with any data processing tool selected by the analyst. The unique data set 
representing the whole simulation process was then filtered so further procedural decision-making 
and resource deployment analyses could be performed.  
Two data sets (i.e. procedural decision-making and resource deployment) were used to conduct the 
data analyses. Initially, individual decision-making performances are compared according to the 
level of decision support used. In this respect, decision-making effort (time taken) and accuracy 
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(points) are estimated for procedural decision-making actions, e.g. “Contact Councils”, “Check 
communication availability”. Additionally, response costs (logistics and response delay) are 
estimated for individual deployment strategies and compared against optimum resource 
deployment identified using the resource allocation optimisation routine proposed in the chapter 5 
(refer to Appendix E for optimum results).  
 
Figure 6-6: DRRT Simulation Data Analysis Method. 
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6.2.4 Case Study Simulations 
Simulations were conducted over a two-month period in Christchurch and Wellington (New 
Zealand). Case study participants were selected from industry, academia and college students from 
the University of Canterbury (UoC) in order to represent as many facets as possible of emergency 
practices taught and adopted in New Zealand. 
The case studies were performed at both individual and group settings according to research 
opportunities developed during the case study period. On one hand, individual simulations were 
carried out with representatives from the industry (e.g. consultants and contractors) as well as 
professionals directly or indirectly involved in emergency management at their respective 
organisations. On the other hand, a group simulation took place with a class of 16 students from the 
Hazards Management course hosted by the Geology Department at the University of Canterbury. 
Although one-to-one and group settings were used to run the case studies, they did not vary much 
in essence. Both settings used the same IT application and simulation conditions (e.g. scenario 
specification, opportunity to interact with the exercise controller). Finally, all case study 
simulations were vital in collecting complete data sets to assess the DRRT in accordance with 
proposed steps shown in Figure 6-6. 
One-to-one simulations took place at participants’ venue so no burden was added to volunteers. 
The researcher was responsible to schedule a time and visit the organisations to run the simulations. 
The case study application was uploaded onto a notebook so the simulation and data collection 
were fully automated.  
The case studies were performed following a simple process. The researcher initially briefed the 
experiment by presenting the research aim and describing the application (i.e. main decision-
making window, resources deployment window and etc). Additional questions were then answered 
by the researcher in order to clarify how the application should be operationalised so possible 
technical difficulties could be reduced during the simulation process. The application was started as 
 141 
soon as the participant agreed with the Information Sheet, which further specified the experiment 
and ensured privacy requirements according to the University of Canterbury’s Ethic Committee 
standards.  
The emergency scenario formally started after a quick initial survey is filled by the participant. 
One-to-one simulations lasted in average 45 minutes (including the 24 procedural decision-making 
and the deployment of physical resources) and were finalised with a survey about the application. 
An unstructured interview/discussion time was encouraged by the researcher at the end of each 
simulation so further data and general impressions from the experiment could be gathered. 
Individual simulations comprised eleven people from four different organisations. Participants’ and 
organisations’ names were suppressed in Table 6-2 due to privacy and ethic requirements of the 
University of Canterbury. 
Table 6-2: Individual DRRT Simulations. 
Participant Professional Experience 4 Position or Team Organisation 
A High Facilities manager Tertiary institution 
B High Asset management Transportation consultancy 
C High Asset management Transportation consultancy 
D High Asset management Transportation consultancy 
E High Asset management Transportation consultancy 
F Low / Medium Lecturer Tertiary institution 
G High Civil Defence manager Local council 
H Low Maintenance  National wide contractor 
I Medium Contractual National wide contractor 
J High Asset manager National wide contractor 
K Low Asset management National wide contractor 
Although some participants did not hold formal positions in emergency management, emergency 
response behaviour and decision-making indicated comprehensive knowledge on response 
procedures. In this light, participants were either regularly involved in the management of real 
                                                     
4 Professional Experience: Low – 0 to 5 years; Medium – 5 to 10 years; High – 10+ years 
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emergencies and/or were immersed in cutting edge emergency management research and exercises 
nationally and internationally.  
Overall, participants demonstrated considerable interest in the proposed DRRT. Most simulations 
finally culminated in discussions on how to improve the proposed system as well as how such 
initiatives could fulfil inter and intra-organisational training needs. The DRRT’s concept and case 
study application were well received by participants and feedbacks/comments were constructive. 
Two data sets were compiled after running one-to-one simulations. The first data set, known as 
procedural decision-making, acquired managerial decisions taken by case study participants during 
the simulation. It recorded action taken, time, accuracy (marks) and outcomes for all decisions 
made according to the list presented in Table 6-1.    
General decision-making patterns were identified in the way that participants responded the 
scenario. Table 6-3 shows that participants focused on communication (i.e. contacting and 
enquiring external organisations) in order to ensure that information sharing protocols were up to 
acceptable standards so information loss could be reduced. The definition of response objectives 
along with resource mobilisation and deployment were consistently performed to support a well 
structured response according to data shown in Table 6-3. This behaviour indicated the 
participants’ good reasoning because information was firstly gathered before resources were 
allocated according to established objectives. Such decision-making pattern points out to strategic 
approaches as decisions were seldom modified due to new events. Communication checks and 
EOC set up were lowly ranked, not due to low priority, but exclusively due to the fact that it only 
needs to be performed once while responding an event. Finally, the projection of future needs 
appears in the last position as the scenario does not require taking into consideration the recovery 
process. It only exercises three initial response days after a major event. Additional columns with 
the frequency (minimum, average and maximum) that each decision category was performed per 
participant have been included in Table 6-3 so differences in decision processes can be observed. 
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All raw data collected during the one-to-one simulations are available in Appendix D for further 
reference. 
Table 6-3: Procedural Decision-making Patterns: One-to-one Simulations. 
Decision-making Activity Times Performed Minimum Average Maximum
Contact (Civil Defence, Consultants etc) 89 4 8 15 
Enquire (Civil Defence, Consultants etc) 39 0 4 9 
Define (Response Objectives) 36 0 3 7 
Deploy (Physical and Human Resources) 34 0 3 6 
Mobilise (Physical and Human Resources) 33 0 3 6 
Check / Set up (Communications, EOC) 21 0 2 4 
Project (Future Needs) 11 0 1 2 
Participants were finally required to allocate resources in a damaged road network according to 
rough priorities defined for the scenario (e.g. evacuation, search and rescue and business 
continuity). Thus, participants had to specify both number of resources to each damage destination 
and their origins. Similarly to Procedural Decision-making, raw data collected for this simulation 
task can be found in the Appendix D. 
Specifically during resource deployment, some participants reported difficulties to fully 
comprehend the situation and/or claimed to struggle to perform such task due to lack of specific 
information. An interesting observation refers to a comprehensive situation awareness and 
familiarity for contractors to deal with resource allocation activities. Nevertheless whenever 
struggles were noticed, the exercise controller directly engaged with participants in order to ensure 
that all necessary data to support decisions were noticed. The controller also provided any 
additional information to help the participant without biasing the process. Hence, this engagement 
only aimed at maintaining data collection up to standards that would allow further analyses.  
In spite of struggles faced by participants, the resource deployment activity was informative. Data 
collected allowed us to understand the reasoning applied when allocating resources. It was 
observed that participants initially assessed the availability of alternative routes and considered 
response priorities (e.g. business continuity, evacuation and search and rescue) before making final 
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decisions. Tangible consequences from the disaster, such as delayed vehicles, lost road capacity 
and so on, were also considered when assessing possible decision-making courses. Ultimately, 
logistics costs were only evaluated in regards to travel time. When enquired about deployment 
costs, participants stated unanimously that economic costs associated with emergencies are much 
more related to further damage and loss of life rather than to the actual cost of resource 
mobilisation and usage. Nonetheless, none assessment routines or methods were pointed out by the 
eleven participants. This fact indicates a high reliance on general knowledge and past experiences, 
which can be inaccurate or unavailable at times.  
Like the one-to-one simulations, the group experience allowed us to collect Procedural Decision-
making and Resource Deployment data. The group simulation occurred at the University of 
Canterbury’s Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) and involved 16 students. Two teams of five and 
one team of six students represented the national transport agency (Team C), a contractor (Team A) 
and a consultant (Team B), respectively. Each team was placed in a different room at the EOC and 
could only contact each other through an available landline extension. The simulation set up 
intended to represent the current state highway management framework adopted by the New 
Zealand Transport Agency.       
The students attended a quick brief about the simulation as for the individual participants. They 
were further encouraged to define a team structure to facilitate the decision-making. The EOC 
environment helped the students to set up the team, i.e. define roles such as communication, 
logistics, operations, controller.  
The experience was productive in presenting the students with common issues to be managed 
during an emergency. Time pressure was slightly introduced towards the end of the simulation due 
to time restrictions. It consequently introduced a common issue to be dealt with when managing 
real emergencies. On one side of the spectrum, communication difficulties, data collection and 
organisation, information loss etc were some of the problems identified when observing the teams 
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during the simulations. On the other side, DRRT facilitated decisions and information management 
as reported by students during a hot debrief at the end of the simulation.  
A specific assessment of the DRRT is performed in the next section. Both individual and group 
simulations complimentarily support to scrutinize data collected and facts observed during the case 
study period. Ultimately, the DRRT System is investigated in its potentials to facilitate decision-
making during real emergency events within the roading organisations context.   
6.3 Results from the DRRT Case Studies 
There were two specific goals when analysing DRRT case studies: i) to understand the support 
offered by the DRRT for procedural decision-making and ii) to identify how resource allocation 
activities can be facilitated by using the proposed resource allocation optimisation routine.  
Aiming at the analysis of decision support offered by the DRRT, we initially proceeded with the 
study of decision-making effort and accuracy. This first assessment measure refers to decision-
making planning (effort) and performance (accuracy) for procedural decisions (e.g. communication 
check, EOC set up, organisational enquiries). It is assumed that outstanding decision-making is 
achieved when planning time (defined as elapsed time between consecutive decision-making 
actions) is reduced and effective or accurate response is accomplished. Accuracy is associated with 
marks assigned to each possible decision (Table 6-1) at individual times accordingly to the scenario 
simulated (refer to Appendix C for further details). Figure 6-7 presents average results for all 
participants according to different levels of support information considered (i.e. limited, good and 
intensive) and the three groups of students. The use of recommendations (decision support) was 
assessed during individual simulations by observing participants’ actions and complimentarily 
enquiring them at the end of the simulation. It aimed at assessing how useful and often 
recommendations were considered before making decisions. Although the same data was also 
collected for the group setting, it was not considered as students had differing perceptions about the 
DRRT. Thus, the estimation of a single indicator for a whole group was considered unrealistic due 
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to different roles simulated (e.g. team leader, communication manager, logistics manager), personal 
expertise/experiences and expectations.  
 
Figure 6-7: Average Decision-making Effort (Planning Time) and Accuracy (Performance). 
Individual decision-making performance increases considerably when DRRT’s support information 
is intensively considered as shown in Figure 6-7. For instance, participant F who is enthusiastic 
about hazards and emergency management research, responded to the scenario with high regard for 
DRRT’s recommendations and made intensive use of available tools. Also, the participant H has 
achieved the highest decision-making accuracy regardless being an inexperienced professional (at 
the time of the research he was hired as a junior road maintenance engineer). When enquired about 
his decisions, he stated that it was based on injects, priorities and recommendations given by the 
DRRT. He finally mentioned that DRRT’s recommendations have considerably helped to trigger 
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alternative courses of response (i.e. it did not automate his decision-making process) by providing 
expert knowledge on disaster response.  
Triggering and supporting decision-making are seen as major characteristics of any expert system. 
Thus, findings highlighted in the last paragraph confirm the expert system nature of the DRRT. 
Note that the recommendations provided by the DRRT throughout the simulation did not 
necessarily represent the best decision to be made (i.e. decisions with a 100 marks), but were 
instead designed to alert the end-user about issues that might have been underestimated. In this 
context, it can be argued that maps, GIS data, recommendation prompts and expected outcomes 
were fundamental for participants F and H in achieving high decision-making performances. 
Finally, data collected for the abovementioned participants show that only approximately 10 out of 
48 decisions made achieved 50 marks or less indicating their consistent decision-making processes 
throughout the simulation.  
On the contrary, Participant B showed some scepticism about decision support for big scale events, 
such as the one simulated (an earthquake). His poor performance can be associated with lack of 
consideration of DRRT’s support or lack of interest in the case study experiment. Nonetheless, he 
declared at the final survey that the DRRT can be useful for localised events so we can discard the 
lack of interest in the experiment. It is suspected that his behaviour originates from his 
comprehensive practical experience and strong familiarity with emergency procedures, which 
culminated in over confidence making him unaware of many considerations to be taken before 
making the decisions. Therefore, a poor consideration of DRRT’s available tools is the most likely 
reason associated with his limited decision-making performance. 
An interesting fact is highlighted by the observed performances of participants G and J. In spite of 
a limited use of decision support, both participants had accurate decision-making. Their high 
performance can be associated with experiences, consistent emergency training and management of 
real events. For instance, participant G has already acted as the emergency manager for the EOC 
and has been local civil defence staff for many years. Likewise, participant J was already involved 
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in emergency exercises and practiced the substantial role of communication manager (information 
collection and liaising with external organisations) for a major road network in the country.  
The abovementioned highlight interesting findings in the context of the DRRT assessment. For 
participant F and H, it is important to emphasise that the accuracy of results provided by the 
decision support system needs to be always interpreted. End-users should not follow the systems’ 
recommendations immediately, but need to check its reasonableness. Moreover, different clusters 
of organisations manage diverse complexities. Hence, DRRT’s outputs can facilitate decision-
making in different contexts. For instance, the restoration of an electricity network can be predicted 
with the precision of hours or days while rebuilding major infrastructures can be accurately 
estimated within months or years time frames. Thus, end-users have to assess the level of accuracy 
required to support his/her decisions (Greco, 2010). As highlighted in the literature review and 
reinforced by Greco (2010), decision support tools aim at accurately providing recommendations 
(i.e. outcomes with correct or true values), but end-users are still required to determine the 
applicability of computer-generated solutions.  
Information presentation and end-user demands are to be better comprehended. Although being 
sceptical, Participant B partially supported the use of decision support systems for localised 
emergency events. This indicates that clear information presentation and simple system routines 
could potentially increase the acceptance and performance of decision support tools. Finally, the 
findings highlighted through participants G and J experiments indicate that regardless support or 
not some decision makers will have good performances due to personal experiences and emergency 
management knowledge. In such cases, the value of decision support systems needs to be 
previously assessed in face of its development cost as possible benefits. 
Additionally, teams confirmed better performances than individuals, with the exception of 
Participants F and H. In general, this fact indicates the intended synergy between Participant F and 
the DRRT. It can be argued that the system was capable to free the participant from performing 
time consuming activities, such as information log, data search, visual representations and so on 
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(Pomykalski et al., 1999). It is also understood that additional human expertise was provided to 
Participant F through system’s recommendations and prompts. 
Figure 6-7 illustrates that the DRRT did not contribute for quicker decision-making (i.e. effort). It 
indicates that when under pressure staff (regardless of experience) were able to systematically 
apply their knowledge to make decisions within limited time frames. It is additionally shown in 
Table 6-4 that good and intensive users of support had higher planning time averages than limited 
ones. This fact raises concerns as greater the planning time, shorter the execution time and vice-
versa. Nonetheless, good users had considerable better decision accuracy than limited users and a 
single instance for the two intensive users (one decision took 21 minutes) increased the average 
planning time for this group of participants. In spite to the both instances, higher accuracy 
suppresses the increased planning time as considerable better performances were achieved by those 
using the DRRT more consistently. For instance, participant F achieved almost double of marks 
than participants B and participant H had an incredible high accuracy in his decisions.     
Table 6-4: Decision-making Performance: Effort. 
 Decision Support Usage 
 Limited  Good Intensive 
 Minutes Minutes Minutes 
Average Planning Time 1.76 2.15 2.06 
Maximum Planning Time 10.00 14.00 21.00 
Minimum Planning Time 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Standard Deviation (Planning Time) 1.48 1.92 3.01 
In this backdrop, the relationship between planning and execution times needs to be properly 
considered as long planning can imply in insufficient execution time frames. Thus, inappropriate 
planning activities can potentially jeopardise response by reducing efficiency or ultimately making 
impossible for plans to be executed. Hence, caution in presenting support information is 
recommended. Increased planning times for participants C, D and E can be possibly related with 
information overload or inaccuracies, which created difficulties for decision-making, instead of 
facilitating it. Nevertheless, this fact cannot be interpreted as a DRRT limitation because increased 
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decision accuracy (i.e. approximately 15 marks) is much more representative than the additional 
planning time of 0.39 minutes. 
Figure 6-8 presents the decision-making accuracy box plot diagram for participants and groups. 
Observe that decision performance between limited and good DRRT users are very similar (same 
25 percentile, median and 75 percentile). However, the average accuracy is slightly higher (5 
marks) for participants using the DRRT at good levels when compared to limited users. A great 
shift in performance was perceived with participants using the DRRT intensively. Only 25% of 
decisions had accuracy bellow 75 marks (i.e. 25 percentile is equal 75 marks).  
In general, participants consistently employing the DRRT achieved better decision-making quality 
than those disregarding the DRRT. Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 illustrate such finding. This fact 
points out to the support offered by the DRRT in managing emergencies and highlights the 
potential efficiency and suitability of the system to support extreme events decision-making. 
Hence, the DRRT system, as proposed in this research, shows promising future opportunities to 
evolve into an operational management system.    
 
Figure 6-8: Decision-making Performance Box Plot and Individual Results: Accuracy. 
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On the specific context of resource allocation, data acquired was valuable and informative to assess 
the logistics model proposed in chapter 5. The constrained situation created by the seventeen link 
network was appropriate to collect data for further analyses. It has shown to be comprehensive and 
technically sound for the intended case study set up. Participants had to consistently assess the 
situation comprising resource availability and needs, road network layout, damage experienced, 
traffic flows, lost capacity, conflicting priorities and etc before deploying resources. It ultimately 
simulated common challenges faced by roading organisations when managing emergencies 
affecting a network.  
During the simulation, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected. Quantitative 
information was recorded by the DRRT application and represented the number of resources 
deployed to each damaged link as well as their origins. Qualitative notes were taken by the 
researcher in order to reflect additional reasoning considered by the participant.  
Acquired data were used to process results and analyse participants’ decision-making as well as 
verify the realism of the logistics model. In this context, data collected was processed to estimate 
two cost components: i) Total Response Costs (TRC) and ii) Total Logistics Costs (TLC). Costs 
were respectively calculated according to Equations 6-1 and 6-4 and summed for all times t.  
Figure 6-9 illustrates TRC for strategies adopted by participants A to F and three optimum ones 
identified by the resource allocation model proposed (Appendix E). Results for group simulations 
were suppressed because of technical difficulties. The exercise controller was not able to clarify 
misunderstandings (commonly observed during individual simulations) so collected data did not 
have the minimum quality needed for analyses. Additionally, participant G did not perform the 
resource allocation task and participants H to K had a very particular behaviour when allocating 
resources. Both cases are further explored in detail.  
Participants A to F reduced response costs similarly to the least optimum strategy (Optimum A). 
The results indicate comprehensive situation awareness and knowledge, because they needed to 
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consider a complex set of information before allocating the resources. Although decisions could be 
better made (optimum strategies B or C), we enforce that differences between the three optimum 
strategies are virtually insignificant. In this backdrop, participants achieved good results in regard 
to resource allocation, which represent their abilities to deal with complex information and 
conflicting priorities. 
In a general sense, the logistics model captured and represented the reasoning applied by decision 
makers when deploying resources. For instance, both model and participants’ behaviours seem to 
target similar damage when allocating resources in the context of the proposed scenario. The 
logistics model prioritises links 8, 9 and 14. Observe higher proportion of resources deployed to 
such links as shown in Table 6-5. A similar pattern is also observed among participants A, B, E and 
F as illustrated in Table 6-5. This approach is correct because link 6 has a very low priority due to 
its high road capacity and low traffic volume, which finally incurs in small number of vehicles 
delayed and low costs.    
Table 6-5: Resource Allocation. 
 Link 6 Link 8 Link 9 Link 14 
Optimum A 0 4 1 3 
Optimum B 1 0 3 4 
Optimum C 0 2 3 3 
Participant A 2 2 2 2 
Participant B 0 4 2 2 
Participant C 4 0 1 3 
Participant D 4 0 0 4 
Participant E 0 4 2 2 
Participant F 1 3 2 2 
As previously mentioned, participant G did not perform the resource allocation task. When 
enquired why, he stated that this decision was missed, because he assumed that maps with damage 
would automatically pop up throughout the simulation. Thus, he thought that physical damage was 
not still assessed so resources should not be deployed. It indicates a good reasoning in spite the 
missed decision. 
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Additionally, participants H to K presented a very distinct deployment strategy. Decisions to 
allocate physical resources were commonly made up to three times during the simulation. This fact 
indicates a particular response behaviour from contractors, who are in charge to conduct repairs 
during emergencies. Hence, the great importance focused in such activity, which is progressively 
made throughout the emergency. Finally, contractor’s staff showed a very comprehensive 
awareness about physical resources and were fully knowledgeable about gear specification 
(diggers, trucks, excavators), production rates, costs and traffic management needs (e.g. detour, 
traffic flows).    
At a first glance, logistics costs seemed to be properly minimised, with the exception of 
participants B and C. Figure 6-10 indicates similar logistics costs between the optimum strategies 
and participants A, D, E and F. Nonetheless, it is concluded that participants B and C only had 
higher costs, because resources were deployed twice (or relocated). Such decision pattern seems to 
be correct, particularly after observing contractor’s staff. The sole use of logistics costs to assess 
decision-making is therefore not recommended.  
In this backdrop, it is conclude that decision makers do not aim at reducing logistics costs 
exclusively, but focus on travel time instead. When enquired about the driving factors behind 
resource deployment, case study participants answered that resources should be relocated as many 
times as needed as long as travel times did not compromise the execution of necessary work. 
Therefore, resource allocation activities have shown to be a flexible, but strategic response activity. 
Complementary exercises and real events observations and game simulations support this finding, 
which indicates the contribution of the logistic cost to estimate travel time and its relation to repair 
execution. 
In summary, the case studies conducted indicated that the use of DRRT (e.g. recommended actions, 
maps, resource deployment optimization recommendation) can indeed facilitate decision-making 
by increasing performance (accuracy) of decision-making processes. As shown in Figure 6-7, 
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participants who considered decision support information more frequently had better performance 
than the ones disregarding it. Many participants highlighted that the proposed system can 
substantially help emergency managers. On one side of the spectrum, mapping technologies can 
help organisations to better share information, communication prompts can avoid information loss, 
response actions record can ease staff shifts change and etc. On the other side of the spectrum, the 
estimation of future instances (i.e. “Expected Results” tool) still needs considerable refinement to 
properly represent reality. Case studies also validated the resource deployment routine proposed in 
chapter 5. Data and facts collected during the resource deployment stage highlight the 
reasonableness behind the formulation of the response and logistics costs. 
Finally, note that the intrinsic conceptual nature of the Resource Allocation Optimisation Routine 
proposed in the last chapter and applied for the scenario defined in Figure 6-5 might not be 
applicable for real cases with dozen of damaged sites and hundreds of links. Therefore, the outputs 
from the model application shall be analysed by emergency management experts before making 
decisions as the reliability of the information generated might be questionable for real and complex 
scenarios. It is also highlighted the need to conduct specific studies to properly define the proposed 
parameters in the model (i.e. travel cost, loading/unloading cost and vehicle delay cost) in order to 
ensure adequacy of outcomes for specific cases under consideration. For such matter, local culture 
and economic indicators are recommended to be considered so sensitive analyses can be performed 
in order to find the best set of coefficients.    
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Figure 6-9: Total Response Costs – TRC. 
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Figure 6-10: Total Logistics Costs - TLC. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarises the findings of this research. It also confirms the hypothesis that the 
DRRT can enhance decision-making during emergency events. Additionally, we perform a critical 
analysis of both contributions and limitations of the DRRT to finally recommend future research 
endeavours.   
The chapter is divided in four sections. After this brief introduction, research findings are 
summarised. In the sequence, the DRRT is evaluated along with its contributions towards decision 
support during emergency events. The third section is dedicated to the analysis of DRRT’s 
limitations and the final section lists some recommendations and suggestions for future research.     
7.1 Research Findings 
This research achieved a number of findings at both emergency management and transportation 
fields. Overall, the findings were elucidative in the context of emergency events decision-making 
and finally helped to develop new and hopefully useful knowledge underpinned by the DRRT 
system. The following list enumerates the most representative research findings from the 
observation of real and simulated events and game simulations: 
 Emergency management is a highly dynamic process, in which information sharing plays a 
vital role. In this context, organisations practice procedures and develop awareness in order 
to avoid information loss and inconsistency in multi-agency responses; 
 The complexity of emergency decision-making has its genesis on the need to integrate the 
four decision-making domains (i.e. physical, information, cognitive and social); 
 Good situation awareness and knowledge were identified for the physical, information and 
social decision-making domains. For instance, good understanding on machinery and 
infrastructures, comprehensive communication procedures and organisational arrangements 
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are well set up, respectively. Nonetheless, the cognitive domain is still unclear as reasoning 
on decision-making processes were seldom specified by game participants;   
 Emergency scenario simulations can meet data needs for numerous research approaches, 
because real events are scarce and data collection procedures are hard to be implemented in 
the immediate aftermath of events;  
 Decision-making processes adopted by game participants indicated the use of Naturalistic 
Decision-making models. Thus, outcomes associated with individual decisions are 
cognitively estimated according to similar instances experienced in the past;  
 When facing non-previously experienced situations, decision makers call upon 
improvisation skills to make decisions. Such an approach is also described by the 
Naturalistic Decision-making model;    
 Emergency response is clearly segmented into two time frames (e.g. short and long terms). 
Short term objectives aim at immediate needs such as evacuation and support to life 
treating circumstances, whereas long term ones target recovering normality in terms of 
restoring socio-economic activities. These time frames are commonly referred as 
emergency response and recovery, respectively; 
 Emergency response and resource deployment are usually performed under strategic 
paradigms. Resources are seldom deployed to single or few locations as decision makers 
aim at attending different priorities at similar time frames; 
 Physical resources are allocated in the road network in order to meet the most urgent needs 
according to resource availability and damage levels. This represents a cognitive processes 
in which the decision-maker weights priorities to finally make decisions on resource 
allocation; 
 Common emergency response procedures were followed by game participants. In this 
context, at initial stages response aimed to facilitate search and rescue and then to ensure 
basic needs, such as water, power, medical treatment and so on;  
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 DRRT’s functionalities support decision-makers to act in a structured and logical manner. 
The procedural recommendations guide the decision makers through steps of the 
emergency response that despite their simplicity require full and timely implementation. 
Procedural recommendations triggered additional decision-making reasoning for 
participants taking into considerations the recommendations. Ultimately, the DRRT 
supported decision-makers to achieve accurate decisions in the scenario simulated; 
 The resource allocation model and information generated made decision makers aware of 
optimum deployment strategies considering a set of information, such as traffic flows, road 
capacity, experienced damage, response priorities and etc. Likewise procedural 
recommendations, this set of information supported better decisions in terms of resource 
allocation;   
 The DRRT tool comprehensively represented emergency management knowledge as the 
two less experienced participants achieved the highest performances. Additionally, those 
were  the participants fully considering the system as well as the less sceptical individuals 
about the idea of decision support during emergencies; 
 Many participants using the system at good or intensive levels achieved similar 
performances to groups A, B and C. Regardless specific assessments of participants’ 
experiences, this fact indicates that the DRRT was able to emulate human expertise 
through its recommendations and resource deployment information as individuals had 
similar or better decision accuracy than groups; 
 The DRRT highlighted an existing relationship between planning and execution activities. 
The case studies showed that planning is a vital activity when managing emergencies, but it 
should not compromise execution by allowing limited time to implement response 
strategies; and 
 The conceptualisation and assessment of the DRRT indicated at practical levels that 
decision makers can be freed of time demanding activities (e.g. information collection and 
organisation). It also supported additional reasoning when decision makers had the 
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tendency to be paralysed or inefficient in his/her decisions due to situation been over 
demanding. 
7.2 Evaluation on the Contribution of the DRRT 
The series of case studies presented in chapter 6 indicated that the DRRT positively contributed in 
facilitating decision-making during extreme events. It was observed that decision-making 
performance is directly proportional to how often DRRT’s tools and recommendations were 
considered when responding to the scenario. Case study participants F and H demonstrate such an 
axiom, given that they were intensive users of DRRT’s recommendations and had the best 
decision-making performances among all participants.  
Conceptually wise, the DRRT represented emergency management knowledge developed in this 
research. Knowledge representation is considered the main technical difference between DSS/ES 
and ordinary information technology systems. In this context, knowledge developed through the 
observation of real and simulated events and game simulations were considered to propose the 
DRRT. For instance, communication and information sharing issues identified when observing 
exercises were targeted by offering an integrated technology platform containing maps, information 
log, injects description, decision-making summary and etc. 
The naturalistic decision-making model adopted in emergencies (identified in the game 
simulations) was incorporated in the DRRT by general recommendations, which triggered 
alternative decision-making reasoning for some participants. Additionally, the DRRT platform 
along with the proposed logistics model were capable to process network data (e.g. traffic flows, 
road capacity, experienced damage) and present end-users with comprehensive information on 
optimum resource allocation strategies. Such strategies facilitated resource allocation decisions by 
considering conflicting priorities, resources limitations, response planning and etc.   
Specific results indicated that the DRRT facilitated decision-making and confirmed the hypothesis 
that decision support tools facilitate decision-making during emergency events. Case study 
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participants using the system at intensive levels achieved in average decisions 28% more accurate 
than good users and 31% better than limited users. Furthermore, 75% of decisions made by 
intensive users were assessed outstanding or good (75 marks or more), while others participants 
had only 25% of decisions with such an accuracy. Finally, numerous participants stated that the 
tools available and information generated can indeed support decisions in real situations.     
7.3 DRRT Limitations 
The main drawback identified in the DRRT was its limiting capacity in encouraging people to use 
the tools available. As shown in the case studies in chapter 6, only two out of eleven participants 
used the system in its full capacity. Although many more used the system at good levels, it was 
frequently observed lack of full consideration of available tools. Ultimately, the DRRT could not 
eliminate the common scepticism associated with decision support tools for complex multi-
disciplinary problems, such as emergency management.  
We also identified specific limitations as listed bellow. We reinforce, though, that they are 
consequences of recent developments in the emergency management field and not a direct related 
to the research method applied.  
 Information technology: better information presentation and graphical user interfaces can 
potentially encourage end-users are to use decision support systems due to simple and 
efficient operation; 
 Knowledge representation: in spite to the great deal of knowledge developed for roading 
organisations, the DRRT was limited in considering emergency management in a holistic 
manner. Issues such as welfare, legislation, policies and etc were not considered when 
developing the DRRT; and 
 Physical resources: limited understanding was developed and incorporated into the DRRT 
about physical resources. This mostly refers to knowledge already available with field 
staff, i.e. contractors. 
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7.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
Despite the considerable knowledge development and outcomes generated with this research, some 
recommendations for future research are listed as follows: 
 Emergency training package: is strongly recommended to evolve the DRRT framework 
application into a comprehensive training package to reduce simulation costs and improve 
results. The initial test ran with a class of students pointed out for alternative ways to 
simulate multi-agency exercises. In this respect, a dynamic platform in which responses 
from individual organisations affect information feed and scenario development to external 
organisations can be practiced, increasing the realism of simulations; 
 Virtual training environment: complimentarily to the previous recommendation, we 
suggest the development of a complete scenario set using virtual reality paradigms and 
human interface technologies in order to simulate a real emergency setting to test human 
reactions to decision support; 
 Increase realism of scenario simulation: it is expected that future endeavours will 
consider real scenarios instead of hypothetical simulations. The decision to use a 
hypothetical city representation has been made due to resource and time limitations 
associated with this particular research. However, it has been found a great deal of 
knowledge about possible disasters scenarios for numerous cities, e.g. Wellington – New 
Zealand, Vancouver – Canada. In this context, participants will not be detracted from the 
simulation as it will have real meaning as well as complexities experienced in real life; 
 Field integration and overlap reduction: concepts and knowledge developed throughout 
this research indicate the need to explore the opportunities to integrate expertise from 
different fields of knowledge. The DRRT development and test shown that “pluggings” 
from a particular fields (e.g. geology, political sciences) can be embedded into the 
application in  order to practice alternative emergency scenarios; therefore, reduce 
redundant research and development effort; 
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 Multi-disciplinary integration for better emergency management practices: strong 
integration among the social, physical, management, law and engineering fields is 
encouraged in order to overcome shortcomings from each area of knowledge. The recent 
“discovery” of emergency management research and the increasing number of disasters 
incurs the need to quickly evolve concepts and practices to reduce loss of life and 
economic disruptions; 
 Integration with well established practices in the academia and industry: the use of 
consecrated techniques such as logistics and supply chain management can support the 
description of the logistics of disasters or humanitarian logistics concept as part of the 
integration between emergency management and supply chain management; 
 Resource allocation mathematical modelling: further development on mathematical 
formulations of the resource optimisation routine needs to be conducted. Network 
reliability, logistics and optimisation techniques should be explored in order to develop a 
complete resource allocation model; 
 Human knowledge representation: there should be further studies that could incorporate 
other cognitive techniques to represent human knowledge. Such a research effort may lead 
to high accuracy levels in terms of recommendations and improved design DSS/ES to 
assist decision-making; and 
 Integration with artificial intelligence: a comprehensive approach of expert system and 
artificial intelligence should be endeavoured in order to represent human knowledge. 
Therefore, dynamic knowledge could be added into systems’ knowledge base in order to 
simulate human expertise similarly to a human being.    
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 GLOSSARY 
1) Textual abbreviations 
 
AELG = Auckland Egineering Lifelines 
AHP = Analitical Hierarchy Process 
AI = Artificial Intelligence 
BI = Business Inteligence 
BoP = Bay of Plenty 
CBD = Central Business District 
CCRP = Defence Command and Control Research Program 
CD = Civil Defence 
CDEM = Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
CELG = Canterbury Engineering Lifelines Group 
CIMS = Co-ordinated Incident Management System 
CLIPS = C Language Integrated Production System 
DGIS = Dynamic Geographic Information System 
DGM = Data Gathering Module 
DLM = Data Log Module 
DM = Decision Making 
DoC = Department of Conservation 
DRRT = Dynamic Response Recovery Tool 
DRRT-GUI = Dynamic Response Recovery Tool Graphical User Interface 
DSS = Decision Support Systems 
DST = Decision Support Tool 
DLCs = Decision and Learning Cycles 
DSSR = Decision Support Systems Resources 
EDS = Eruption Detection System 
EMA = Emergency Management Australia 
EMYCIN = Empty MYCIN 
EOC = Emergency Operations Centre 
ES = Expert Systems 
FEMA = Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GEOC = Group Emergency Operations Centre 
GIS = Geographic Information Systems 
GUI = Graphical User Interface 
GWRC = Greater Wellington Regional Council 
HLS = Humanitarian Logistics Software 
HPP = Heuristic Programming Project 
ICS = Incident Control System  
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IDE = Integrated Development Environment 
IE = Inference Engine 
IFRCRCS = The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cross Crescent Societies 
IT = Information Technology 
KB = Knowledge Base 
MCDEM = Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
MES = Management Expert Systems 
MIS = Management Information Systems 
MIT = Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MoU = Memorandum of Understanding 
MSF = Microsoft Solution Framework 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NIMS = National Incident Management Systems 
NLG = Northland Lifelines Group 
NZ = New Zealand 
NZFD = New Zealand Fire Department 
NZTA = New Zealand Transport Agency 
OD = Origin and Destination  
OLAP = On line Analytical Processing 
OODA = Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 
OS = Operational Systems 
PDSS = Planning and Decision Support Systems 
PSC = Public Safety Canda 
PSS = Planning Support Systems 
NTR = Network Terminal Reliability 
RCAs = Roading Controlling Authorities 
ResOrgs = Resilient Organisations Research Programme 
R&D = Research and Development 
RT = Radio Transmitter 
SAGAT = Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique 
SDST = Spatial Decision Support Tool 
SHO = State Highway Organisations 
UoC = University of Canterbury 
UPS = United Parcel Service 
VB = Visual Basic 
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APPENDIX B – GAME SIMULATION DATA BASE 
Importance Matrix: 
Participant A         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     9     8     9     9     6     6     9     
Protect Private Property  1/9 1      1/5 1     1      1/6  1/2  1/5 
Support Lifelines  1/8 5     1     4     4     1     1     2     
Protect Economy  1/9 1      1/4 1     5     1      1/5  1/2 
Protect Environment  1/9 1      1/4  1/5 1      1/5  1/9  1/3 
Enable Support from other 
Areas  1/6 6     1     1     5     1     3     9     
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/6 2     1     5     9      1/3 1     5     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/9 5      1/2 2     3      1/9  1/5 1     
Participant B         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     7     3     5     7     7     3     3     
Protect Private Property  1/7 1      1/5  1/3 1     3     3     3     
Support Lifelines  1/3 5     1     5     5     1     1     1     
Protect Economy  1/5 3      1/5 1      1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3 
Protect Environment  1/7 1      1/5 3     1      1/3  1/3 1     
Enable Support from other 
Areas  1/7  1/3 1     3     3     1     1     1     
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/3  1/3 1     3     3     1     1     3     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/3  1/3 1     3     1     1      1/3 1     
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Participant C         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     3     1     3     3     1     1     3     
Protect Private Property  1/3 1      1/7  1/2  1/3  1/5  1/5  1/2 
Support Lifelines 1     7     1     3     3     1     2     2     
Protect Economy  1/3 2      1/3 1     1      1/3  1/3  1/2 
Protect Environment  1/3 3      1/3 1     1      1/5  1/3 1     
Enable Support from other 
Areas 1     5     1     3     5     1     1     1     
Repair Key Infrastructure 1     5      1/2 3     3     1     1     1     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/3 2      1/2 2     1     1     1     1     
         
         
Participant D         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     9      1/9 9     8      1/3  1/9  1/7 
Protect Private Property  1/9 1     9      1/2  1/2  1/5  1/7  1/7 
Support Lifelines 9      1/9 1     9     5     1     3     1     
Protect Economy  1/9 2      1/9 1      1/3  1/5 1      1/7 
Protect Environment  1/8 2      1/5 3     1      1/7  1/3  1/9 
Enable Support from other 
Areas 3     5     1     5     7     1     9     1     
Repair Key Infrastructure 9     7      1/3 1     3      1/9 1      1/7 
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities 7     7     1     7     9     1     7     1     
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Participant E         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     6     8     2     4     8     8     7     
Protect Private Property  1/6 1      1/6  1/4  1/4  1/8  1/8  1/7 
Support Lifelines  1/8 6     1      1/5  1/6  1/8  1/7  1/6 
Protect Economy  1/2 4     5     1      1/4  1/8  1/7  1/7 
Protect Environment  1/4 4     6     4     1      1/8  1/8  1/7 
Enable Support from other 
Areas  1/8 8     8 1/2 8     8     1      1/2  1/4 
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/8 8     7 1/2 7     8     2     1      1/6 
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/7 7     6     7     7     4     6     1     
         
         
Participant F         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     5     2     6     5     4     2     5     
Protect Private Property  1/5 1     2     4     4     2     5     4     
Support Lifelines  1/2  1/2 1     4     3     1     1     2     
Protect Economy  1/6  1/4  1/4 1     2      1/2  1/3  1/2 
Protect Environment  1/5  1/4  1/3  1/2 1      1/2  1/2 1     
Enable Support from other 
Areas  1/4  1/2 1     2     2     1      1/2 1     
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/2  1/5 1     3     2     2     1     2     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/5  1/4  1/2 2     1     1      1/2 1     
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Participant G         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     8     2     8     8     4     3     3     
Protect Private Property  1/8 1      1/5 5     3      1/4  1/2 3     
Support Lifelines  1/2 5     1     6     8     2      1/2 3     
Protect Economy  1/8  1/5  1/6 1     1      1/2  1/4  1/2 
Protect Environment  1/8  1/3  1/8 1     1      1/3  1/4  1/2 
Enable Support from other 
Areas  1/4 4      1/2 2     3     1      1/2 1     
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/3 2     2     4     4     2     1     3     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/3  1/3  1/3 2     2     1      1/3 1     
         
         
Participant H         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     9     1     4     3      1/3 2     5     
Protect Private Property  1/9 1      1/2 3     1      1/3 2      1/5 
Support Lifelines 1     2     1     3     2      1/3 1     5     
Protect Economy  1/4  1/3  1/3 1     1      1/5  1/2  1/2 
Protect Environment  1/3 1      1/2 1     1      1/3  1/2  1/2 
Enable Support from other 
Areas 3     3     3     5     3     1     2     3     
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/2  1/2 1     2     2      1/2 1     1     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/5 5      1/5 2     2      1/3 1     1     
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Participant I         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     9     1     9     7     5     9     9     
Protect Private Property  1/9 1      1/9 1      1/3  1/9  1/5  1/3 
Support Lifelines 1     9     1     9     7     3     9     9     
Protect Economy  1/9 1      1/9 1      1/5  1/9  1/5  1/7 
Protect Environment  1/7 3      1/7 5     1      1/9  1/7 1     
Enable Support from other 
Areas  1/5 9      1/3 9     9     1     1     9     
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/9 5      1/9 5     7     1     1     2     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/9 3      1/9 7     1      1/9  1/2 1     
         
         
Participant J         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     5     1     5     3     1     1     1     
Protect Private Property  1/5 1      1/5  1/5  1/3  1/7  1/5  1/5 
Support Lifelines 1     5     1      1/5  1/3 1     1     1     
Protect Economy  1/5 5     5     1      1/3  1/5  1/5  1/5 
Protect Environment  1/3 3     3     3     1      1/5  1/5  1/5 
Enable Support from other 
Areas 1     7     1     5     5     1     1     1     
Repair Key Infrastructure 1     5     1     5     5     1     1     1     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities 1     5     1     5     5     1     1     1     
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Participant K         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     7     5     7     7     3     7     7     
Protect Private Property  1/7 1      1/7  1/7  1/9  1/9  1/9  1/7 
Support Lifelines  1/5 7     1     7     3     3     7     7     
Protect Economy  1/7 7      1/7 1      1/7  1/7  1/9  1/7 
Protect Environment  1/7 9      1/3 7     1     3     3     3     
Enable Support from other 
Areas  1/3 9      1/3 7      1/3 1      1/7 1     
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/7 9      1/7 9      1/3 7     1     5     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/7 7      1/7 7      1/3 1      1/5 1     
         
         
Participant L         
Items "i"            Items "j" 
Support 
Immediate 
Rescue 
Protect 
Private 
Property 
Support 
Lifelines 
Protect 
Economy 
Protect 
Environment
Enable 
Support 
from other 
Areas 
Repair Key 
Infrastructure
Facilitate 
Accessibility 
Between 
Communities 
Support Immediate Rescue 1     9     3     9     7     3     3     7     
Protect Private Property  1/9 1      1/9  1/3  1/7  1/9  1/9  1/5 
Support Lifelines  1/3 9     1     9     9     5     7     5     
Protect Economy  1/9 3      1/9 1      1/4  1/9  1/7  1/7 
Protect Environment  1/7 7      1/9 4     1     5      1/5  1/7 
Enable Support from other 
Areas  1/3 9      1/5 9      1/5 1      1/5 1     
Repair Key Infrastructure  1/3 9      1/7 7     5     5     1     3     
Facilitate Accessibility 
Between Communities  1/7 5      1/5 7     7     1      1/3 1     
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Resource Deployment:  
 
Participant A         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 6 6 4 10 0 10 0 10 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
3 0 0 4 4 3 7 0 7 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 4 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 
7 2 2 0 2 0 2 4 6 0 
8 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 3 1 
9 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 6 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 2 2 0 2 5 7 0 7 0 
Airport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 13  - 13  - 13 
       End of Sim   59 
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Participant B         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 5 5 5 10 0 10 0 10 0 
2 4 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
3 0 0 4 4 3 7 0 7 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 1 
8 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 6 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 1 1 1 2 5 7 0 7 8 
Airport 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 13  - 13  - 13 
       End of Sim   59 
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Participant C         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 7 7 0 7 0 7 0 
4 2 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 2 
6 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 5 0 
7 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
8 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
14 4 4 2 6 1 7 0 7 0 
Airport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 10  - 10  - 10 
       End of Sim   50 
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Participant D         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 4 0 
3 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 6 1 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
6 0 0 4 4 1 5 0 5 0 
7 6 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
8 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 0 
9 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 3 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 1 1 1 2 5 7 1 8 1 
Airport 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 10  - 10  - 10 
       End of Sim   50 
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Participant E         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 2 2 2 4 3 7 3 10 0 
2 1 1 1 2 2 4 1 5 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 3 3 0 3 0 3 0 
6 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 
7 4 4 1 5 0 5 0 5 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
9 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 2 
10 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 4 
14 1 1 3 4 0 4 1 5 4 
Airport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 10  - 10  - 13 
       End of Sim   53 
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Participant F         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 2 2 3 5 0 5 3 8 2 
2 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 6 0 
3 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 5 
4 2 2 2 4 0 4 0 4 0 
5 0 0 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 
6 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 6 0 
7 3 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 3 3 0 3 5 8 0 8 0 
Airport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 10  - 10  - 10 
       End of Sim   50 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 190 
          
          
          
          
          
          
Participant G         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 3 3 1 4 1 5 2 
4 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 0 
5 0 0 3 3 3 6 0 6 0 
6 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 5 0 
7 6 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 
10 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 3 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 3 3 3 6 1 7 0 7 0 
Airport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 10  - 10  - 10 
       End of Sim   50 
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Participant H         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 2 2 2 4 2 6 4 10 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
3 0 0 2 2 2 4 3 7 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 1 1 5 6 0 6 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 
7 4 4 3 7 0 7 0 7 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
14 4 4 2 6 1 7 0 7 0 
Airport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 10  - 10  - 13 
       End of Sim   53 
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Participant I         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 7 7 3 10 0 10 0 10 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 
3 0 0 2 2 2 4 3 7 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
6 0 0 0 0 4 4 1 5 0 
7 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 6 0 
8 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 5 5 2 7 0 7 0 
Airport 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 13  - 13  - 13 
       End of Sim   59 
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Participant J         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 5 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
3 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 5 2 
4 2 2 2 4 1 5 0 5 0 
5 1 1 2 3 0 3 0 3 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 2 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 1 
8 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 0 
9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 2 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 
14 2 2 2 4 3 7 0 7 1 
Airport 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 10  - 10  - 10 
       End of Sim   50 
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Participant K         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 0 0 3 3 0 3 7 10 0 
2 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 
3 2 2 2 4 0 4 0 4 3 
4 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
5 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 5 
6 3 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 2 
7 3 3 2 5 1 6 0 6 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 
9 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 7 0 
Airport 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 
TOTAL 10  -  10  - 10  - 10  - 13 
       End of Sim   53 
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Participant L         
 Resources Mobilized 
 
1st 
Movement  Net Total 
2nd 
Movement  Net Total 
3rd 
Movement  Net Total 
4th 
Movement  Net Total 
5th 
Movement  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
4 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
6 2 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 0 
7 1 1 3 4 2 6 0 6 0 
8 1 1 1 2 2 4 0 4 0 
9 1 1 1 2 4 6 0 6 0 
10 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 
Airport 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 
TOTAL 8  -  9  - 10  - 9  - 10 
       End of Sim   46 
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APPENDIX C – DRRT CASE STUDY APPLICATION SCENARIO SPECIFICATION 
Decision 
Instance Time Injects Response Targets ID Response Activity 
Accuracy 
(Points) Expected Outcome Outcome Information / Inject 
 -  3.00 am  - Earthquake happens  - Nil Nil  -  - 
1 Contact Civil Defence 50 Establish information loop with Civil Defence / Data sharing and disseminating 
Civil Defence not reached: Failed 
communication / No response 
2 Contact contractors 50 Establish information loop with contractors / Data sharing and disseminating 
Contractors reached: RTs operational and 
limited cell phone coverage. 
3 Contact consultants 50 Establish information loop with consultants / Data sharing and disseminating 
Consultants reached: Cell phone limited, 
dedicated landline channel and no e mail 
communication 
4 Contact City Councils 50 Establish information loop with the City Council / Data sharing and disseminating 
City Council reached: Cell phone limited, 
dedicated landline channel and no e mail 
communication 
5 Enquire Civil Defence 25 Collect information about number of affected people, deaths and needs / Data collection Failed communication / No response 
6 Enquire contractors 25 Collect information about road damage and available resources / Data collection 
Unspecific damage information about Mt. 
Victoria and The Terrace tunnels 
7 Enquire consultants 25 Reinforce technical scheme of response and provide technical advice / Data collection 
No specific information, but damage 
throughout the state highway network has 
been already reported by numerous 
sources 
8 Enquire City Councils 25 Collect information about local community needs / Data collection Supporting local community rescue efforts 
9 Contact NZTA local office 50 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Liaising with regional office to start 
emergency operations 
10 Contact NZTA regional office 50 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Endeavouring to collect information on 
road damage and external organisations' 
needs 
11 Contact NZTA national office 50 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Strategic information priorities released by 
fax communication early on 
12 Contact NZ Police 50 Establish information loop with Police and collect on site information / Data sharing and disseminating 
No much specific information currently. 
Information about abandoned vehicle, 
panic and public disobedience 
13 Contact National Emergency Controller 50 Acquire strategic information at National level / Data sharing and disseminating Defining National Response Planning 
14 Mobilize physical resources 0 
Identify and organise available physical resources for 
immediate deployments / Fuel dependency and availability 
/ Local, regional and national resources inventory 
Nil 
15 Mobilize human resources 75 
Identify and organise available human resources to 
conduct emergency management activities / Staff 
availability / Volunteering 
Approximately 60% of your staff is 
available. They are heading to the EOC 
while 5 people is already at the EOC 
starting emergency operations 
16 Deploy human resources (management) 0 Damage assessment and management / Temporary traffic management / Alternative routes and detours Nil 
1st 6.00am (1st day) Set 1 
Response begins. 
Start operations in 
emergency mode. 
Sort organisational 
procedures for 
response. Define 
organisation's 
mission in response 
efforts. Define 
organisation's 
priorities in response 
efforts. Identify 
possible 
communication 
technologies to be 
used. 
17 Deploy physical resources (damage repair) 0 
Repair identified and assessed damage / Increase 
network operationability / Driver availability / Fuel 
availability / Route / Resource inventory / Destination 
Nil 
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18 Check available communication technologies 100 Assessment of RTs, e-mail, phone, fax, satellite phone and internet communication operationability 
RTs often operational, phone / fax / 
satellite phones usable and e-mail / 
internet non operational 
19 Define information procedures 50 
Operationalise data collection, analysis, storing, 
summarising, sharing, disseminating, maintaining and 
updating frameworks / Communication intra-organisation, 
inter-organisation, with media and public information 
Limited operationability of information 
sharing and processing frameworks 
20 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 100 
Operationalise CIMS structure (assign communication, 
logistics, public information, operations, emergency 
management roles) / Define staff shifts / Check backup 
power (generators) / Ensure venue safety / Arrange food 
needs and first aid kits 
Define: CIMS structure, staff shifts, check 
backup power (generators), ensure venue 
safety, arrange food needs and first aid 
kits 
21 Define organisation's response objectives 100 Agree upon response objectives / Create importance matrix Define response objectives 
22 Define organisation's response priorities 100 Establish priorities upon agreed response objectives / Fill in importance matrix Prioritise response objectives 
23 Define emergency scenario needs 0 Forecast resource needs Nil 
24 Projection of future instances 0 Forecast upcoming situations Nil 
1 Contact Civil Defence 50 Establish information loop with Civil Defence / Data sharing and disseminating 
Civil Defence reached: Cell phone limited, 
dedicated landline channel and no e mail 
communication 
2 Contact contractors 50 Establish information loop with contractors / Data sharing and disseminating 
Contractors reached: RTs operational and 
limited cell phone coverage. 
3 Contact consultants 50 Establish information loop with consultants / Data sharing and disseminating 
Consultants reached: Cell phone limited, 
dedicated landline channel and no e mail 
communication 
4 Contact City Councils 50 Establish information loop with the City Council / Data sharing and disseminating 
City Council reached: Cell phone limited, 
dedicated landline channel and no e mail 
communication 
5 Enquire Civil Defence 25 Collect information about number of affected people, deaths and needs / Data collection 
Organisation currently involved in search 
and rescue, wellbeing, shelter and injury 
treatment 
6 Enquire contractors 25 Collect information about road damage and available resources / Data collection 
Unspecific damage information about 
tunnels and major road infrastructure 
7 Enquire consultants 25 Reinforce technical scheme of response and provide technical advice / Data collection 
No specific information, but damage 
throughout state highway network has 
been already reported by numerous 
sources 
8 Enquire City Councils 25 Collect information about local community needs / Data collection Supporting local community rescue efforts 
9 Contact NZTA local office 100 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
10 Contact NZTA regional office 100 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
2nd 9.00am (1st day) Set 2 
Establish information 
procedures and 
initiate information 
loop within 
organisation. 
Establish intra-
organisational 
information loop. 
Acquire strategic 
information. 
11 Contact NZTA national office 100 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
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12 Contact NZ Police 50 Establish information loop with Police and collect on site information / Data sharing and disseminating 
No much specific information currently. 
Information about abandoned vehicle, 
panic and public disobedience 
13 Contact National Emergency Controller 100 Acquire strategic information at National level / Data sharing and disseminating National Response Planning available 
14 Mobilize physical resources 25 
Identify and organise available physical resources for 
immediate deployments / Fuel dependency and availability 
/ Local, regional and national resources inventory 
Nil 
15 Mobilize human resources 75 
Identify and organise available human resources to 
conduct emergency management activities / Staff 
availability / Volunteering 
Most of staff at the EOC. Staff shortages 
are not currently experienced 
16 Deploy human resources (management) 0 Damage assessment and management / Temporary traffic management / Alternative routes and detours Nil 
17 Deploy physical resources (damage repair) 0 
Repair identified and assessed damage / Increase 
network operationability / Driver availability / Fuel 
availability / Route / Resource inventory / Destination 
Nil 
18 Check available communication technologies 75 Assessment of RTs, e-mail, phone, fax, satellite phone and internet communication operationability 
RTs often operational, phone / fax / 
satellite phones usable and e-mail / 
internet non operational 
19 Define information procedures 100 
Operationalise data collection, analysis, storing, 
summarising, sharing, disseminating, maintaining and 
updating frameworks / Communication intra-organisation, 
inter-organisation, with media and public information 
Full operationability of information sharing 
and processing frameworks 
20 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 75 
Operationalise CIMS structure (assign communication, 
logistics, public information, operations, emergency 
management roles) / Define staff shifts / Check backup 
power (generators) / Ensure venue safety / Arrange food 
needs and first aid kits 
Define: CIMS structure, staff shifts, check 
backup power (generators), ensure venue 
safety, arrange food needs and first aid 
kits 
21 Define organisation's response objectives 75 Agree upon response objectives / Create importance matrix Define response objectives 
22 Define organisation's response priorities 75 Establish priorities upon agreed response objectives / Fill in importance matrix Prioritise response objectives 
23 Define emergency scenario needs 25 Forecast resource needs Nil 
24 Projection of future instances 0 Forecast upcoming situations Nil 
1 Contact Civil Defence 100 Establish information loop with Civil Defence / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
2 Contact contractors 100 Establish information loop with contractors / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
3 Contact consultants 100 Establish information loop with consultants / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
4 Contact City Councils 100 Establish information loop with the City Council / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
3rd 12.00pm (1st day) Set 3 
Initiate information 
loop among external 
organisations. 
Establish inter-
organisational 
information loop.  
5 Enquire Civil Defence 50 Collect information about number of affected people, deaths and needs / Data collection 
Acquire specific information about the 
main regional hospital 
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6 Enquire contractors 50 Collect information about road damage and available resources / Data collection 
Acquire partial information about tunnels 
and major road infrastructure 
7 Enquire consultants 50 Reinforce technical scheme of response and provide technical advice / Data collection 
Acquire information about motorway 
bridges 
8 Enquire City Councils 50 Collect information about local community needs / Data collection Acquire house displacement estimation 
9 Contact NZTA local office 75 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
10 Contact NZTA regional office 75 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
11 Contact NZTA national office 75 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
12 Contact NZ Police 75 Establish information loop with Police and collect on site information / Data sharing and disseminating 
Abandoned vehicles at the city centre. 
Increasing levels of panic due to deaths 
and aftershocks 
13 Contact National Emergency Controller 75 Acquire strategic information at National level / Data sharing and disseminating National Response Planning available 
14 Mobilize physical resources 25 
Identify and organise available physical resources for 
immediate deployments / Fuel dependency and availability 
/ Local, regional and national resources inventory 
Initial contacts made towards building up 
resources inventory nationally and 
regionally. Fuel availability still unknown 
15 Mobilize human resources 75 
Identify and organise available human resources to 
conduct emergency management activities / Staff 
availability / Volunteering 
Most of staff at the EOC. Staff shortages 
are not currently experienced 
16 Deploy human resources (management) 25 Damage assessment and management / Temporary traffic management / Alternative routes and detours 
Limited assessments due to site 
inaccessibility. Some support to police in 
temporary traffic management 
17 Deploy physical resources (damage repair) 25 
Repair identified and assessed damage / Increase 
network operationability / Driver availability / Fuel 
availability / Route / Resource inventory / Destination 
Very limited impact on initiation of repair. 
Waste of fuel and personnel 
18 Check available communication technologies 50 Assessment of RTs, e-mail, phone, fax, satellite phone and internet communication operationability 
RTs often operational, phone / fax / 
satellite phones usable and e-mail / 
internet non operational 
19 Define information procedures 75 
Operationalise data collection, analysis, storing, 
summarising, sharing, disseminating, maintaining and 
updating frameworks / Communication intra-organisation, 
inter-organisation, with media and public information 
Full operationability of information sharing 
and processing frameworks 
20 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 50 
Operationalise CIMS structure (assign communication, 
logistics, public information, operations, emergency 
management roles) / Define staff shifts / Check backup 
power (generators) / Ensure venue safety / Arrange food 
needs and first aid kits 
Define: CIMS structure, staff shifts, check 
backup power (generators), ensure venue 
safety, arrange food needs and first aid 
kits 
21 Define organisation's response objectives 50 Agree upon response objectives / Create importance matrix Define response objectives 
22 Define organisation's response priorities 50 Establish priorities upon agreed response objectives / Fill in importance matrix Prioritise response objectives 
23 Define emergency scenario needs 25 Forecast resource needs Non comprehensive understanding of the "big picture" 
24 Projection of future instances 0 Forecast upcoming situations Nil 
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1 Contact Civil Defence 75 Establish information loop with Civil Defence / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
2 Contact contractors 75 Establish information loop with contractors / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
3 Contact consultants 75 Establish information loop with consultants / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
4 Contact City Councils 75 Establish information loop with the City Council / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
5 Enquire Civil Defence 100 Collect information about number of affected people, deaths and needs / Data collection 
Acquire information about main regional 
Hospital, airport and wharf 
6 Enquire contractors 100 Collect information about road damage and available resources / Data collection 
Acquire full information about tunnels and 
major road infrastructure 
7 Enquire consultants 100 Reinforce technical scheme of response and provide technical advice / Data collection 
Acquire technical information about 
tunnels and major road infrastructure   
8 Enquire City Councils 100 Collect information about local community needs / Data collection 
Acquire house displacement estimation 
and death tools 
9 Contact NZTA local office 50 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
10 Contact NZTA regional office 50 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
11 Contact NZTA national office 50 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
12 Contact NZ Police 100 Establish information loop with Police and collect on site information / Data sharing and disseminating 
Acquire full information about tunnels and 
major road infrastructure, local roads 
blocked by debris and abandoned cars at 
the CBD 
13 Contact National Emergency Controller 50 Acquire strategic information at National level / Data sharing and disseminating National Response Planning available 
14 Mobilize physical resources 50 
Identify and organise available physical resources for 
immediate deployments / Fuel dependency and availability 
/ Local, regional and national resources inventory 
Ongoing communications to build up 
resources inventory nationally and 
regionally. Fuel availability limited due to 
power outages and inaccessible CBD 
15 Mobilize human resources 50 
Identify and organise available human resources to 
conduct emergency management activities / Staff 
availability / Volunteering 
Most of staff at the EOC. Staff shortages 
are not currently experienced 
4th 
6.00am 
(2nd 
Day) 
Set 4 
Collect specific 
information on 
experienced damage 
and priorities from 
external 
organisations. 
Collect information. 
Establish inter-
organisational 
information loop with 
Police to liaise 
operations 
16 Deploy human resources (management) 50 Damage assessment and management / Temporary traffic management / Alternative routes and detours 
Better infrastructure assessments, but not 
complete. Better support to police in 
temporary traffic management 
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17 Deploy physical resources (damage repair) 50 
Repair identified and assessed damage / Increase 
network operationability / Driver availability / Fuel 
availability / Route / Resource inventory / Destination 
Increased impact on repair and better use 
of fuel and personnel. Not at optimum 
levels though 
18 Check available communication technologies 25 Assessment of RTs, e-mail, phone, fax, satellite phone and internet communication operationability 
RTs often operational, phone / fax / 
satellite phones usable and e-mail / 
internet non operational 
19 Define information procedures 50 
Operationalise data collection, analysis, storing, 
summarising, sharing, disseminating, maintaining and 
updating frameworks / Communication intra-organisation, 
inter-organisation, with media and public information 
Full operationability of information sharing 
and processing frameworks 
20 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 25 
Operationalise CIMS structure (assign communication, 
logistics, public information, operations, emergency 
management roles) / Define staff shifts / Check backup 
power (generators) / Ensure venue safety / Arrange food 
needs and first aid kits 
Define: CIMS structure, staff shifts, check 
backup power (generators), ensure venue 
safety, arrange food needs and first aid 
kits 
21 Define organisation's response objectives 25 Agree upon response objectives / Create importance matrix Define response objectives 
22 Define organisation's response priorities 25 Establish priorities upon agreed response objectives / Fill in importance matrix Prioritise response objectives 
23 Define emergency scenario needs 50 Forecast resource needs Better comprehension of the emergency situation. Needs superficially surveyed 
24 Projection of future instances 25 Forecast upcoming situations Uncomprehensive projections 
1 Contact Civil Defence 50 Establish information loop with Civil Defence / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
2 Contact contractors 50 Establish information loop with contractors / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
3 Contact consultants 50 Establish information loop with consultants / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
4 Contact City Councils 50 Establish information loop with the City Council / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
5 Enquire Civil Defence 75 Collect information about number of affected people, deaths and needs / Data collection 
Acquire information about main regional 
Hospital, airport and wharf 
6 Enquire contractors 75 Collect information about road damage and available resources / Data collection 
Acquire full information about tunnels and 
major road infrastructure 
7 Enquire consultants 75 Reinforce technical scheme of response and provide technical advice / Data collection 
Acquire technical information about 
tunnels and major road infrastructure   
8 Enquire City Councils 75 Collect information about local community needs / Data collection 
Acquire house displacement estimation 
and death tools 
5th 
6.00am 
(3rd 
Day) 
Set 5 
Initiate formal 
response in terms of 
resources (physical 
and human) 
deployment to attend 
external 
organisation's 
needs. Organise and 
sort available 
physical resources. 
Organise and sort 
available human 
resources. Initiate 
human resources 
deployment for 
management efforts. 
Initiate physical 
resources 
deployment to clean 
roads, fix damage 
and re-establish 
normality. 
9 Contact NZTA local office 25 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
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10 Contact NZTA regional office 25 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
11 Contact NZTA national office 25 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
12 Contact NZ Police 75 Establish information loop with Police and collect on site information / Data sharing and disseminating 
Acquire full information about tunnels and 
major road infrastructure, local roads 
blocked by debris and abandoned cars at 
the CBD 
13 Contact National Emergency Controller 25 Acquire strategic information at National level / Data sharing and disseminating National Response Planning available 
14 Mobilize physical resources 100 
Identify and organise available physical resources for 
immediate deployments / Fuel dependency and availability 
/ Local, regional and national resources inventory 
Physical resources inventory complete 
15 Mobilize human resources 100 
Identify and organise available human resources to 
conduct emergency management activities / Staff 
availability / Volunteering 
Human resources availability identified 
16 Deploy human resources (management) 100 Damage assessment and management / Temporary traffic management / Alternative routes and detours 
Deploy human resources to: 
assessments, volunteering, search & 
rescue, debris removal, damage repair 
17 Deploy physical resources (damage repair) 100 
Repair identified and assessed damage / Increase 
network operationability / Driver availability / Fuel 
availability / Route / Resource inventory / Destination 
Full impact on repair and best use of fuel 
and personnel 
18 Check available communication technologies 0 Assessment of RTs, e-mail, phone, fax, satellite phone and internet communication operationability 
RTs often operational, phone / fax / 
satellite phones usable and e-mail / 
internet non operational 
19 Define information procedures 25 
Operationalise data collection, analysis, storing, 
summarising, sharing, disseminating, maintaining and 
updating frameworks / Communication intra-organisation, 
inter-organisation, with media and public information 
Full operationability of information sharing 
and processing frameworks 
20 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 0 
Operationalise CIMS structure (assign communication, 
logistics, public information, operations, emergency 
management roles) / Define staff shifts / Check backup 
power (generators) / Ensure venue safety / Arrange food 
needs and first aid kits 
Define: CIMS structure, staff shifts, check 
backup power (generators), ensure venue 
safety, arrange food needs and first aid 
kits 
21 Define organisation's response objectives 0 Agree upon response objectives / Create importance matrix Define response objectives 
22 Define organisation's response priorities 0 Establish priorities upon agreed response objectives / Fill in importance matrix Prioritise response objectives 
23 Define emergency scenario needs 75 Forecast resource needs Needs comprehensively identified 
24 Projection of future instances 50 Forecast upcoming situations Superficial projections 
1 Contact Civil Defence 25 Establish information loop with Civil Defence / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
6th 
6.00am 
(4th 
Day) 
Set 6 
Project future needs 
and upcoming 
scenarios. Identify 
future needs in 
terms of human and 
physical resources. 
Identify possible 
upcoming events 
2 Contact contractors 25 Establish information loop with contractors / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
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3 Contact consultants 25 Establish information loop with consultants / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
4 Contact City Councils 25 Establish information loop with the City Council / Data sharing and disseminating 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
5 Enquire Civil Defence 50 Collect information about number of affected people, deaths and needs / Data collection 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
6 Enquire contractors 50 Collect information about road damage and available resources / Data collection 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
7 Enquire consultants 50 Reinforce technical scheme of response and provide technical advice / Data collection 
Information sharing procedures and 
available communication technologies 
agreed upon. No risk of major information 
lost 
8 Enquire City Councils 50 Collect information about local community needs / Data collection 
Acquire house displacement estimation 
and death tools 
9 Contact NZTA local office 0 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
10 Contact NZTA regional office 0 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
11 Contact NZTA national office 0 
Establish and maintain information loop intra-organisation 
/ Data storing, analysing and summarising / Data 
maintaining and updating 
Intra-organisational information sharing 
procedures set up 
12 Contact NZ Police 50 Establish information loop with Police and collect on site information / Data sharing and disseminating 
Acquire full information about tunnels and 
major road infrastructure, local roads 
blocked by debris and abandoned cars at 
the CBD 
13 Contact National Emergency Controller 0 Acquire strategic information at National level / Data sharing and disseminating National Response Planning available 
14 Mobilize physical resources 75 
Identify and organise available physical resources for 
immediate deployments / Fuel dependency and availability 
/ Local, regional and national resources inventory 
Physical resources inventory complete 
15 Mobilize human resources 75 
Identify and organise available human resources to 
conduct emergency management activities / Staff 
availability / Volunteering 
Human resources availability identified 
16 Deploy human resources (management) 75 Damage assessment and management / Temporary traffic management / Alternative routes and detours 
Deploy human resources to: 
assessments, volunteering, search & 
rescue, debris removal, damage repair 
17 Deploy physical resources (damage repair) 75 
Repair identified and assessed damage / Increase 
network operationability / Driver availability / Fuel 
availability / Route / Resource inventory / Destination 
Full impact on repair and best use of fuel 
and personnel 
from the emergency. 
Forecast activities 
re-development and 
recovery periods. 
18 Check available communication technologies 0 Assessment of RTs, e-mail, phone, fax, satellite phone and internet communication operationability 
RTs often operational, phone / fax / 
satellite phones usable and e-mail / 
internet non operational 
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19 Define information procedures 0 
Operationalise data collection, analysis, storing, 
summarising, sharing, disseminating, maintaining and 
updating frameworks / Communication intra-organisation, 
inter-organisation, with media and public information 
Full operationability of information sharing 
and processing frameworks 
20 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 0 
Operationalise CIMS structure (assign communication, 
logistics, public information, operations, emergency 
management roles) / Define staff shifts / Check backup 
power (generators) / Ensure venue safety / Arrange food 
needs and first aid kits 
Define: CIMS structure, staff shifts, check 
backup power (generators), ensure venue 
safety, arrange food needs and first aid 
kits 
21 Define organisation's response objectives 0 Agree upon response objectives / Create importance matrix Define response objectives 
22 Define organisation's response priorities 0 Establish priorities upon agreed response objectives / Fill in importance matrix Prioritise response objectives 
23 Define emergency scenario needs 100 Forecast resource needs Needs fully surveyed 
24 Projection of future instances 100 Forecast upcoming situations Recovery plan fully draw by projection of future needs 
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APPENDIX D – DRRT CASE STUDY COLLECTED DATA 
     
Participant A  Simulation Start: 2:13:00 p.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1  Contact NZ Police  18/02/2010 2:17:00 p.m. 4 50 
2  Contact Civil Defence  18/02/2010 2:18:00 p.m. 1 50 
3  Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  18/02/2010 2:18:00 p.m. 1 100 
4  Mobilize human resources  18/02/2010 2:18:00 p.m. 1 75 
5  Define organisation's response objectives  18/02/2010 2:21:00 p.m. 3 75 
6  Define organisation's response priorities  18/02/2010 2:21:00 p.m. 1 75 
7  Define emergency scenario needs  18/02/2010 2:22:00 p.m. 2 25 
8  Contact contractors  18/02/2010 2:22:00 p.m. 1 50 
9  Mobilize physical resources  18/02/2010 2:23:00 p.m. 2 25 
10  Contact consultants  18/02/2010 2:24:00 p.m. 2 100 
11  Deploy human resources (management)  18/02/2010 2:24:00 p.m. 1 25 
12  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  18/02/2010 2:24:00 p.m. 8 25 
13  Projection of future instances  18/02/2010 2:32:00 p.m. 1 0 
14  Contact City Councils  18/02/2010 2:35:00 p.m. 3 75 
15  Contact NZTA local office  18/02/2010 2:35:00 p.m. 1 50 
16  Contact National Emergency Controller  18/02/2010 2:35:00 p.m. 1 50 
17  Define information procedures  18/02/2010 2:36:00 p.m. 2 50 
18  No action  18/02/2010 2:37:00 p.m. 2 0 
19  Contact NZTA national office  18/02/2010 2:40:00 p.m. 3 25 
20  Contact NZ Police  18/02/2010 2:41:00 p.m. 2 75 
21  Contact contractors  18/02/2010 2:41:00 p.m. 1 50 
22  Contact consultants  18/02/2010 2:41:00 p.m. 1 50 
23  Contact National Emergency Controller  18/02/2010 2:42:00 p.m. 2 0 
24  Contact NZ Police  18/02/2010 2:42:00 p.m. 1 50 
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Participant B  Simulation Start: 9:34:00 p.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1  Mobilize physical resources  19/02/2010 9:38:00 a.m. 4 0 
2  Mobilize human resources  19/02/2010 9:38:00 a.m. 1 75 
3  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 9:39:00 a.m. 2 0 
4  Enquire Civil Defence  19/02/2010 9:40:00 a.m. 2 25 
5  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 9:42:00 a.m. 3 25 
6  Contact NZTA local office  19/02/2010 9:42:00 a.m. 1 100 
7  Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  19/02/2010 9:44:00 a.m. 3 75 
8  Define organisation's response priorities  19/02/2010 9:44:00 a.m. 1 75 
9  Deploy human resources (management)  19/02/2010 9:44:00 a.m. 1 0 
10  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 9:46:00 a.m. 10 25 
11  Enquire Civil Defence  19/02/2010 9:54:00 a.m. 1 50 
12  Contact NZTA local office  19/02/2010 9:54:00 a.m. 1 75 
13  Projection of future instances  19/02/2010 9:54:00 a.m. 1 0 
14  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 9:56:00 a.m. 3 50 
15  Enquire Civil Defence  19/02/2010 9:57:00 a.m. 2 50 
16  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 9:57:00 a.m. 1 25 
17  Contact NZTA local office  19/02/2010 9:59:00 a.m. 3 75 
18  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 9:59:00 a.m. 1 50 
19  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 10:02:00 a.m. 3 75 
20  Enquire Civil Defence  19/02/2010 10:02:00 a.m. 1 75 
21  Contact NZTA local office  19/02/2010 10:02:00 a.m. 1 25 
22  Projection of future instances  19/02/2010 10:02:00 a.m. 1 50 
23  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 10:03:00 a.m. 2 50 
24  Contact NZTA local office  19/02/2010 10:03:00 a.m. 1 0 
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Participant C  Simulation Start: 11:12:00 p.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 11:16:00 a.m. 4 25 
2  Contact Civil Defence  19/02/2010 11:16:00 a.m. 1 50 
3  Contact NZTA local office  19/02/2010 11:17:00 a.m. 2 50 
4  Mobilize human resources  19/02/2010 11:17:00 a.m. 1 75 
5  Check available communication technologies  19/02/2010 11:22:00 a.m. 5 75 
6  Contact NZ Police  19/02/2010 11:23:00 a.m. 2 50 
7  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 11:24:00 a.m. 2 0 
8  Define information procedures  19/02/2010 11:24:00 a.m. 1 100 
9  Define organisation's response objectives  19/02/2010 11:25:00 a.m. 2 75 
10  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 11:26:00 a.m. 2 50 
11  Define organisation's response priorities  19/02/2010 11:28:00 a.m. 3 50 
12  Mobilize physical resources  19/02/2010 11:29:00 a.m. 2 25 
13  Define emergency scenario needs  19/02/2010 11:30:00 a.m. 2 25 
14  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 11:34:00 a.m. 12 50 
15  Contact NZTA regional office  19/02/2010 11:42:00 a.m. 1 50 
16  Deploy human resources (management)  19/02/2010 11:43:00 a.m. 2 50 
17  Projection of future instances  19/02/2010 11:43:00 a.m. 1 25 
18  Mobilize human resources  19/02/2010 11:44:00 a.m. 2 50 
19  Deploy human resources (management)  19/02/2010 11:45:00 a.m. 2 100 
20  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 11:46:00 a.m. 2 100 
21  Define organisation's response priorities  19/02/2010 11:49:00 a.m. 4 0 
22  Projection of future instances  19/02/2010 11:49:00 a.m. 1 50 
23  Check available communication technologies  19/02/2010 11:50:00 a.m. 2 0 
24  Define emergency scenario needs  19/02/2010 11:50:00 a.m. 1 100 
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Participant D  Simulation Start: 12:15:00 p.m   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1  Contact National Emergency Controller  19/02/2010 12:20:00 p.m. 5 50 
2  Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  19/02/2010 12:21:00 p.m. 2 100 
3  Contact NZTA local office  19/02/2010 12:22:00 p.m. 2 50 
4  Enquire Civil Defence  19/02/2010 12:23:00 p.m. 2 25 
5  Contact contractors  19/02/2010 12:23:00 p.m. 1 50 
6  Contact City Councils  19/02/2010 12:24:00 p.m. 2 50 
7  Check available communication technologies  19/02/2010 12:25:00 p.m. 2 75 
8  Contact NZ Police  19/02/2010 12:25:00 p.m. 1 50 
9  Deploy human resources (management)  19/02/2010 12:26:00 p.m. 2 0 
10  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 12:29:00 p.m. 14 25 
11  Mobilize human resources  19/02/2010 12:40:00 p.m. 1 75 
12  Define organisation's response priorities  19/02/2010 12:40:00 p.m. 1 50 
13  Projection of future instances  19/02/2010 12:40:00 p.m. 1 0 
14  Contact consultants  19/02/2010 12:42:00 p.m. 3 75 
15  Enquire Civil Defence  19/02/2010 12:43:00 p.m. 2 100 
16  Check available communication technologies  19/02/2010 12:44:00 p.m. 2 25 
17  Define emergency scenario needs  19/02/2010 12:44:00 p.m. 1 50 
18  Contact NZ Police  19/02/2010 12:45:00 p.m. 2 100 
19  Mobilize human resources  19/02/2010 12:46:00 p.m. 2 100 
20  Mobilize physical resources  19/02/2010 12:47:00 p.m. 2 100 
21  Contact NZTA local office  19/02/2010 12:47:00 p.m. 1 25 
22  Enquire Civil Defence  19/02/2010 12:48:00 p.m. 2 75 
23  Define emergency scenario needs  19/02/2010 12:50:00 p.m. 3 100 
24  Check available communication technologies  19/02/2010 12:51:00 p.m. 2 0 
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Participant E  Simulation Start: 13:23:00 p.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1  Contact Civil Defence  19/02/2010 1:27:00 p.m. 4 50 
2  Contact City Councils  19/02/2010 1:27:00 p.m. 1 50 
3  Contact NZTA regional office  19/02/2010 1:27:00 p.m. 1 50 
4  Contact contractors  19/02/2010 1:28:00 p.m. 2 50 
5  Contact contractors  19/02/2010 1:32:00 p.m. 5 50 
6  Contact NZTA regional office  19/02/2010 1:33:00 p.m. 2 100 
7  Deploy human resources (management)  19/02/2010 1:34:00 p.m. 2 0 
8  Contact NZ Police  19/02/2010 1:35:00 p.m. 2 50 
9  Enquire City Councils  19/02/2010 1:36:00 p.m. 2 25 
10  Contact contractors  19/02/2010 1:38:00 p.m. 3 100 
11  Contact NZTA regional office  19/02/2010 1:38:00 p.m. 1 75 
12  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 1:39:00 p.m. 5 25 
13  Projection of future instances  19/02/2010 1:43:00 p.m. 1 0 
14  Contact Civil Defence  19/02/2010 1:47:00 p.m. 4 75 
15  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 1:47:00 p.m. 1 100 
16  Enquire City Councils  19/02/2010 1:47:00 p.m. 1 100 
17  Contact NZTA regional office  19/02/2010 1:48:00 p.m. 2 50 
18  Projection of future instances  19/02/2010 1:48:00 p.m. 1 25 
19  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  19/02/2010 1:51:00 p.m. 4 100 
20  Enquire contractors  19/02/2010 1:52:00 p.m. 2 75 
21  Contact NZTA regional office  19/02/2010 1:52:00 p.m. 1 25 
22  Contact NZ Police  19/02/2010 1:52:00 p.m. 1 75 
23  Contact NZ Police  19/02/2010 1:53:00 p.m. 2 50 
24  Contact Civil Defence  19/02/2010 1:54:00 p.m. 2 25 
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Participant F  Simulation Start: 9:14:00 a.m.  
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1  Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  1/03/2010 9:17:00 a.m. 3 100 
2  Define organisation's response objectives  1/03/2010 9:19:00 a.m. 3 100 
3  Contact contractors  1/03/2010 9:20:00 a.m. 2 50 
4  Contact Civil Defence  1/03/2010 9:20:00 a.m. 1 50 
5  Enquire contractors  1/03/2010 9:21:00 a.m. 2 25 
6  Mobilize physical resources  1/03/2010 9:22:00 a.m. 2 25 
7  Mobilize human resources  1/03/2010 9:22:00 a.m. 1 75 
8  Contact NZTA regional office  1/03/2010 9:23:00 a.m. 2 100 
9  Contact National Emergency Controller  1/03/2010 9:23:00 a.m. 1 50 
10  Contact consultants  1/03/2010 9:24:00 a.m. 2 100 
11  Contact NZTA national office  1/03/2010 9:24:00 a.m. 1 75 
12  Contact City Councils  1/03/2010 9:24:00 a.m. 1 100 
13  Contact consultants  1/03/2010 9:25:00 a.m. 2 100 
14  Define organisation's response priorities  1/03/2010 9:26:00 a.m. 2 25 
15  Define information procedures  1/03/2010 9:26:00 a.m. 1 50 
16  Check available communication technologies  1/03/2010 9:26:00 a.m. 1 25 
17  Enquire Civil Defence  1/03/2010 9:27:00 a.m. 2 100 
18  Enquire contractors  1/03/2010 9:27:00 a.m. 1 100 
19  Mobilize physical resources  1/03/2010 9:28:00 a.m. 2 100 
20  Mobilize human resources  1/03/2010 9:28:00 a.m. 1 100 
21  Enquire contractors  1/03/2010 9:28:00 a.m. 1 75 
22  Deploy human resources (management)  1/03/2010 9:28:00 a.m. 1 100 
23  Deploy human resources (management)  1/03/2010 9:29:00 a.m. 2 75 
24  Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  1/03/2010 9:29:00 a.m. 6 75 
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Participant G  Simulation Start: 8:45:00 a.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  22/03/2010 8:49:00 a.m. 4 100 
2 Contact City Councils  22/03/2010 8:50:00 a.m. 1 50 
3 Contact NZ Police  22/03/2010 8:50:00 a.m. 1 50 
4 Define organisation's response objectives  22/03/2010 8:51:00 a.m. 1 100 
5 Check available communication technologies  22/03/2010 8:52:00 a.m. 1 75 
6 Define organisation's response priorities  22/03/2010 8:53:00 a.m. 1 75 
7 Enquire contractors  22/03/2010 8:53:00 a.m. 1 25 
8 Mobilize human resources  22/03/2010 8:54:00 a.m. 1 75 
9 Define information procedures  22/03/2010 8:55:00 a.m. 1 100 
10 Contact NZTA local office  22/03/2010 8:55:00 a.m. 1 75 
11 Mobilize physical resources  22/03/2010 8:56:00 a.m. 1 25 
12 Mobilize physical resources  22/03/2010 8:57:00 a.m. 1 25 
13 Projection of future instances  22/03/2010 8:57:00 a.m. 1 0 
14 Mobilize physical resources  22/03/2010 8:59:00 a.m. 2 50 
15 Enquire contractors  22/03/2010 8:59:00 a.m. 1 100 
16 Enquire contractors  22/03/2010 9:00:00 a.m. 1 100 
17 Enquire City Councils  22/03/2010 9:00:00 a.m. 1 100 
18 Enquire Civil Defence  22/03/2010 9:00:00 a.m. 1 100 
19 Mobilize human resources  22/03/2010 9:01:00 a.m. 1 100 
20 Mobilize physical resources  22/03/2010 9:01:00 a.m. 1 100 
21 Mobilize physical resources  22/03/2010 9:02:00 a.m. 1 100 
22 Contact NZ Police  22/03/2010 9:02:00 a.m. 1 75 
23 Check available communication technologies  22/03/2010 9:02:00 a.m. 1 0 
24 Define organisation's response priorities  22/03/2010 9:03:00 a.m. 1 0 
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Participant H  Simulation Start: 9:52:00 a.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1 Contact National Emergency Controller  23/03/2010 9:58:00 a.m. 6 50 
2 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  23/03/2010 9:58:00 a.m. 1 100 
3 Define organisation's response priorities  23/03/2010 9:59:00 a.m. 1 100 
4 Check available communication technologies  23/03/2010 10:00:00 a.m. 1 100 
5 Define information procedures  23/03/2010 10:02:00 a.m. 2 100 
6 Contact NZTA local office  23/03/2010 10:04:00 a.m. 2 100 
7 Contact NZTA regional office  23/03/2010 10:05:00 a.m. 1 100 
8 Mobilize human resources  23/03/2010 10:05:00 a.m. 1 75 
9 Define organisation's response priorities  23/03/2010 10:06:00 a.m. 1 75 
10 Contact NZ Police  23/03/2010 10:07:00 a.m. 1 75 
11 Contact consultants  23/03/2010 10:07:00 a.m. 1 100 
12 Contact contractors  23/03/2010 10:08:00 a.m. 1 100 
13 Contact City Councils  23/03/2010 10:09:00 a.m. 1 100 
14 Enquire Civil Defence  23/03/2010 10:13:00 a.m. 4 100 
15 Enquire consultants  23/03/2010 10:14:00 a.m. 1 100 
16 Enquire contractors  23/03/2010 10:15:00 a.m. 1 100 
17 Enquire City Councils  23/03/2010 10:15:00 a.m. 1 100 
18 Contact Civil Defence  23/03/2010 10:17:00 a.m. 2 75 
19 Mobilize physical resources  23/03/2010 10:19:00 a.m. 2 100 
20 Deploy human resources (management)  23/03/2010 10:19:00 a.m. 1 100 
21 Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  23/03/2010 10:20:00 a.m. 1 100 
22 Mobilize human resources  23/03/2010 10:41:00 a.m. 21 100 
23 Define emergency scenario needs  23/03/2010 10:41:00 a.m. 1 100 
24 Projection of future instances  23/03/2010 10:42:00 a.m. 1 100 
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Participant I  
Simulation Start: 11:05:00 
a.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  23/03/2010 11:09:00 a.m. 4 100 
2 Check available communication technologies  23/03/2010 11:11:00 a.m. 2 100 
3 Contact NZTA regional office  23/03/2010 11:14:00 a.m. 3 50 
4 Define organisation's response priorities  23/03/2010 11:15:00 a.m. 1 100 
5 Contact consultants  23/03/2010 11:17:00 a.m. 2 50 
6 Mobilize human resources  23/03/2010 11:18:00 a.m. 1 75 
7 Mobilize physical resources  23/03/2010 11:21:00 a.m. 3 25 
8 Contact National Emergency Controller  23/03/2010 11:21:00 a.m. 1 100 
9 Define organisation's response objectives  23/03/2010 11:22:00 a.m. 1 75 
10 Contact contractors  23/03/2010 11:24:00 a.m. 2 100 
11 Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  23/03/2010 11:25:00 a.m. 1 25 
12 Contact contractors  23/03/2010 11:34:00 a.m. 9 100 
13 Enquire City Councils  23/03/2010 11:36:00 a.m. 2 50 
14 Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  23/03/2010 11:38:00 a.m. 2 50 
15 Contact National Emergency Controller  23/03/2010 11:41:00 a.m. 3 50 
16 Contact NZTA regional office  23/03/2010 11:42:00 a.m. 1 50 
17 Enquire consultants  23/03/2010 11:43:00 a.m. 1 100 
18 Deploy human resources (management)  23/03/2010 11:43:00 a.m. 1 50 
19 Mobilize human resources  23/03/2010 11:46:00 a.m. 3 100 
20 Deploy human resources (management)  23/03/2010 11:47:00 a.m. 1 100 
21 Enquire contractors  23/03/2010 11:48:00 a.m. 1 75 
22 Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  23/03/2010 11:48:00 a.m. 1 100 
23 Enquire consultants  23/03/2010 11:51:00 a.m. 3 50 
24 Deploy human resources (management)  23/03/2010 11:52:00 a.m. 1 75 
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Participant J  
Simulation Start: 12:08:00 
p.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  23/03/2010 12:14:00 p.m. 6 100 
2 Contact Civil Defence  23/03/2010 12:14:00 p.m. 1 50 
3 Contact consultants  23/03/2010 12:16:00 p.m. 2 50 
4 Contact National Emergency Controller  23/03/2010 12:17:00 p.m. 1 50 
5 Define information procedures  23/03/2010 12:19:00 p.m. 2 100 
6 Check available communication technologies  23/03/2010 12:20:00 p.m. 1 75 
7 Contact NZTA local office  23/03/2010 12:20:00 p.m. 1 100 
8 Mobilize human resources  23/03/2010 12:21:00 p.m. 1 75 
9 Define organisation's response objectives  23/03/2010 12:23:00 p.m. 2 75 
10 Contact Civil Defence  23/03/2010 12:25:00 p.m. 2 100 
11 Define organisation's response priorities  23/03/2010 12:25:00 p.m. 1 50 
12 Mobilize physical resources  23/03/2010 12:26:00 p.m. 1 25 
13 Deploy human resources (management)  23/03/2010 12:27:00 p.m. 1 25 
14 Contact consultants  23/03/2010 12:29:00 p.m. 2 75 
15 Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  23/03/2010 12:30:00 p.m. 1 50 
16 Enquire City Councils  23/03/2010 12:36:00 p.m. 6 100 
17 Enquire Civil Defence  23/03/2010 12:37:00 p.m. 1 100 
18 Contact NZ Police  23/03/2010 12:38:00 p.m. 1 100 
19 Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  23/03/2010 12:40:00 p.m. 2 100 
20 Define emergency scenario needs  23/03/2010 12:43:00 p.m. 3 75 
21 Projection of future instances  23/03/2010 12:45:00 p.m. 2 50 
22 Enquire consultants  23/03/2010 12:45:00 p.m. 1 75 
23 Define information procedures  23/03/2010 12:47:00 p.m. 2 0 
24 Contact NZTA national office  23/03/2010 12:48:00 p.m. 1 0 
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Participant K  
Simulation Start: 13:08:00 
p.m.   
DecisionMakingID  DecisionMaking  Time Time Elapsed Marks 
1 Set up Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)  23/03/2010 1:14:00 p.m. 6 100 
2 Contact National Emergency Controller  23/03/2010 1:15:00 p.m. 1 50 
3 Define emergency scenario needs  23/03/2010 1:15:00 p.m. 1 0 
4 Define organisation's response objectives  23/03/2010 1:15:00 p.m. 1 100 
5 Contact NZTA national office  23/03/2010 1:17:00 p.m. 2 100 
6 Check available communication technologies  23/03/2010 1:18:00 p.m. 1 75 
7 Define organisation's response priorities  23/03/2010 1:18:00 p.m. 1 75 
8 Contact NZ Police  23/03/2010 1:19:00 p.m. 1 50 
9 Mobilize human resources  23/03/2010 1:20:00 p.m. 1 75 
10 Mobilize physical resources  23/03/2010 1:20:00 p.m. 1 25 
11 Contact Civil Defence  23/03/2010 1:22:00 p.m. 2 100 
12 Enquire Civil Defence  23/03/2010 1:22:00 p.m. 1 50 
13 Contact National Emergency Controller  23/03/2010 1:23:00 p.m. 1 75 
14 Contact National Emergency Controller  23/03/2010 1:24:00 p.m. 1 50 
15 Deploy human resources (management)  23/03/2010 1:27:00 p.m. 3 50 
16 Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  23/03/2010 1:27:00 p.m. 1 50 
17 Contact NZ Police  23/03/2010 1:31:00 p.m. 4 100 
18 Define emergency scenario needs  23/03/2010 1:32:00 p.m. 1 50 
19 Contact consultants  23/03/2010 1:33:00 p.m. 1 50 
20 Mobilize physical resources  23/03/2010 1:33:00 p.m. 1 100 
21 Mobilize human resources  23/03/2010 1:33:00 p.m. 1 100 
22 Deploy human resources (management)  23/03/2010 1:34:00 p.m. 1 100 
23 Deploy physical resources (damage repair)  23/03/2010 1:34:00 p.m. 1 75 
24 Contact NZ Police  23/03/2010 1:38:00 p.m. 4 50 
 
 
   
 216 
APPENDIX E – RESOURCE ALLOCATION OPTIMISATION 
ROUTINE CASE STUDY 
A seventeen link road network and a damage scenario were used to assess the estimate resource 
allocation costs (i.e. logistics and response delay) according to the Logistics Model proposed in 
chapter 4. Both network / damage scenario and optimum results are presented as follows after the 
analyses of 2,900 resource deployment scenarios.    
Figure E.1 illustrates the road network and associated damage scenario.  
 
Figure E.1: Road Network and Damage Scenario.  
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Total Logistics Costs (TLC) and Delay Response Costs (DRC) were estimated according to the 
following equations (refer to Chapter 4 for further details). Final results for the thirty optimum 
deployment strategies are presented in Table E.1.   
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  t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 
Strategy ∑LRC ∑DRC ∑DRC ∑DRC ∑DRC ∑DRC ∑DRC 
1 2955.00 463253.79 12483.08 8656.70 5611.56 3199.38 1780.22 
2 2955.00 463253.79 12876.52 9037.66 5986.56 3563.02 2138.43 
3 3330.00 463253.79 10765.75 5419.19 1628.33 363.64 358.21 
4 3330.00 463253.79 11185.91 6118.24 2627.88 1034.00 0.00 
5 3435.00 463253.79 11049.50 5884.40 2083.17 0.00 0.00 
6 2955.00 463253.79 12483.08 8656.70 5611.56 3199.38 1780.22 
7 3030.00 463253.79 11989.49 7810.55 4534.64 2014.77 369.96 
8 3045.00 463253.79 11989.49 7810.55 4534.64 2014.77 369.96 
9 2955.00 463253.79 12483.08 8656.70 5611.56 3199.38 1780.22 
10 3105.00 463253.79 11495.90 6964.40 3457.72 1034.00 0.00 
11 3135.00 463253.79 11495.90 6964.40 3457.72 1034.00 0.00 
12 2955.00 463253.79 12666.68 8656.70 5611.56 3199.38 1780.22 
13 3255.00 463253.79 11049.50 5884.40 2083.17 0.00 0.00 
14 3285.00 463253.79 11049.50 5884.40 2083.17 0.00 0.00 
15 3030.00 463253.79 12382.93 8191.50 4909.64 2378.41 728.17 
16 3045.00 463253.79 12382.93 8191.50 4909.64 2378.41 728.17 
17 3105.00 463253.79 11889.34 7345.35 3832.72 1397.64 358.21 
18 3135.00 463253.79 11889.34 7345.35 3832.72 1397.64 358.21 
19 3255.00 463253.79 11679.50 6964.40 3457.72 1034.00 0.00 
20 3285.00 463253.79 11679.50 6964.40 3457.72 1034.00 0.00 
21 3405.00 463253.79 11049.50 5884.40 2083.17 0.00 0.00 
22 3405.00 463253.79 11049.50 5884.40 2083.17 0.00 0.00 
23 3420.00 463253.79 11049.50 5884.40 2083.17 0.00 0.00 
24 3030.00 463253.79 11989.48 7810.54 4534.63 2014.76 369.96 
25 3120.00 463253.79 11495.89 6964.39 3457.71 1034 0 
26 3120.00 463253.79 11889.34 7345.34 3832.71 1397.63 358.20 
27 3105.00 463253.79 11679.50 6964.39 3457.71 1034.00 0.00 
28 3135.00 463253.79 11679.50 6964.39 3457.71 1034.00 0.00 
29 3270.00 463253.79 11679.50 6964.39 3457.71 1034.00 0.00 
30 3120.00 463253.79 11679.50 6964.39 3457.71 1034.00 0.00 
Table E.1: Total Logistics Costs and Delay Response Costs for 30 Optimum Resource Deployment 
Strategies.  
